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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines metropolitan areas subject to exclusive cruising regula-
tions which prevent taxis affiliated with one city from picking up passengers in other
neighboring cities. It examines the regulatory structure that evolved in North Amer-
ica, compares exclusive cruising regulation to a combined regulatory regime, and
proposes a market-based mechanism to improve upon existing regulations.
The first chapter examines the evolution of regulation of the taxicab industry in
different metropolitan areas in North America. It provides an explanation for the
prevalence of price and quantity regulations at the local level, and why the industry
remains heavily regulated despite numerous attempts at deregulation.
The second chapter theoretically investigates the efficiency of exclusive cruising
regulation when there are multiple exclusive cruising locations in close proximity.
Conventional wisdom suggests it is better to operate a combined regulatory regime,
thereby eliminating the empty return trips that occur under exclusive cruising reg-
ulation. Under combined regulation, however, drivers have an incentive to be in the
location with the highest expected revenue. It is shown that this can undermine
regulators’ control over the allocation of taxis across disparate locations, outweigh-
ing losses from empty return trips. In such situations exclusive cruising regulation
iv
would be preferred to combined regulation. When locations are sufficiently similar,
it is shown that combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising.
The third chapter proposes a regulatory exchange market as an alternative to
existing regulatory structures. The proposed mechanism maintains separate affili-
ations, but allows taxi drivers to exchange the right to pick up passengers in each
others’ affiliated location by participating in a bilateral market. In this market, taxis
can exchange the right to pick up passengers in each others’ affiliated locations, for a
price paid by market participants affiliated with one location to those affiliated with
the other location. It is shown that such an exchange market can be designed to
achieve superior outcomes to both exclusive cruising regulation and combined regu-
lation modes. We describe situations where the regulatory exchange market cannot
be dominated by any other conceivable regulatory mechanism.
v
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1Chapter 1
Regulation of the Taxicab Industry
21.1 Introduction
The North American taxicab industry is highly regulated, frequently including both
price and quantity regulation. A casual glance at the industry suggests it is an
industry that would foster competition. There are few specialized skills needed to
drive a taxi, and the cost of entering the industry is relatively low. All that is needed
to enter is a suitable vehicle and metering equipment. In cities where the primary
mode of contracting is through a dispatcher, entrants also need to incur the modest
cost of acquiring dispatching technology. Despite these low costs of entry, the taxi
industry is one of the more highly regulated industries. The goal of this chapter is to
examine the regulation of the North American taxicab industry and the justifications
for its regulatory structure.
Taxi regulation started in the 1920s and 1930s. Over time cities adopted price
and quantity regulation. There was a movement to deregulate the industry in the
1970s and 1980s; however, this movement has been reversed. Most municipalities
that deregulated their taxicab industries reintroduced some of the regulations they
eliminated. The current regulatory structure in most jurisdictions, even the ones that
experimented with deregulation, includes some form of price and quantity regulation.
We provide a general overview of taxi regulation, drawing examples from the
regulatory structures that exist in three metropolitan areas; New York City, the
Boston Metropolitan area, and Los Angeles. We summarize the regulations that
exist in each of these cities. Each of these cities is a major taxi market and has
different regulatory structures. New York City and Los Angeles divide the city into
multiple regulatory locations, limiting where taxis affiliated with particular locations
can pick up passengers. The Boston metropolitan area has similar regulations that
occur because there are multiple jurisdictions that each prevent taxis from picking
3up passengers in each other’s affiliated locations. New York City allows entry at the
taxi level while Los Angeles allows entry at the firm level.
Regulations can be categorized as price regulation, entry restrictions, service-level
regulation, safety and quality of service regulation, and regulation aimed at accom-
plishing other objectives. The price regulation often consists of a regulated fare, with
drivers having little flexibility to offer different prices. Entry is typically restricted
directly, by restricting the total number of taxis, or indirectly, by restricting the
number of firms. Service-level regulation often includes regulations that require min-
imum levels of service or restrict where taxis can pick up passengers. Municipalities
often impose regulations that ensure taxis are operated safely and meet a minimum
standard of quality. Regulations are also implemented with the goal of accomplishing
social objectives.
When looking at the normative justifications for the observed taxi regulations, the
nature of the search process is an important consideration. Passengers and drivers
are at different locations and need to coordinate with each other in order to contract.
Taxi service is typically contracted using one of three methods; drivers cruising the
street searching for passengers, passengers and drivers meeting each other at taxi
stands, or passengers contacting drivers through a dispatcher. The characteristics of
a city will influence the proportion of each of the methods of contracting used.
Under each method of contracting, the number of vacant taxis affects the value
of taxi service. By increasing the vacancy rate, the passengers’ expected wait times
decrease. In each of the three contracting modes, the price and vacancy rate will
not be chosen efficiently. Under the cruising and taxi stand methods of contracting,
bargaining will be inefficient, since the vacancy rate is not explicitly chosen through
the contracting process. Under the dispatch model, vacancy creates economies of
4scale, which make it efficient for a small number of firms to offer service. When there
are a small number of firms, market power is problematic. The resulting price will
be too high and the number of vacant taxis each firm chooses will be too low.
While bargaining and competition-based arguments are sufficient to justify price
regulation, they are not sufficient to justify quantity regulation. If bargaining issues
were the only friction, regulators could choose a regulated price and allow free en-
try. In most municipalities with quantity regulation, however, firms make positive
economic profit. An externality cause by taxi traffic and a preference towards driver
profit could each lead to quantity regulation being preferred to free-entry. If the driv-
ing process creates a sufficiently large externality on surrounding traffic, the price
and quantity regulations we see in practice could be justified. The regulator having
a sufficiently large preference towards driver profits could also cause the regulator to
prefer quantity regulation.
Service-level regulation is typically geared towards increasing the number of taxis
during off-peak hours and in low demand locations. When demand differs over
time or by location, the outcome may not be efficient. It may be beneficial to use
the profit from the high demand period to offset losses in the low demand period.
Minimum service level regulations can be used to ensure that decent levels of service
are provided in off-peak periods. In cruising environments, taxis have an incentive
to search for passengers in high demand locations. Exclusive cruising regulations
can be used to ensure adequate service in low demand locations, thereby increasing
surplus.
Municipalities frequently have regulation geared towards improving safety and
quality of service. Safety regulations are often justified because safety is difficult
to observe and an unsafe environment places externalities on surrounding drivers.
5The presence of price and quantity regulations means that in the absence of quality
regulations, quality levels will be inefficient. The bargaining process may not lead
to an efficient level of quality. In a cruising environment, quality levels will be too
low. In a taxi stand environment, the bargaining process will typically lead to an
inefficient level of quality.
While there are economic arguments that may justify the regulatory structure,
there are costs of imposing the common types of regulations we see in the taxi
industry. Consumers and drivers are negatively affected by the quantity regulation;
facing higher prices and lower service levels. When there are restrictions on the
number of taxis that can operate, fewer drivers are hired and the equilibrium wage
drivers receive is lower. The regulatory structure also limits the ability for the price
and quantity to respond to the changes in demand.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 we look at the
history of taxi regulation in North America. In Section 1.3 we look at the types of
regulatory frameworks typically present in North American municipalities, focusing
attention to the institutions in three major North American metropolitan areas. In
Section 1.4 we look at modes of contracting for service in taxi markets. In Section
1.5 we look at normative justifications for the regulations. In Section 1.6, we look at
the cost of these regulations. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 History of Regulation and Deregulation
Regulation of the taxicab industry has historical roots in the regulation of horse-
drawn carriages in London. The regulations put in place by the London Hackney
Carriage Act of 1831 (London, 1831) have many similarities to modern taxi regu-
lation. Like modern taxi regulation, the act required carriages to obtain a license
6in order to contract with passengers on the street. The act imposed a maximum
fare that drivers could charge their passengers. The regulations also require drivers
provide non-discriminatory service. Drivers could not refuse any passenger willing
to pay the fare. There were basic elements of service level regulation, including the
requirement that drivers treat passengers in a courteous manner.
Before the industry was regulated, there was a large amount of entry and exit.
In New York City, between 1923 and 1930, the number of taxis that operated in a
given year changed by an average of 10.8% a year in absolute terms (Shreiber, 1975).
The number of drivers tended to vary counter-cyclically with economic output (Davis,
1998). Both high prices (Shreiber, 1975; Dempsey, 1996) and low prices (Davis, 1998)
have been suggested as initial motivations for regulation of the taxi industry. When
high prices were present, they often coincided with low occupancy rates (Shreiber,
1975).
The movement to regulate the North American taxi industry originated in the
1920s. The movement to regulate the taxi industry had a number of supporters.
Before New York City regulated the taxi industry, various New York City Mayor’s
committees suggested that the occupancy rates were too low and that reasonable
levels of service could be provided with 70% to 80% of the taxis that were in op-
eration at the time (Shreiber, 1975). Established companies were pushing for more
regulation in the taxi industry (Davis, 1998). Both taxi companies and mass trans-
portation companies were concerned about competition from ride-sharing services
(Davis, 1998). Regulation proposed by the taxi industry generally included required
metering technology.
Taxi regulation started to become common in North American cities in the 1930s
(Dempsey, 1996). Regulation was originally delegated to either state governments
7or municipal governments, depending on the jurisdiction. Over time, regulatory
decisions have increasingly been carried out at the municipal level, typically including
price and quantity regulation. Regulation also limited the tasks that drivers were
able to carry out, limiting or eliminating ride sharing options. Regulations placed
restrictions on the characteristics of vehicles used for providing taxi service, often
requiring that taxis were equipped with specific metering technology. Regulation
was also geared towards ensuring that certain standards were met for the drivers,
including maximum work days and minimum wages (Davis, 1998).
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a movement to deregulate the taxi industry. The
structure of deregulation varied by city with some cities removing entry restrictions
while others eliminated both their price and entry restrictions. A majority of the
cities that deregulated their industry, chose to reintroduce regulation (Dempsey,
1996). Business groups were among groups that advocated the return to regulation.1
Business groups were concerned that the quality of service deteriorated in cities that
deregulated the taxi industry (Frankena and Pautler, 1986).
Municipalities that deregulated price saw little competition at taxi stands (Schaller,
2007; Teal and Berglund, 1987). The expectation that passengers take the next
available taxi continued to prevail, resulting in limited price competition.2 In the
municipalities where the price continue to be regulated, many of the new entrants
went to taxi stands at hotels and airports (Teal and Berglund, 1987), and had a neg-
ligible impact on service levels. In municipalities where the price was deregulated,
prices increased more in municipalities that mostly relied on cruising and taxi stands
1Atlanta and Fresno were among the cities that experimented with deregulation and then rein-
troduced regulation after complaints from business groups (Frankena and Pautler, 1986). Atlanta
had experimented with open entry while Fresno had eliminated price and entry restrictions.
2Williams (1980) said that this norm is not present in Melbourne, and that the experience there
with a deregulated price was generally positive.
8for contracting than they did in municipalities which mostly relied on dispatch. In
some cities, there was a substantial increase in the rate of refusals of service and no
shows that coincided with the deregulation process (Teal and Berglund, 1987). The
reversal of deregulation resulted in a movement back to quantity controls and price
regulation (Schaller, 2007).
Cities, such as Boston and New York City, that did not deregulate their industry
were often seen as being slow to adjust their medallion levels. In each of these cities,
medallion levels did not change in response to changing economic conditions. In
New York City, the number of medallions remained the same between 1941 and 2006
(Ashenfelter et al., 2010). Despite the number of medallions remaining fixed, the
price was periodically increased to take into account the economic circumstances.
1.3 The Structure of Regulation
There are similarities in the structure of regulation across municipalities. Most mu-
nicipalities regulate taxi fares, frequently requiring drivers adhere to a specific fare
structure. Regulators frequently place restrictions limiting the number of taxicabs
that are able to provide service, placing restrictions at the firm-level or taxi-level. In
some cities, regulation is aimed at ensuring that adequate service levels are achieved
in off-peak and low demand locations. Municipalities have a number of regulations
aimed at improving service quality. There are other forms of regulation, these reg-
ulations are usually aimed at accomplishing social goals. In each of these areas, we
provide a general characterization of the types of regulations that exist.
Taxicab regulation varies from one city to another; therefore, we also look at
the regulations that exist in three major American metropolitan areas; New York
9City, the Boston metropolitan area, and Los Angeles.3 We choose to examine these
metropolitan areas because they offer a range of regulatory frameworks. They also
each have a form of local exclusive cruising regulation, regulations that divide the
metropolitan area up in separate regulatory affiliations and restrict where taxis of a
given affiliation are able to pick up passengers.
1.3.1 Price Regulation
Municipalities typically enact price regulation. This regulation frequently requires
drivers adhere to a prescribed fare structure which includes a fixed component for en-
tering the taxi, a variable component for distance traveled, and a variable component
for time spent idle. Municipal regulators may also have extra charges for additional
services. These charges include extra fees for trips to and from the airport, handling
luggage, having additional passengers, and using taxi services during specific times
of the day. Los Angeles and the Boston metropolitan area both have fees that taxis
pay when they leave from or arrive at the airport. New York City places a surcharge
based on the time of day, charging a higher rate in the evening rush hour and during
the night.
Some localities with a regulated fare structure give drivers limited flexibility in
setting their fares. Los Angeles allows drivers to offer a senior’s discount of up to
10%. Cambridge allows taxis to offer a discount of up to 25% on trips to the airport,
making their fares more competitive with companies offering airport transportation
services.
3Information regarding the rules and regulations in each of the metropolitan areas come from
the rules published by the cities. The regulations for New York come from New York City Taxi
& Limousine Comission (2015a) and New York City Taxi & Limousine Comission (2015b). The
regulations in the Boston metropolitan area come from Boston Police Department (2008), City of
Cambridge License Comittee (2012), and Town of Brookline Transportation Board (2013). The
regulations for Los Angeles come from City of Los Angeles (2014).
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Other models of pricing exist but are less common. Zone pricing divides the
city up into zones, calculating the total price based on the zones that drivers drive
through. Zone pricing existed in Washington DC up until 2008, but has since been
discarded for the typical fare structure (Sabar, 2008). The zone structure is more
common for long trips outside the service area. Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline
use zone rates for trips to cities outside of the Boston metropolitan area. Los Angeles
uses a fixed price for trips from the airport to downtown Los Angeles. New York
City uses a fixed rate for all trips from the airport.
Some municipalities choose not to have a regulated fare structure. These munic-
ipalities may impose a maximum price to prevent opportunistic behaviors by taxi
drivers or may choose not that have any restrictions on prices. Phoenix is one of the
only major cities in North America that has a deregulated price.
1.3.2 Entry Regulation
Entry can be regulated at the driver level or at the firm level. When entry is regulated
at the driver level, individual drivers can enter the industry. When entry is regulated
at the firm level, only firms meeting specific standards can enter. These standards
may include providing dispatch service, having a minimum fleet size, and providing
service for a minimum number of hours each day. Regardless of whether entrance is
carried out at the driver level or firm level, regulators can choose whether to restrict
entry.
At the driver level, entry is frequently restricted using medallions. Each medal-
lion grants its owner the right to drive a single taxi in the regulator’s jurisdiction.
Medallions are transferable assets that can be bought or sold, typically having a
positive selling price. In many municipalities, the medallion price is so high that few
11
drivers can afford to own medallions. In these municipalities, drivers typically enter
into a contract with the medallion owners allowing the use of the owners’ medallion
in exchange for a payment.
At the firm level, entry is typically restricted using “public convenience and ne-
cessity” regulations. Under these regulations, taxi companies need to show that their
entrance would provide sufficient benefit to the public. In a regulated environment,
potential entrants would be required to show that their entrance would sufficiently
decrease the wait time or increase service quality. Depending on the regulator’s in-
terpretation of “public convenience and necessity”, this could make entrance quite
difficult. Regulators may also place restrictions on the fleet sizes of established firms.
Schaller (2007) categorizes entry regulation of 43 North American municipalities
based on whether entry is at the driver or firm level and whether entry is restricted.4
There were only four cities in his survey that allowed entry of taxicabs at the in-
dividual level and did not restrict entry; Washington (DC), Phoenix, Indianapolis,
and Orange County (FL). There were only two cities in his survey that only allowed
entry at the firm level but did not restrict the entry of firms, Orange County(CA)
and San Jose. The remaining 37 municipalities had some form of entry restriction;
21 choosing entry restrictions at the driver level and 16 choosing entry restrictions
at the firm level.
Of the cities we investigate, there is a mixture of driver level entry restrictions and
firm level entry restrictions. Each of the cities choose policies that restrict the number
of firms. Los Angeles and Brookline restrict entry at the firm level, while Boston,
Cambridge and New York City have a medallion system. Brookline is considering
4Schaller (2007) listed regulatory structure for 43 cities of the largest cities in North America.
It includes the number of taxis in each location, whether entry is restricted, whether there are
restrictions on where taxis can pick up passengers, and the role of independents, and conditions for
entry of new firms.
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moving from firm-level entry restrictions to a medallion system. Revenue from the
sales of medallions appears to be one of the factors motivating this consideration
(Safer et al., 2014).
1.3.3 Service-level Regulation
Some municipalities require companies to provide adequate levels of service. Service
level regulation typically takes one of two forms: minimum service level regulation
and exclusive cruising regulation. Minimum service regulation requires companies
maintain minimum levels of service, either requiring companies provide service suffi-
ciently quick or requiring companies maintain a sufficiently large number of operating
taxis. The town of Brookline requires that dispatchers provide service within a suffi-
ciently short period of time as a condition of being licensed to provide service. New
York City has regulations requiring taxis operate for a minimum number of hours.
Taxis belonging to fleets must operate at least 18 hours a day. These regulations are
aimed at ensuring adequate service levels at all times of the day and over all parts
of the municipality.
Exclusive cruising regulations occur when a taxi market is divided into multiple
affiliated locations, with restrictions placed on which drivers can pick up passengers
in a given affiliation. Exclusive cruising regulation may occur when municipalities
prevent drivers affiliated with other municipalities from picking up passengers. Alter-
natively, a single municipality may choose to subdivide the municipality into multiple
affiliated locations, restricting which areas the drivers can pick up passengers. Single
municipalities may choose to do this because to they ensure that each affiliation has
a sufficient number of available taxicabs.
In the Boston metropolitan area, exclusive cruising occurs due to multiple mu-
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nicipalities being in close proximity. Each municipality has regulations preventing
taxis affiliated with other municipalities from picking up passengers. Taxis frequently
make trips from each of these municipalities to the others. Taxis that drive a pas-
senger from one municipality to another will not be able to pick up passengers at
their destination. They will have to return to their original municipality in order to
pick up another passenger.
Los Angeles and New York City specifically chose to divide their city into mul-
tiple affiliated locations, placing restrictions on where taxis can pick up passengers.
Los Angeles subdivides its municipality into multiple zones. Each taxi company is
affiliated with a subset of the zones. Taxis are not able to cruise for passengers
outside their affiliated zones. While regulations do not prevent taxi companies from
providing dispatch services to customers outside of their affiliated locations, the city
imposes a number of regulations aimed at reducing the amount of dispatch service
provided to unaffiliated locations. Taxi companies are prevented from advertising
outside of their zone and required to have a phone number with an area code that
is associated with their zone. Companies also have the right to refer passengers to
taxi firms that are affiliated with the passenger’s location.
New York City recently adopted exclusive cruising regulation. Traditionally, New
York City had one type of taxi that provided service to the entire city. Due to high
demand in the inner city, most of the yellow taxis were located in central Manhattan.
The service levels in the outer boroughs of the city were too low, leading to unlicensed
vehicles providing service in these areas. In an effort to combat the illegal market and
provide adequate service to the outer boroughs, the municipality adopted regulations
that created a medallion class that is only able to serve the outer boroughs of the
city. These “Street Hail Livery Service” vehicles are painted an apple green color
14
and are only able to provide service to the outer portions of the city. The Yellow
taxis continue to be able to provide service to the entire city. Beyond the service
areas being different, the Street Hail Livery Service Vehicles have the same general
regulatory structure.5
1.3.4 Safety and Quality of Service Regulation
Municipalities have regulations aimed at increasing the safety of passengers and
other drivers on the road. Basic safety regulations apply to drivers and taxicabs,
resembling the regulations in other transportation industries. Municipalities impose
additional regulations aimed at improving the quality of aspects of the service that
are easily observable, such as the cleanliness of the taxi.
Municipalities typically require drivers have a license, have a clean driving record,
and pass a training and certification course in order to drive a taxi. Drivers are also
required to have a background check, with major incidents excluding drivers from
the possibility of employment. Regulations requiring drivers have insurance are also
quite common. These regulations are in place in most cities, including all the cities
that we examine. Cities may impose additional requirements aimed at improving
safety. In Los Angeles and New York City, drivers are subject to periodic controlled
substance testing. Drivers that test positive for controlled substances are suspended
from being licensed to drive a taxi. Boston requires that taxi drivers have been in
the possession of an American driver’s license for at least two years.
There are also regulations aimed at ensuring that taxicabs are in good working
order. Most municipalities require that taxis have vehicle inspections, often at a
rate that is more frequent than regular passenger cars. All the cities we look at
5There are some differences in the medallion ownership structure; however, most regulations
affecting consumers are the same for both types of taxis.
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require regular inspections. Taxis in New York City are subject to inspections every
4 months. Taxis in Brookline and Cambridge are subject to inspections every six
months.6 Taxis in Los Angeles are subject to inspections every year. Regulations
in most municipalities have a maximum permissible vehicle age. The maximum age
varies by municipality. Los Angeles and Cambridge have 5 year maximum taxi age.7
Boston taxis are able to operate for up to 6 years with owner-operators being able
to operate their taxi for an additional year.
Most municipalities have regulations ensuring that a minimum level of service is
maintained. Most municipalities require drivers have adequate English skills. Drivers
are frequently required to maintain a certain standard of appearance. This require-
ment ranges from Brookline’s requirement that drivers “be clean in person and dress”
to Los Angeles’s restrictions on the types of clothes that drivers can wear. Drivers are
also required to keep their taxi clean and in good physical shape. Brookline requires
that taxis are clean. Boston requires that the inside and outside of the taxi is washed
daily. In Los Angeles vehicle can be taken out of service because of “unsightly dirt,
grime and stains inside and out including trunk”.
Municipalities often place restrictions on the nature of vehicles that can be use
to provide taxi service. These regulations include requiring the appearance and
dimensions of the taxicabs meet certain standards. These standards ensure that
taxis are easily identifiable.8 Regulators frequently restrict the characteristics of the
vehicle, ensuring that the vehicle has adequate space for passengers. Regulation
of finer details, such as the amount and type of advertising that is permissible on
the inside of taxicabs, is also common. The cities we look at all have limits on
6Boston requires “periodic inspections”.
7In Los Angeles, there are some minor exceptions this requirement.
8In addition to making it easier for passengers to find taxis, this also helps to distinguish taxis
from illegal transport vehicles, making it easier to enforce regulation.
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advertisements on and inside the vehicle.
Since all of the cities we look at have exclusive cruising regulation, having regu-
lations that distinguish taxis of a particular affiliation from other taxis is important.
Los Angeles requires that taxis conform to an approved vehicle coloring scheme,
with the company name and telephone number on the vehicle. Taxis in New York
City are all painted yellow or green, corresponding to their medallion type. Boston,
Cambridge, and Brookline each require that taxis have their affiliated municipality’s
name on the outside of the taxi.
Regulations for electronic payment are also common in taxi regulation. Munici-
palities often require that taxis have this equipment. Regulations also either prevent
or limit the surcharge that drivers can charge for the use of the payment mecha-
nisms. All the cities that we look at require that drivers accept electronic payments.
In addition to the card based payment systems in New York, taxis are also required
to have a display panel that shows the current fare and the location of the taxi.
1.3.5 Other Regulations
Regulators typically enact regulations aimed at providing non-discriminatory ser-
vice. The regulated fare structure typically requires drivers charge all passengers the
same fare, regardless of their characteristics. In addition to the non-discriminatory
fare structure, regulators frequently require that taxi service is non-discriminatory.
Drivers are required to drive passengers to their desired destination, regardless of the
location. These regulations exist in all the cities that we looked at; however, drivers
have been known to refuse fares on unprofitable trips. In areas that are subject to
exclusive cruising, drivers have a stronger incentive to discriminate when passengers
demand trips to unaffiliated locations.
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There are regulations aimed at accomplishing social goals. These regulations
tend to be more diverse. In some municipalities, regulations require that a certain
number of taxis have specialized equipment to assist individuals with disabilities.
These regulations are present in Brookline, where a portion of each fleet must have
this equipment. New York City collects taxes on each fare, and provides subsidies
to buyers of taxis with equipment that improves accessibility.
Municipalities often have regulations aimed at ensuring that outcomes are eq-
uitable. These regulations include regulations aimed at ensuring that drivers make
a sufficiently high wage. Cambridge requires drivers on commission receive a suffi-
ciently large share of total receipts. New York City has maximum rates that taxicab
owners can charge drivers for leasing vehicles and medallions. Regulations are also
aimed at subsidizing service to certain groups. Brookline requires that Brookline-
based taxis offer passengers a seniors discount. Boston also provides subsidies to
seniors.
Municipalities enact regulations creating incentives for taxis to be environmen-
tally friendly. In order to increase the use of environmentally friendly vehicles, Boston
has more relaxed regulations on the minimum passenger space in hybrid vehicles.
Cambridge and New York also provide incentives for taxis to be environmentally
friendly.
1.4 Contracting Structure of Taxi Markets
Search considerations are important for both passengers and drivers. During the
search process, passengers incur the cost of waiting for drivers, the cost of contacting
drivers, and, if applicable, the cost of walking to the location where they meet drivers.
The number of unoccupied taxis decreases each of these costs. Drivers are concerned
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about the time it takes to find passengers, the cost of contracting with the passenger,
and the cost of driving to the passengers location.
There are three methods that passengers and drivers use to contact each other.
Taxis can cruise the street looking for passengers, taxis and passengers can meet each
other at taxi stands, and passengers can use a dispatch service to contact drivers.
Each of these modes of contracting imposes different types of costs on the passengers
and drivers. The extent that each of the methods is prevalent in a particular city will
depend on the characteristics of the city and the choices of regulators that support
or impede particular methods of contracting.
Taxis using the cruising method of contracting drive around the city searching
for passengers. A passenger desiring taxi service signals the cruising taxi, and the
taxi picks the passenger up. The taxi drives the passenger to the passenger’s desired
location. Cruising taxis can choose the location where they search for passengers and
will focus their search on locations with a higher likelihood of finding a passenger.
Despite being able to direct their search, drivers do not know the exact location of
passengers and will not always drive in the direction up the nearest passenger.
Taxi stands are predefined locations for passengers and drivers to meet. Taxi
stands usually have a place for drivers to wait when they arrive and find no available
passengers. Drivers and passengers go to the stand knowing that there is a reasonably
high number of trips originating from the location. Taxi stands can be set up by
local governments, at places on public streets and airports, or by private companies,
at places like malls and hotels. Taxi stands are stationed at these locations because
there is a high density of nearby passengers.
In dispatch markets, passengers contact a dispatcher. Dispatchers have tradi-
tionally been contacted via telephone, but it is increasingly common for dispatching
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Figure 1.1: Modes of Contracting
to be done using smartphone technology. Once contacted, the dispatcher sends a
driver to pick up the passenger at her location. The dispatched taxi drives straight
to the passengers’ location. When there are multiple dispatchers available, the pas-
senger’s wait time is determined by the location of the vacant taxis of the contacted
dispatcher. The passenger may not have contacted the dispatcher with closest the
taxi.
A graphic representation of the different modes of contracting is shown in Figure
1.1. We look at the behavior of a single passenger (P) and driver (D). Under the
cruising mode of contracting, drivers search for passengers by cruising the streets.
Since the drivers do not know where the passengers are, the drivers will not choose
the most efficient route to pick up the passenger. Under the taxi stand mode of
contracting the driver and passenger meet at the location of the taxi stand. Typically,
both the driver and the passenger have to travel to the taxi stand. Under dispatch,
the driver takes the shortest path to the passengers location.
Under each of the modes of transport, increasing the number of vacant taxis
benefits consumers. A larger number of vacant cruising taxis decreases the time it
takes a cruising taxicab to drive by a passenger. A large number of vacant taxis at
taxi stands decreases the probability that passengers will have to wait for taxis when
arriving at a stand. In the event that taxi stands are always full, new taxi stands
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can be introduced by cities and private organizations, decreasing the passengers cost
of traveling to the stand. Under the dispatch model, more vacant taxis decreases the
expected distance of the nearest unoccupied taxi.9
To illustrate the sources of inefficiency under each of these systems, we use the
situation where drivers know where passengers are located as a reference. We assume
that the nearest vacant driver goes directly to the passenger’s location.10 Under the
cruising mode of contracting, the driver searching for the passenger takes an indirect
route to the passenger’s location. Passengers have to wait longer to contract with
a vacant taxi. The vacant drivers also take longer finding passengers, resulting in
a lower expected occupancy rate and expected profit. The process of searching for
passengers places an external cost on other drivers.
Under the taxi stand mode of contracting, both the driver and passenger go
directly to the taxi stand. Both the passenger and the driver incur the cost of
getting to the taxi stand. Since the passenger has to walk to the taxi stand, if there
is no taxi stand nearby, this cost could be quite high. Taxi stands will also typically
have a queue. Taxis or passengers may wait at the stand for the other party to arrive.
It is common in airports, for instance, to have a large number of taxis waiting for
passengers. The government or owner of the taxi stand will also incur the cost of
providing the space for the taxi stand.11
Under the dispatch mode of contracting, the passenger incurs a cost of contacting
the dispatcher. A driver affiliated with the dispatcher goes directly to the passenger’s
location. When there are multiple dispatchers, the driver that picks up the passenger
may not be the closest driver to the passenger’s location. The passenger’s wait time
9This is true provided the vacant taxis are associated with the dispatcher the passenger contacts.
10This is not the first best allocation of taxis. When deciding which taxi to send to a passenger,
the planner would concerned about the residual distribution of taxis (Arnott, 1996).
11Taxi stands may create benefits for the owners and surrounding businesses.
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and the drivers cost are higher than they would be when the closest driver picks up the
passenger. The dispatching company also incur the cost of purchasing, maintaining,
and operating the dispatch system.
Due to the differences in the sources of inefficiency under the three modes of con-
tracting, there is a tendency for different types of contracting to be used in different
situations. Cruising and taxi stands will be more prominent in high-density areas.
When the density of passengers is sufficiently high, the losses that result from the
indirect route that occurs under cruising will be small. Since cruising will be prof-
itable when drivers can find passengers in a reasonable amount of time, taxis will
cruise in areas where there is a large density of passengers. Cruising will tend to be
more prevalent in locations such as city centers.
A high density of passengers is needed nearby a taxi stand for the stand to be
viable. Since a minimal rate of arrival of passengers is necessary to make waiting
for passengers at taxi stands viable for drivers, there has to be a sufficiently large
number of passengers within walking distance. Taxi stands will tend to be established
at airports, hotels, and malls, because there are a large number of passengers nearby.
Governments and businesses have an incentive to build taxi stands to make traveling
from these locations easier.
Dispatching will tend to occur in areas with low population densities. Dispatch
performs better than cruising when there is a low population density. The time it
takes for a passenger to find a taxi is inversely proportional to the density of vacant
taxis under cruising and inversely proportional to the square root of the density
of taxis of the contacted dispatcher under dispatch (Arnott, 1996). As a result,
dispatching becomes more appealing as the density of passengers decreases. When
the density of passengers is low, taxi stands are also not viable. Drivers do not want
22
to wait at taxi stands for long periods of time and passengers do not want to walk
long distances.
1.5 Theoretical Justifications for Regulation
In this section, we look at the normative justifications of the regulations discussed in
Section 1.3. We start by looking at a deregulated environment where taxis are free
to choose prices, and discuss normative factors that could lead to price regulation
being desirable. Given that the price is regulated, we discuss normative justifications
for quantity regulation. We then look at normative justifications for service-level
regulation and quality of service regulation in the context of price and quantity
regulation.
1.5.1 Price Regulation
When passengers and drivers contract through cruising or at a taxi stand, the avail-
ability of unoccupied taxis depends on the aggregate decisions by all drivers. The
vacancy rate will be chosen as an aggregate decision, and will not directly be chosen
as part of the bargaining process. Since the price is chosen indirectly, the bargaining
process could lead to a price that is either too low or two high. When taxis are con-
tracted through a dispatcher, the dispatch companies are able to receive the benefit
from choosing a higher number of vacant taxis, as they can quote a shorter wait time
and charge a higher price. The nature of vacancy creates economies of scale, making
it so that competition will not lead to the efficient outcome. In each of these cases,
price regulation can improve efficiency.
A standard result of the cruising literature is that there is a range of prices and
vacancy rates that have zero profit (Douglas, 1972). The bargaining process will
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determine which equilibrium is chosen. Many have argued that the drivers have
much stronger price setting ability (Douglas, 1972; Cairns and Liston-Heyes, 1996).
When drivers have price setting ability, everyone will be excluded from the market
(Cairns and Liston-Heyes, 1996). Passengers incur a search cost in order to look for
a taxi. Given that the passenger has incurred the search cost, the driver can charge
a slightly higher price than the passenger was expecting to pay. Since search costs
are sunk, the passenger would still be willing to accept the fare. This means that
the only equilibrium has no taxi service.
In a bargaining environment where the passenger has bargaining power, the out-
come may still be inefficient. When a passenger and driver meet, they bargain over
the price. If they agree to a price then the driver takes the passenger to the pas-
senger’s desired location, otherwise the driver searches for other passengers and the
passenger searches for other drivers. The price they bargain to is based on their
bargaining power and their outside option. In a single price equilibrium, the price
that they bargain to is the expected future price. Entrance ensures that drivers make
zero profit. In this environment, the equilibrium price could either be too low or too
high (Flath, 2006).
The price and vacancy levels will tend to be too high when the driver has suf-
ficiently large bargaining power and they will be too low when the passenger has
sufficiently large bargaining power. In general, there is no reason to expect that the
distribution of bargaining power will lead to the efficient outcome. Since drivers are
likely to repeat the bargaining process frequently, they will likely have a substantial
share of the bargaining power. This suggests that a maximum price may be useful
for solving bargaining issues (Frankena and Pautler, 1986).
In addition to the inefficient price and vacancy rate under cruising, the bargaining
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process is likely to create a congestion externality. In order to contract over service,
the driver and passenger have to reach an agreement. While they are in the process
of bargaining, the driver remains idle and obstructs the flow of surrounding traffic.
The combination inefficiencies as a result of the bargaining process and the external
cost of bagaining provide a normative justification for price regulation in markets
that heavily rely on cruising.
When passengers and drivers contract using taxi stands, the bargaining process
depends on the norms that are used when bargaining. If there is an expectation
that the passenger chooses the first taxi in line, then this gives significant bargaining
power to the drivers. In this case, we would expect that the price would be above the
efficient price, and the number of unoccupied taxis would be too high. When this
first-in first-out norm is not as strong, the price that the passenger and driver will
bargain to depends on the relative bargaining strength of each party, the number of
individuals on each side of the market, and future expectations. As in the cruising
environment, the bargaining power may lead to a price that is either too low or too
high.
Dispatchers can choose both the price and the number of vacant taxis, taking into
account the effect of vacancy on wait time. In a dispatch environment, passengers can
choose between competing dispatchers, and will contact the dispatcher that provides
the highest net benefit. The bargaining issues that occur in the cruising and taxi
stand modes of contracting will not be problematic.
There are economies of scale in dispatch due to the cost of acquiring the dispatch
technology and the cost of maintaining specific vacancy rates. Acquiring the dispatch
technology imposes a fixed cost. The stochastic nature of the dispatching calls also
leads to economies of scale in hiring dispatch operators. If a business has twice as
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many customers and twice as many operators, the probability of an operator being
unavailable decreases. Two operators can handle more than twice the number of
passengers that one operator.
There are also economies of scale in the cost of maintaining specific wait times.
To maintain a given wait time, there needs to be a certain number of available taxis,
regardless of the total number of trips an operator makes. The cost of maintaining
a given number of vacant taxis remains the same as the quantity of taxis increases,
creating economies of scale. The economies of scale in vacancy tend to be large. The
combined economies of scale from the fixed cost of the dispatch technology and fixed
cost of maintaining a given service level means that the market outcome will generally
be inefficient. In the dispatch environment, entry restrictions and a regulated price
could increase efficiency.
1.5.2 Entry Regulation
Quantity regulations typically restrict the number of taxicabs that are able to oper-
ate in a municipality. Given the presence of price regulation, quantity restrictions
cannot be justified by bargaining frictions, in the cruising and taxi stand modes of
contracting, or market power, in the dispatch model of contracting. In absence of
other frictions, the optimal regulation can be achieved without regulating quantity.
We look at three possible frictions that could justify quantity restrictions. Quantity
restrictions can improve efficiency when there is an externality caused by taxi travel,
when there is a regulatory preference to driver profit, or when the regulated price is
set too high.
A major result in the taxicab literature is that taxi travel should be subsidized
when there is no externality or preference towards revenue (Douglas, 1972; Arnott,
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1996). The first best fare is set equal to the cost of operating the taxi while occupied.
The first best vacancy is set such that the consumers’ benefit of decreased wait time
of an additional unit of vacancy is equal to the marginal cost of the additional unit
of vacancy. Since the fare is equal to the driver’s cost while occupied, drivers incur a
loss due to the cost incurred when they are vacant. In order for drivers to be willing
to provide service, the regulator would have to provide a subsidy to cover the loss.
When subsidizing taxi travel is infeasible, drivers require non-negative expected
discounted profit. When there is no externality or preference towards revenue, taxis
make zero profit under the second-best. By choosing the second best price and allow-
ing entry, the second best outcome can be implemented without quantity regulations,
suggesting that quantity regulation is unnecessary. In practice, the medallion price
is positive, suggesting that there is some factor motiving the regulator to prefer such
a policy. Either an externality or a preference towards driver profit could cause the
regulator to prefer to restrict the quantity.
Like other vehicles driving on the road, taxis increase congestion and emit pol-
lution. There is an additional externality that taxis create through the process of
picking up and dropping off passengers. When the externality caused by taxi travel
is sufficiently high, the surplus maximizing price and vacancy levels could have pos-
itive driver profit (Beesley, 1973; Shreiber, 1975; Cairns and Liston-Heyes, 1996).
The first-best price is equal to the cost of operating the taxi plus the external cost.
If the profit is positive at the first-best vacancy rate, then quantity restrictions are
beneficial.
A regulatory preference towards driver profit can also lead to quantity restrictions
being beneficial. The regulator may have a preference towards driver profit due
to regulatory capture by the taxi industry or due to the benefit from the sales of
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medallions. By restricting the quantity, either through medallions or franchise rights,
the owners of these exclusive rights can make positive economic profit. The owners
of these rights fight to convince the regulator to keep entry restricted and to choose
a price that generates as large profit as possible.
The regulator may also prefer to have positive profit because the regulator can
capture part of the profit through the selling new medallions and charging licensing
fees. When new medallions are introduced, they are often introduced through an
auction. By introducing medallions, local governments receive a portion of the rev-
enue from having a positive medallion price. Alternatively, the regulatory can use
licensing fees to capture the surplus. If the regulator’s primarily goal was revenue
generation, this would be the better way to capture surplus.
Finally, it is possible for the price and quantity choices to be made by two different
agents, where the price setting agent is influenced by the taxi industry. The municipal
government could decide on the regulatory structure and allow a bureaucrat to carry
it out. If the bureaucrat’s decision is influenced by the taxi industry, the price could
be set too high. Market power could dissipate much of the gains that the passengers
receive. Flath (2006) finds that in this type of environment, quantity limits could
lead to higher surplus.
1.5.3 Service-level Regulation
Municipalities are concerned about service levels in locations where demand is low
and at times when demand is low. Similarly, different areas of the cities have different
levels of demand base on their wealth and population density. Taxis will prefer to
provide service in the locations with the higher demand. The demand for taxicab
services also varies over the day. It is typically lowest during late hours of the night
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and early hours of the morning. Regulation aimed at increasing service levels when
there is low demand can improve efficiency.
There are two types of policies that are typically used to ensure adequate service
levels. Regulators can either require cross-subsidization or, in the case of location-
specific differences in demand, they can give exclusive right to taxis to operate in
the low demand location. The cross-subsidization requires that companies ensure
adequate service levels in low demand locations as a condition of getting the right
to operate a taxi in a given location.
The cross-subsidization could increase efficiency. The income from the low de-
mand period may not be sufficient to cover the operating cost, but may still provide
higher surplus. In order to implement the cross-subsidization across different times,
the regulator can require that taxis remain operational for a specific number of
hours for each day. Alternatively, in locations heavily reliant on dispatched taxis,
the regulator can require that companies have a sufficiently short wait time. If these
regulations are binding, it means that revenue from the high-demand period is being
used to subsidize losses in the low-demand period.
When demand differs by location and locations rely heavily on cruising, govern-
ments can restrict where certain drivers can pick up passengers. Exclusive cruising
regulations divide the city up into multiple regions and limit the ability of drivers
affiliated with one region from picking up passengers in other regions. Since taxis
are limited to their affiliated regions, exclusive cruising regulations ensure that there
are a sufficient number of taxis in each location, even when one of the two locations
is more profitable than the others. While exclusive cruising regulations require taxis
that drive passengers to unaffiliated location return to an affiliated location before
they can pick up passengers, exclusive cruising systems can be preferred to regulation
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where licensed taxis can move between locations freely.12
1.5.4 Safety and Quality of Service Regulation
Like other privately run transportation industries, the taxi industry has basic safety
and liability regulations. Safety regulations are valuable because safety is difficult
for passengers to observe; therefore, the level of safety drivers choose will tend to
be too low. These issues are made less problematic through regulations setting
minimum safety levels. In the absence of required insurance, drivers may not be
able to compensate the individuals that are injured due to financial constraints.
Uninsured drivers typically do not have much to lose in the event of a major accident,
and may not find it worthwhile to purchase insurance. Minimum insurance standards
ensure that drivers are able to compensate individuals harmed in accidents.
Quality of service regulations help to eliminate some of the adverse incentives
caused by the regulatory structure. Under a regulated price, the choice of quality
will be inefficient under the cruising and taxi stand modes of contracting. Under
the cruising mode of contracting, taxi drivers choose a level of quality in advance
of meeting with passengers. When passengers and drivers meet, the passenger has
a decision of whether to accept the driver. If the passenger rejects the driver, the
passenger incurs a search cost while waiting for another taxi. Given an expected
average quality, each taxi has an incentive to choose a slightly lower quality than the
average, putting downward pressure on the quality of taxi service. Without quality
regulation, a portion of the gains that occur as a result of price regulation will be
lost due to inefficiently low levels of quality.
Under the taxi stand mode of contracting, the quality choice will be inefficient.
12We show this result in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
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The nature of the inefficiency depends on whether the taxi that was the first to arrive
is expected to provide service to the next passenger. If there is the expectation that
the first taxi to arrive at the taxi stand gets the next passenger, then the quality
will typically be too low. Taxis will typically have an incentive to lower their quality
below the optimal level because, from the passenger’s perspective, they behave like
a monopolist with a fixed price.13 If there is an expectation that taxis at taxi stands
compete for passengers, then in equilibrium each taxi will choose a different level of
quality. When multiple taxis are present, the passenger will choose the taxi with the
higher quality. If all taxis are choosing the same quality, each taxi would have an
incentive to increase quality. The only equilibria involve different levels of quality,
even when passengers have the same preference towards quality.
The regulator may be concerned about quality because if affects the general image
of the municipality. Tourists and business travelers disproportionately use taxis as
a means of transportation. By having a high quality taxi service, the image of the
city is improved. Business groups that benefit from tourism and business travel have
advocated for regulation of the taxi industry to ensure a sufficiently high quality.
1.5.5 Other Arguments for Regulation
The methods that are typically used to control price and quantity give the regulator
greater control of the taxicab industry. This control allows the regulator to use
taxi regulation as a way of achieving outcomes that are viewed as more equitable.
The structure of regulation may also make it easier to monitor regulations, such as
ensuring basic safety standards are met. The common regulatory structures increase
13Given that passengers are willing to walk to the taxi stand, they incur a search cost. If the
search cost of all passengers is bounded below by a positive number, this is sufficient to ensure that
quality is undersupplied in the taxi stand market.
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the ability of the regulator to regulate the industry and increase the effectiveness of
the enforcement mechanisms.
Regulators may be concerned about drivers charging different rates to different
passengers based on their characteristics. There is a particular concern that drivers
will charge a higher rate to the elderly and people going to essential locations, such
as hospitals. Setting a required fare prevents drivers from charging discriminatory
fares. Regulators can also use these regulations to ensure that additional services
are provided for specific types of individuals. Regulations have been used to ensure
that there are a sufficiently large number of taxis that are equipped to handle people
with disabilities. Regulations are also used to give senior citizens and individuals
with disabilities special rates on taxi service.
Regulation limiting entry can also decrease the cost of monitoring other regula-
tions. If entry is only permissible at the firm level, the cost of monitoring regulation is
lower since enforcement can be carried out at the firm level. It is easier to coordinate
regulation with a small number of firms than it is with a large number of individual
owners. The regulator also has a greater benefit of finding breaches of regulation
because additional breaches are more likely to occur when a company already has
one breach. Regulation that limits entry through medallions will also have a lower
cost. By regulating a more concentrated industry with a smaller number of drivers,
the cost of enforcing the regulation is lower. The cost per driver would also be lower
since the medallion tracking mechanism is a convenient way to track entry and exit.
1.6 Costs of Regulation
The two most significant cost of the price and quantity regulation are the harm
it causes certain stakeholders and the lack of flexibility it gives taxi companies to
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respond to economic circumstances. The increased price and decreased quantity
harms passengers and taxicab drivers. The price structure prevents the price of taxi
service from changing to respond to the demand characteristics of the location and
the time.
1.6.1 Stakeholders Negatively Affected by Regulation
Passengers are negatively affected by quantity restrictions. If there is a regulatory
preference towards revenue or an external cost of driving, then the price will be
higher and the vacancy rate will be lower then in the absence of these factors. The
lower-income individuals are disproportionately being harmed by the high price since
they spend a greater share of their income on taxi service (Frankena and Pautler,
1986). Quantity restrictions are also thought to disproportionately affect the poorer
members of society since most taxis will locate in high demand areas, decreasing the
vacancy rate in less wealthy neighborhoods.
Drivers are also harmed by quantity restrictions. When entry is restricted using
medallions, the price of medallions is often too high for the typical driver to afford.
Whether restrictions are done at the taxi-level or the firm-level, the exclusive right
to provide taxi service is typically owned by business interests. Since taxi drivers
are hired in a competitive market, quantity restrictions will harm drivers (Frankena
and Pautler, 1986). The limited quantity will cause the number of drivers to be
lower than in the absence of regulation, thereby decreasing the equilibrium wage
that drivers receive. Regulations that increase driver wages would counter this effect
and could lead to a higher wage despite the quantity regulation; however, this type
of regulation would have other distortions.
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1.6.2 Limited Flexibility
The regulatory framework generally has a fixed rate structure that does not depend
on the economic circumstances. The price does not adjust in response to factors that
affect demand, such as the time of day, the weather, and presence of a major event
in the city. This lack of flexibility can be partially alleviated by introducing a more
complicated fare structure that accounts for some of these details; however, such a
fare schedule will have a limited ability account the variation in demand. The setup
also does not allow the supply of taxis to vary in response to increases in demand.
The evolution of digital dispatch companies, such as Uber and Lyft, has increased
the cost of the inflexibility. The dispatch technologies connect passengers and drivers
in real time, tailoring the prices to the demand characteristics. Uber charges a
different price to passengers based on the demand for services and the number of
available drivers. They pay drivers a higher wage when demand is high, thereby
increasing incentives for more drivers to supply service. This process ensures that
vacancy levels are more stable and allows the price of taxi service to better reflect
the economic circumstances.
Regulation may also prevent innovation in the type of services that are provided.
A number of authors have pointed to regulation preventing various forms of rideshar-
ing from occurring (Davis, 1998; Frankena and Pautler, 1986; Beesley, 1973). Reg-
ulation also decreases the degree of quality diversity. In principle, passengers could
pay different prices for different speeds of service, a customer who values quick ser-
vice could be willing to pay a higher price for quicker service while a customer who
places a low value on quick service could prefer a lower fare. A deregulated cruising
environment allows firms to charge different prices and may lead to more efficient
outcomes.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter discussed price and quantity regulation in the North American taxicab
industry. We provide an overview of the history of taxi regulation and the struc-
ture of regulation that currently exists. We focus on the regulations that occur in
three North American metropolitan areas. We see that the regulatory structure
significantly restricts the actions of taxi drivers. We examined the theoretical justi-
fications for price and quantity regulation, and found that there are some normative
justifications for the types of regulations that are commonly used. This theory helps
to explain the evolution of regulation of the taxicab industry. It also explains why
most municipalities that experimented with deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s
reintroduced some form of regulation.
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Chapter 2
Comparing Exclusive Cruising and Combined Regulation
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2.1 Introduction
Exclusive cruising regulations require taxicabs be affiliated with a particular area
in order to pick up passengers in that area. When there are multiple regulators in
close proximity, such as in the greater Boston metropolitan area, exclusive cruising
regulations prevent taxicab drivers from picking up passengers in other affiliated
locations. Similar regulations exist in areas governed by a single regulator, such as
New York City and Los Angeles. In these cities, there are multiple affiliated locations
and taxis are prevented from picking up passengers in certain parts of the city. Trips
to unaffiliated locations are frequent and require that taxicabs return empty to their
affiliated location in order to pick up passengers. These empty return trips increase
the cost of providing service.
A combined regulatory system, where taxi drivers can pick up passengers in all
parts of the metropolitan area, eliminates the cost of the return trips. This type
of regulation occurs in cities such as Chicago and Houston. Under this regulation,
taxicabs are allowed to pick up passengers in all parts of the city or metropolitan
area. Drivers can search for passengers immediately after dropping off a passenger,
rather than having to make empty return trips to an affiliated location in order to
be able to pick up passengers. However, under combined regulation, drivers are able
to search for passengers in a strategic manner. When one location offers a higher
payoff than another, drivers will prefer to be at the higher-value location; as a result,
service levels may be too low in some locations and too high in other locations.
We compare these two types of regulations; exclusive cruising regulation and
combined regulation. Under exclusive cruising regulation, the regulator chooses a
price and number of medallions for each location. Taxis that acquire a medallion
become affiliated with the location. Taxis can only pick up passengers in their
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affiliated location and are prevented from being affiliated with multiple locations.
Taxis that drive passengers to an unaffiliated location will have to return to their
affiliated location before they can search for passengers. Under combined regulation,
a joint regulator chooses prices for each location and a total number of taxicabs
that can pick up passengers in the entire metropolitan region. All taxis affiliated
with the metropolitan area can pick up passengers at both locations. Given that
taxicab drivers can pick up passengers at both locations, they have the option to
behave strategically. They direct their search in a manner that maximizes their
expected discounted profit, directing their search towards the location that provides
the highest expected revenue.
We look at a framework where each location is characterized by a traffic external-
ity, a regulatory preference towards revenue, and demand for trips from the location
to each of the other locations. Under exclusive cruising regulation, the regulator
has the flexibility to choose price and vacancy level for each of the locations inde-
pendently, but has to consider the cost of the empty return trips. Under combined
regulation, the vacancy levels for each of the two locations is chosen indirectly. The
vacancy rates are determined by search behavior of the taxis, the price levels, and
the total number of medallions chosen by the regulator. Combined regulation may
not be able to maintain the desired vacancy levels. At the location specific desired
price and vacancy levels, the driver profit may differ. When this is the case, drivers
will have an incentive to locate in the high-value location. As a result, the search be-
havior limits the set of price and vacancy levels that are implementable, potentially
acting as a source of inefficiency.
There is a tradeoff between the inefficiency that occurs as a result of these two
factors. The inefficiency that occurs as a result of the return trips under exclusive
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cruising regulation is positively related to the proportion of trips that go to the other
locations. When there are a small number of trips between locations, the inefficiency
that occurs under exclusive cruising regulation is small. When the number of trips
between locations is large, the cost of the inefficiency under exclusive cruising reg-
ulation is large. Under combined regulation, taxis are not required to make return
trips; therefore, this source of inefficiency is not present.1 When the characteristics
of the environment differ by location, the desired prices, vacancy levels, and the
corresponding quantity will tend to differ in each of the locations. As a result, the
corresponding expected profit could differ based on location. The regulator may not
be able to maintain the desired prices and vacancy levels under combined regulation,
and may have to choose an implementable policy that is less than ideal. Exclusive
cruising regulation does not have this source of inefficiency.
When locations have different externalities, preferences towards driver profit, or
demand functions, the regulator faces a tradeoff between the cost of the duplicate
return trips under exclusive cruising regulation and the cost of limited flexibility
in choosing price and vacancy level under combined regulation. When driver profit
differs at the regulator’s preferred price and quantity, and the number of trips between
locations is sufficiently small, the benefit from choosing a policy more consistent with
the regulator’s preferences could exceed the cost of the duplicate trips. Differences
between locations, occurring as the result of differences in the congestion externality,
differences in driver profit, or asymmetries in demand, can each result in exclusive
cruising regulation being the preferred regulatory regime. Conversely, when the
externalities, preference towards driver profit, and demand are the same, combined
1There are combined regulation equilibria where taxis from one of the locations transitions to
the other location without searching for passengers. Taxis will only transition from one of the two
locations. The transitioning need not be a source of inefficiency and, when it is, the inefficiency can
be viewed as resulting from search behavior.
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regulation will be preferred. When the locations are identical, the desired price
and vacancy rate in each location is the same; therefore, the same set of prices and
vacancy levels can be implemented in each location. This will be implementable
since the drivers will be indifferent between the locations.
Given an exclusive cruising equilibrium, we characterize conditions on price, va-
cancy, and demand that guarantee that combined regulation is preferred. This ap-
proach allows us to look at the market outcomes under exclusive cruising regulations
and determine whether it would be better to switch to combined regulation. We
find that having the same prices and vacancy levels is insufficient to guarantee that
combined regulation is preferred to exclusive cruising regulation. However, if each
location has the same expected revenue and there is sufficient vacancy to cover the
difference in the flow of taxis, we can choose a policy under combined regulation that
is preferred to the exclusive cruising outcome.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2 we look qualitatively at regulation
in the taxicab industry. In Section 2.3 we review the relevant literature. In Section
3.2 we develop a general model of the regulatory framework for the taxicab indus-
try. In section 2.5 we characterize an exclusive cruising equilibrium and a combined
regulation equilibrium. In section 2.6 we compare the benefits of exclusive cruising
regulation and combined regulation. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Taxicab Regulation
In most major cities in North America, the taxicab industry faces price and quantity
regulation. Regulators typically set a regulated price that consists of a fixed cost of
entering the taxicab plus a per-unit charge based on the total distance traveled and
trip duration. These regulations are typically applied to cruising taxicabs, taxicabs
40
waiting at taxicab stands, and dispatched taxicabs. The regulators also regulate
other non-price aspects of service.2
Regulators typically restrict the total number of taxicabs that are allowed to pro-
vide service, using medallions. Medallions are transferable assets that can be bought
and sold. Each medallion allows its owner the right to provide taxi services with a
single taxicab. Because the limited supply of medallions restricts entry, medallions
typically have a positive selling price. The positive medallion price indicates that
medallions are a source of profit for the drivers. The regulator could have a positive
preference towards driver profit, either due to regulatory capture by current medal-
lion holders or due to the source of revenue the medallions provide the regulator
when they are auctioned.
Since medallions grant taxi drivers the right to drive passengers to a specific
location, potential investors are willing to pay up to the value of the expected profit
that the medallions will generate. By choosing a price that generates positive driver
profit, local governments can generate revenue from medallion sales. New medallions
are typically introduced into the market through auctions. These auctions can be a
significant source of revenue for cities.3 A regulator may prefer to generate revenue
from the sale of medallions as opposed to using other sources of revenue. This
preference could exist for political or economic reasons. Revenue from selling the
medallions is less visible, making it less costly in political terms than other revenue
generation mechanisms. Alternatively, the increased revenue could have a lower
2These include regulations on the maximum age of the car, required acceptance of electronic
payment methods, and a required protective barrier between the driver and passengers. While these
sometimes differ in different jurisdictions, the cost of adhering to all the regulations simultaneously
is, in most cases, insufficient to justify exclusive cruising regulations; therefore, we disregard these
differences.
3In Boston, between 1991 and 2001 medallions auctioned for an average price of $180,000 each.
Over that time period the city was able to auction 225 medallions.
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deadweight loss than other forms of taxation. From an economic standpoint, it may
be beneficial to generate revenue from the sales of medallions. Finally, collecting
revenue from taxicabs collects additional revenue from residents from other cities,
tourists, and business travelers.
Current medallion holders benefit when the regulator chooses a limited supply
of medallions and a higher price. A limited supply of medallions and a sufficiently
high price allows driver to earn positive profit without the threat of entry. Medallion
owners lobby the government for a high regulated price and a low level of medal-
lions. The owners could have sufficient lobbying power that they can encourage the
government to restrict the number of medallions, despite the losses that consumers
incur as a result of these higher price and lower service levels.
Driving a taxi creates a traffic externality. In addition to the standard traffic
externality from the typical driver, a taxicab driver may drive more erratically when
searching for passengers. The externality results from a combination of slower driving
and unpredictable movements. When picking up and dropping off passengers, taxis
also often obstruct the flow of traffic. This causing surrounding traffic to slow and
cause an externality for other drivers. Higher externalities create a tendency for the
regulator to prefer a higher price and lower quantity.
We look at an environment where regulatory can have a greater preference to-
wards driver profit than other components of surplus and where taxi travel causes
an externality on surrounding traffic. In the absence of these factors, the medallion
price should be zero. Since medallions typically have a positive selling price, we
include the externality and preference towards revenue.
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2.3 Literature Review
The taxi industry differs from other industries because the vacancy rate is a factor
in demand. When the vacancy rate is higher, passengers’ expected wait times are
shorter and the service is more valuable. The classic works in the taxicab literature
are Douglas (1972), Orr (1969), and De Vany (1975). These aggregate demand
models take into account the role of vacancy, incorporating the feedback of the total
number of taxis into demand through the vacancy rate. The Douglas cruising model
looks at the total number of taxis indirectly, through the vacancy rate and the
quantity demanded.4 By looking at vacancy, instead of the total number of taxis,
the problem is easier to solve.5 The Douglas cruising model and subsequent work
commonly assumes that the regulator chooses prices and vacancy levels.
Pricing and bargaining issues are often used to justify the regulated fare structure.
Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) heuristically discuss the implications of search costs
when taxis are able to set prices. When passengers incur a cost of searching for the
next available taxi, for any set of prices drivers will have an incentive to increase
their fare when they meet a customer. Since the fares will be too high, passengers
will not find it worthwhile searching for passengers. While the price setting ability is
an unreasonable assumption, the bargaining process is not guaranteed to lead to the
optimal price and vacancy rate (Flath, 2006). Since, it is difficult for passengers and
drivers to communicate and bargain over prices, the bargaining process will lead to
increased congestion.
4The model is typically presented in terms of a cruising framework, but, with the small adjust-
ments to the cost structure and the value of vacancy, it can also be applied to the dispatched taxis
and taxis at taxi stands.
5In practice, the regulator chooses the total number of taxicabs; however, for a given price there
is a one-to-one relationship between vacancy rate choices and quantity choices, allowing us to look
at the problem in terms of price and vacancy rate without loss of generality.
43
Arnott (1996) shows that, when there is no externality or preference towards
revenue, it is optimal to subsidize taxicab transportation. Under the first best, the
price should be set equal to the marginal cost of driving and the vacancy rate should
be chosen such that the marginal benefit to consumers of increased vacancy is equal
to the marginal cost of providing an additional unit of vacancy. Since the price is
set equal to the cost of driving, drivers will cover their marginal costs when occupied
and will incur a loss due to the cost incurred when vacant; therefore, under the first
best taxi travel is subsidized. This would suggest that if subsidies were impossible,
the second best price and vacancy levels should have zero profit. Since the medallion
prices are typically positive, we use this as evidence that an externality or preference
towards driver profit is influencing the regulator’s choice of prices and medallion
levels.
Flores-Guri (2005) looks at the efficiency of exclusive cruising regulations using a
modified version of the Douglas cruising model. Under exclusive cruising regulation,
occupied taxis travel to the other locality with a specific probability, incurring an
additional cost of making the return trip. Under combined regulation, taxis do not
have to make return trips. He finds that, when replacing exclusive cruising regulation
with combined regulation, it is possible to increase surplus while still maintaining
the same level of driver profit. The structure in Flores-Guri (2005) neither takes into
account the taxi drivers’ incentives nor the regulator’s incentives. When the profit
levels differ under combined regulation, taxis will prefer one of the locations to the
other; therefore, the solution that he proposes may not be incentive compatible for
the taxi drivers. By specifically looking at the regulator’s preferences and accounting
for driver search behavior, we find that the results from Flores-Guri (2005) no longer
hold.
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Yang et al. (2002) develop a network model for taxicab demand. A city is divided
into nodes and taxicabs travel between nodes at a speed determined empirically.
Each node has a demand for travel to every other node based on the vacancy rate at
the node and the price of taxi service. Taxicabs search for passengers in a manner
that minimizes the expected time it takes to find a passenger. Yang et al. (2005)
consider a taxicab model where vehicles on the road create a congestion externality.
In their model, in addition to vacancy rate and price, demand depends on travel
time, increasing the number of taxis could lower demand and make everyone worse
off. As a result, in the presence of a congestion externality, it may be efficient to
restrict the number of available taxis.
Our contribution to the literature is to extend the Douglas Cruising model to
a network model that incorporates the regulator’s and drivers’ incentives. Incorpo-
rating driver incentives into the network structure allows us to compare exclusive
cruising regulations to combined regulations. Instead of assuming that drivers min-
imize search costs, as in Yang et al. (2002), we assume that they maximize their
expected profit. This assumption is important when the price is not the same in all
locations. We also model the regulator’s preferences, something that is typically not
done in the network models. The model allows us to show that exclusive cruising
regulations may be preferred to combined regulations, specifically focusing on the
conditions that can lead to exclusive cruising regulations being preferred.
2.4 Model Structure
We develop a general model of the regulated taxicab market that will allow us to
model exclusive cruising and combined regulation. The model consists of two loca-
tions, L = {1, 2} with index i. Each location has an affiliation, denoted by a. Under
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exclusive cruising regulations there are two affiliations ALEC = {1, 2}. Taxis will a
particular affiliation are only able to pick up passengers in their affiliated location.
Under combined regulation the is a single affiliation, AML = {1}. Taxis with the
single affiliation can pick up passengers in both locations. Over time, taxis move
between locations but maintain the same affiliation.
Time is broken up into discrete periods. At the start of each period, taxis are in
one of the two locations. There are ni taxis at location i, of which ni,a are affiliated
with a. Over the course of a period, taxis either remain in the same location or move
to the other location. The number of taxis that remain in the same location and
the number that end up in the other location at the end of a period depends on the
drivers’ strategies and the customers’ desired locations. The set of strategies that
taxis can pursue in each location will vary based on the regulatory structure and the
affiliation of the taxicab.
To model the taxi market, we start by looking at the movement of taxis over time.
We then characterize the demand for taxi service. We look at the strategies available
to drivers and how they affect the movement of taxis. We look at the driver’s profits
and the corresponding stationary equilibrium induced by the strategies. Finally, we
look at the regulator’s objective.
2.4.1 Flow of Taxis
Over the duration of a period, taxicabs can become occupied, remain vacant after
searching for passengers, or transition to the other location without searching for
passengers. The number of occupied taxicabs that pick up a passenger at location
i is given by Qi. Based on the preferences of the passengers, occupied taxis drive
their passengers to a destination in one of the two locations. The number of taxis
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that drive passengers to the same location and to the other location are denoted by
qi and q˜i, respectively. The total number of occupied taxis originating from location
i is
Qi = qi + q˜i (2.1)
The number of taxis that remain vacant after searching for passengers is given by
Vi. The destination of vacant taxis is determined by the taxi drivers’ search behavior.
Vacant taxis can either remain in the same location or relocate to the other location.
The number of taxis at location i that remain in the same location is denoted by vi
and the number of vacant taxis at location i that relocate to the other location is
denoted by v˜i. The total number of taxis at location i that remain vacant satisfies
Vi = vi + v˜i (2.2)
The drivers’ search behaviors determine the number of vacant taxis that remain in
the same location and the number of vacant taxis that relocate.
Taxis can also transition to the other location without searching for customers.
The number of transitioning taxicabs is given by Ti. Under exclusive cruising reg-
ulation, drivers are required to transition back to their affiliated locations. Under
combined regulation, drivers may find it worthwhile to transition to the other lo-
cation rather than to search in the lower value location. By transitioning, drivers
move to the high-value location with certainty but forgo the possibility of earning
revenue. When the continuation value of being at the other location is sufficiently
high, it may be worthwhile for drivers to transition.
In a given period, taxis must either be occupied, remain vacant, or transition;
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therefore, the total number of taxis is
ni = Qi + Vi + Ti (2.3)
Of these taxis,
qi + vi
remain in the same location and
q˜i + v˜i + Ti
will move from location i to location j. The total number of taxis at location i in
the subsequent period is
n′i = vi + qi + v˜j + q˜j + Tj (2.4)
The number of taxis in each location will remain constant when the number of
taxis that go from location i to location j equals the number of taxis that go from
location j to location i. The flow of taxis is equal when
T1 + q˜1 + v˜1 = T2 + q˜2 + v˜2 (2.5)
We look at the number of taxis involved in each task that are affiliated with
each regulator. There are Qi,a occupied taxis at location i that have affiliation a, of
these qi,a drive passengers to the same location and q˜i,a drive passengers to the other
location. Likewise, there are Vi,a searching taxis with affiliation a that do not find
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a passenger at location i. Of these taxis, vi,a remain in the same location and v˜i,a
relocate. Finally, Ti,a taxis at location i with affiliation a choose to transition to the
other location without searching for passengers.
Analogous results to equations (2.1) through (2.5) will hold for taxis affiliated
with each affiliation. In particular, the number of taxis of each affiliation at each
location remains constant when
T1,a + q˜1,a + v˜1,a = T2,a + q˜2,a + v˜2,a (2.6)
A stationary flow of taxis occurs when the number of taxis involved in each task
remains constant over time. Formally, an outcome is a stationary flow of taxis when
{vi,a, v˜i,a, qi,a, q˜i,a, Ti,a}i∈{1,2},a∈A
remains constant. When we have a stationary flow of taxis, the aggregate number
of occupied and vacant taxis at each location will remain constant.When equation
(2.6) is satisfied, and drivers of each of the affiliations are choosing the same Markov
strategies, the outcome will be a stationary distribution of taxis.
2.4.2 Demand
Demand for taxi travel depends on the location specific price, pi, and the location
specific vacancy rate, Vi. The price is directly chosen by the regulator, while the
vacancy rate is chosen indirectly.6 We extend the Douglas cruising model to account
for the two locations and the possibility of trips between locations. We represent the
6We use Vi as a measure of the vacancy rate because the discrete representation is used to
represent a continuous time process. In continuous time, the number of occupied taxis do not affect
the rate at which passengers find taxis.
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aggregate demand for trips originating from location i by Qi (pi, Vi).
The aggregate demand can be decomposed into demand for trips to the same
location, qi (pi, Vi), and demand for trips to the other location, q˜i (pi, Vi). We assume
that taxis cannot refuse passengers; therefore, the total demand for trips at location
i satisfies
Qi (pi, Vi) = qi (pi, Vi) + q˜i (pi, Vi)
We assume that qi and q˜i are continuous in their arguments, and Qi(pi, 0) = 0.
We assume increase in price and a decrease in vacancy lowers the quantity of trips
demanded to both the same location and to the other location.
2.4.3 Driver Strategies
We assume there is a continuum of taxicab drivers which seek to maximize their
expected discounted profit. Drivers receive the location specific price when they find
passengers. As is typical in the taxicab literature, we assume a constant marginal
cost, c, of driving in each period. We assume that drivers discount the future at a
rate δ. To be willing to provide service, taxis need non-negative expected discounted
profit.
The available strategies will depend on the regulatory structure. Under combined
regulation, at the beginning of each period taxis can be taking part in one of three
actions; searching for passengers while remaining in the same location if unoccupied,
ν, searching for passengers while moving to the other location if unoccupied, ν˜, and
transitioning to the other location without searching for a passenger, T . As a result,
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under combined regulation, the set of available actions at either location are
Si,a = {ν, ν˜, T}
Under exclusive cruising regulation, taxis are prevented from searching for pas-
sengers in their unaffiliated location; as a result, the only strategy that is available
in the unaffiliated location is to transition. In the affiliated location, searching for
passengers while remaining in the same location strictly dominates searching and
while relocating and transitioning. Because other strategies are strictly dominated,
we assume that the only permissible action is to search for passengers while remain-
ing in the same location when vacant. Under exclusive cruising, the set of available
actions are Si,i = {ν} for taxis in their affiliated location and Si,j = {T} for taxis in
their unaffiliated location.
We assume that drivers choose symmetric Markov mixed strategies. Drivers can
condition their choices based on their current location and the number of taxis at
each location affiliated with each regulator; therefore, the state space for a given
driver is (n1,n2, i). The vector nk = (n1,k, n2,k) denotes the number of taxis at
location k of each affiliation, and i is the location of the taxi. The probability a taxi
at location i with affiliation a choose an action s is σa(s;n1,n2, i).
Using the drivers’ strategies, we can determine the number of taxicabs in each
location choosing each strategy. We let nsii,a be the number of drivers at location i
affiliated with location a choosing a strategy si. Then
nsi,a = ni,a σ
r(s;n1,n2, i)
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The total number of taxis at location i choosing a strategy si is given by
nsi =
∑
a∈A
nsi,a
In a given period, the total number of taxicabs that are searching for passengers at
location i is:
nSi = n
ν
i + n
ν˜
i
Since all searching taxis at location i must either find a passenger or remain
vacant, the total number of searching taxicabs must satisfy
nSi = Qi + Vi (2.7)
Using equation (2.7) and the demand equation, Qi = Qi(pi, Vi), we can determine
the aggregate quantity and vacancy rates. The total number of taxicabs that are
remain vacant and become occupied can be found by solving these two equations.
Since Qi is continuous and increasing in Vi, the values for Vi and Qi are uniquely
determined by the nSi and pi.
We assume that all taxis searching for passengers at location i have the same
probability of finding a passenger, regardless of their affiliation and how they direct
their search. Given this, the number of vacant taxis that remain in the same location
and that relocate to the other location:
vi =
nνi
nSi
Vi v˜i =
nν˜i
nSi
Vi
Of the vacant taxis, the number of taxis with affiliation a that remain in the same
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location and relocate to the other location are respectively given by:
vi,a =
nνi,a
nSi
Vi v˜i,a =
nν˜i,a
nSi
Vi
The number of taxis that drive a passenger from location i to the same location
and the number that drive a passenger to the other location are qi = qi(pi, Vi) and
q˜i = q˜i(pi, Vi), respectively. Of these taxis, the number of each affiliation that drive
a passenger to the same location and to the other location are:
qi,a =
nSi,a
nSi
qi q˜i,a =
nSi,a
nSi
q˜i
For a given state and a given set of strategies, we can determine the number of
searching taxis, the vacancy rates, the quantities, and the number of transitioning
taxis evolves over time. For a given initial n1,n2, a stationary distribution is induced
by the strategies, if the stationary flow condition is satisfied:
T1,a + q˜1,a + v˜1,a = T2,a + q˜2,a + v˜2,a
for a ∈ A.
2.4.4 Driver Profit
We determine the drivers’ expected discounted profit given their strategy choices.
We start by looking at the expected single period-revenue that taxis at location i
receive. Searching drivers that find passengers receives the location specific price
pi and drive to their passenger’s desired location. Searching drivers that do not
find passengers receive no revenue. Drivers that transition to the other location, do
not pick up a passengers and do not receive any revenue. Given this, the expected
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single-period revenue of taxicabs at location i that choose strategy s is
Rsi =

Qi
Qi+Vi
pi if s ∈ {v, v˜}
0 if s = T
When searching for passengers, the single period revenue is the same whether the
driver chooses to stay in the same location or relocate to the other; therefore, we
define the expected single-period revenue at location i from searching for passengers
as7
Rνi =
Qi
Qi + Vi
pi
This will come in useful in characterizing the incentives that taxi drivers face under
combined regulation.
The drivers’ transition probabilities differ depending on what action they choose.
When drivers are searching, the transition probability is the sum of the probability
of arriving at the destination while occupied and the probability of arriving at the
location while vacant. When searching for passengers, drivers pick up passengers
that are going to the same location with probability
qi
Vi +Qi
and pick up passengers going to the other location with probability
q˜i
Vi +Qi
7When Vi = 0, the expected revenue is R
ν
i = 0
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With the remaining probability,
Vi
Vi +Qi
the taxi remains vacant and the drivers arrive at the location they direct their search
to. When drivers choose to transition to the other location without searching for
passengers, they end up at the other location with certainty. Letting ρsiik be the
probability that taxis from location i travel to location k when choosing the strategy
si, the transition probabilities are:
ρvii =
Vi + qi
Vi +Qi
ρv˜ii =
qi
Vi +Qi
ρTii = 0
ρvij =
q˜i
Vi +Qi
ρv˜ij =
Vi + q˜i
Vi +Qi
ρTij = 1
where i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i.
Given the regulated prices, pi, the drivers current state (n1,n2, i), and the set of
strategies played by the other drives, σ′, the drivers Bellman equation is given by
Ui,a(σ
′;n1,n2) = max
s∈Si,r
Rsi − c+ δ ∑
k∈{1,2}
ρsik Uk,a(σ
′;n′1,n
′
2)
 (2.8)
The maximizing strategy set at each location is the set of permissible strategies that
maximizes equation (3.2).
Under both exclusive cruising regulation and combined regulation, drivers have
the option of whether to operate. In order to be willing to continue to operate,
drivers must have a non-negative expected discounted profit at each point in time:
Ui,a(σ
′;n1, n2) ≥ 0
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whenever ni,a > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and a ∈ A.
2.4.5 Equilibrium
For an initial set of taxis in each location, an equilibrium is an individually rational
set of strategies such that every strategy that is played with positive probability
maximizes the Bellman equation. A stationary Markov equilibrium imposes the ad-
ditional assumption that the state variables must remain constant. For a given value
of N1 and N2, this occurs if when all the players choose the same mixed strategies,
the incentive compatibility condition is satisfied, the non-negative discounted profit
constraint is satisfied, and the stationary flow equation is satisfied. Formally we
define a stationary equilibrium as:
Definition Stationary Markov Equilibrium: Let Na (a ∈ A) be the number of
taxis of each affiliation, p1 and p2 be the prices at the locations, and Si,a be the set of
permissible strategies. A stationary Markov equilibrium is a set of mixed strategies
such that
1. Na = n1,a + n2,a for a ∈ A.
2. For each state (n1,n2, i), the set of mixed strategies that is played with positive
probability satisfies
arg maxsi∈Si,a
Rsii (nVi )− c+ δ ∑
k∈{1,2}
ρ
si(n1,n2,i)
ik Uk,a(s−;n
′
1, n
′
2)

3. Ui,a ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2} and a ∈ A where ni,a > 0.
56
4. For all a ∈ A
T1,a + q˜1,a + ν˜1,a = T2,a + q˜2,a + ν˜2,a
Under a stationary Markov equilibrium, the flow condition is satisfied for each
affiliation; therefore, the number of taxis of each affiliation in each location remains
constant. This means that the number of taxis choosing each of the strategies remains
constant. As a result the vacancy rates and the number of occupied taxis will also
remain constant.
We define an exclusive cruising equilibrium and a combined regulation equilib-
rium. Under exclusive cruising regulation, the regulator chooses a location specific
price, pi, and the total number of taxi medallions, Ni, for each location. Taxis with
affiliation i can only pick up passengers at location i. Formally, an exclusive cruis-
ing equilibrium is a stationary Markov equilibrium in a setting with A = {1, 2},
Si,i = {ν} and Sj,i = {T}.
Under combined regulation, there is one affiliation. The regulator chooses a
price for each location and a total number of medallions. The regulator allows taxis
with medallions to pick up passengers in both locations and drive freely between
the locations. Formally, a combined regulation equilibrium is a stationary Markov
equilibrium in a setting with A = {1}, Si,1 = {v, ν˜, Ti}. For notational simplicity,
we drop the subscript when looking at combined regulation
2.4.6 Regulator’s Objective
To model the regulators preferences, we assume that there is a joint regulator that
seeks to maximize the joint weighted surplus of the two locations. The joint regulator
assumption is used to model both a single municipality that is broken up into multiple
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locations and a metropolitan area that is under the control of multiple regulators.
The joint regulator takes into account the consumer surplus, the firm profit, and the
external cost of taxi traffic. We allow the regulator to place a greater weighting on
firm profit than it does on consumer surplus and the external cost of taxi travel.
Both the benefits that the consumers receive and the costs that the firms incur
depend on the vacancy rate. The benefit that consumers in location i receive from
trips originating from location i is
CSi =
∫ Qi
0
pi(Q, Vi) dQ− pi Qi
Increasing Vi increases consumers’ willingness to pay, thereby increasing the con-
sumer surplus. The producer surplus generated in locator i is given by
PSi = pi Qi − c ni
Taxis that become occupied receive a payment from their passengers. Taxis incur
costs whenever occupied, vacant, or transitioning.
The traffic externality is a location dependent constant external cost per unit of
time spent driving. The per-unit external cost, φi, can differ based on the location.
The external cost is incurred based on the location of the drivers at the start of
the period8 and is incurred regardless of whether the taxi is vacant, occupied, or
transitioning. The total external cost in location i, Φi, is
Φi = φi · (Vi +Qi + Ti)
8Since we will focus our attention on stationary outcomes, the assumption that the point of
origin is where the externality is not problematic. For every taxi that leaves another must return;
therefore, this representation is equivalent to a representation where half of the external cost of
taxis that move from one location to another is place on each of the locations.
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For simplicity, we ignore the externality that drivers place on other drivers.
The regulator places a weight of ωi on driver profit. This weight can differ based
on location. We consider ωi ≥ 1; the regulator places at least the same weight on
driver profit as she does on other components of the surplus. When ωi = 1, the
regulator maximizes total surplus. When ωi > 1, she places a greater weight on
driver profit. In the case of multiple regulators, we assume that driver profit is the
transferable component of surplus; therefore, we normalize the other components of
the surplus at location i by dividing them by ωi.
The regulator chooses a regulatory structure, prices, and medallion levels in order
to maximize the joint weighted total surplus, normalized by the location specific
preference to driver profit:
WTS =
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(CSi + ωi PSi + Φi)
=
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, Vi) dQ− c ni − φi ni + (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c ni)
)
(2.9)
The surplus in each location is normalized by the preference towards driver profit
because driver profit is the most natural way in which surplus is transferred across
locations. When there are multiple regulators, surplus can be transferred through
lump sum payment from one regulator to another or by assigning an appropriate
number of medallions to taxis in each of the two locations.
Given this setup, an environment is characterized by the demand functions, the
externalities, the preference towards revenue, the marginal cost, and the discount
rate:
{(qi( ), q˜i( ), φi, ωi, c, δ)}i∈{1,2}
59
Given the environment, the regulator’s choice of the regulatory structure, prices, and
medallion levels induces an equilibrium. The regulator choose these in a manner that
maximizes the weighted total surplus.
2.5 Exclusive Cruising and Combined Regulation
In equilibrium, drivers choose strategies in response to the regulator’s choice of price
levels and the number of medallions. It is, however, more convenient to characterize
the equilibrium in terms of the regulator’s choice of prices and vacancy rates, as it
makes the equilibrium easier to solve and makes the analysis consistent with the
previous taxicab literature. For exclusive cruising regulation and combined regula-
tion, we show that there exists an equivalent representation where the variables of
interest are represented in terms of price and vacancy rates. This is the most natural
extension of the Douglas Cruising framework to the multiple location setup. The
next result shows that exclusive cruising equilibria can be represented in terms of
prices and vacancy levels that satisfy a series of conditions.
Proposition 1 (Stationary Markov Equilibrium - Exclusive Cruising Regulation)
An exclusive cruising equilibrium can be characterized by {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2} such that
for i ∈ {1, 2},
1. Demand: The quantities demanded satisfy qi = qi(pi, Vi) and q˜i = q˜i(pi, Vi).
2. Flow Behavior: The number of transitioning taxis is Ti = q˜j.
3. Individual Rationality: The discounted expected profit must be non-negative
δpi Qi ≥ c (Qi + δq˜i + Vi) if q˜i > 0
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pi Qi ≥ c (Qi + Vi) if q˜i = 0
Conversely, for any pair {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2} such that the above conditions are satisfied,
there exists a unique exclusive cruising equilibrium {(pi, NLECi )}i∈{1,2} with the same
values of {(Vi, Qi, Ti)}i∈{1,2}.
Under exclusive cruising, incentive compatibility is satisfied trivially. The flow
condition is satisfied because taxis have to transition back to their affiliated loca-
tion to be able to pick up passengers; therefore, q˜i taxis will have to transition back
to their original location. The individual rationality condition depends on whether
drivers drive passengers to the other location. When drivers drive passengers to
the other location, the drivers’ unaffiliated location will have the lower expected dis-
counted profit. The expected discounted profit will be positive provided the condition
in the proposition is satisfied. When drivers do not drive passengers to the other
location, individual rationality only requires nonnegative discounted profit in their
affiliated location. The drivers will receive a nonnegative discounted profit provided
the expected revenue exceeds the cost, this will occur provided the condition in the
proposition is satisfied. Given a price vacancy representation, the total number of
medallions for affiliation i will satisfy:
NLECi = Vi +Qi + q˜i
Since taxis pick up and drop off passengers with high frequency, the discount
rate will be close to 1; therefore, we look at the limiting behavior of the individual
rationality constraint. Taking the limit as δ → 1 implies:
pi Qi ≥ c (Qi + q˜i + Vi)
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The total revenue drivers receive must exceed the total cost they incur.
Looking at prices and vacancy levels instead of prices and the total number of
taxis allows us to state the regulator’s problem in a simpler way. The regulator
chooses a set of prices and vacancy levels to maximize total surplus subject to the
zero discounted profit constraints:
WTSLEC =
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi + q˜i)
− φi (Qi + Vi + q˜j) + (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi + q˜i))
)
subject to
δpi Qi ≥ c (Qi + δq˜i + Vi) if q˜i > 0
pi Qi ≥ c (Qi + Vi) if q˜i = 0
To develop a representation of combined equilibria in terms of price and vacancy,
we need to characterize incentive compatible vacancy rates. The driver’s search
behavior will be based on the expected revenue drivers receive in each of the locations
and the transition probabilities. The expected revenue and transition probabilities
gives conditions on the vacancy rates and transitioning that is observed. For a given
price and vacancy rate, we can look at whether these prices and vacancy rates lead
to an outcome that is incentive compatible.
Proposition 2 (Search Behavior - Combined Regulation) For each combined equi-
librium with price and vacancy levels {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2}, the following conditions hold:
1. If Rν1 = R
ν
2 then Ti = 0 and Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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2. If Rνi > R
ν
j for some i, j ∈ {1, 2} where j 6= i, define
R∗j =
δ ρν˜jj
1 + δ(1− ρvii)
Rνi (2.10)
Then Ti = 0 and
Vj = q˜i − q˜j Tj = 0 if Rνj > R∗j
Vj + Tj = q˜i − q˜j if Rνj = R∗j
Tj = q˜i − q˜j Vj = 0 if Rνj < R∗j
Alternatively, for prices and vacancy rates {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2}, when condition (1) or
(2) is satisfied there exists incentive compatible strategies that induces these price
and vacancy levels such that the stationary flow condition is satisfied. Any such
strategies induce the same {(Qi, Vi, Ti)}i∈{1,2}.
If the expected revenue is the same in each location, drivers that transition forgo
revenue in the period they transition but do not receive a higher payoff from being
in the other location; therefore, drivers will not want to transition. The net flow of
occupied taxis from location j to i, q˜j− q˜i, must be made up by vacant taxis moving
from location i to j. If
Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i (2.11)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, there are enough vacant taxis at location i to make up the difference
in the number of occupied taxis traveling between locations. When equation (3.3)
holds, drivers can direct their search such that the net flow of vacant taxis from
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location i to j equals the flow of occupied taxis from location j to location i.9
When the expected revenue differs, drivers will prefer to be in the location with
the higher expected revenue. Depending on the relative payoffs of the two locations
and the transition probabilities, the drivers at the low-value location will either prefer
to search for passengers while relocating to the high-value location, would prefer to
transition to the high-value location, or would be indifferent between the two actions.
There will be some critical value for revenue in the low-value location such that the
driver will be indifferent between searching for passengers and transitioning. For
expected revenue levels above that, drivers would prefer to search. For expected
revenue levels below the critical value drivers would prefer to transition.
Proposition 2 established the the set of the prices and vacancy levels that lead to
incentive compatible outcomes that have a stationary flow of taxis. When individu-
ality rationality is satisfied for the prices and vacancy rates, the outcome will be an
equilibrium. Formally:
Proposition 3 (Metro-Level Equilibrium) A combined equilibrium can be charac-
terized by {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2} and {(qi, q˜i, Ti)}i∈{1,2} such that
1. Demand: The quantities demanded satisfy qi = qi(pi, Vi) and q˜i = q˜i(pi, Vi).
2. Flow Behavior: Either condition (1) or (2) in Proposition 2 is satisfied.
3. Individual Rationality: The discounted expected profit must be non-negative:
If Ti + Vi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}:
Rνi ≥ c if Rν1 = Rν2 (2.12)
9When the expected revenue is equal at the two locations, multiple sets of strategies can induce
the same equilibrium prices and vacancy rates. All of these equilibria are payoff equivalent; there-
fore, we do not need to distinguish between equilibria by looking at which location the vacant taxis
end up.
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(
1− δ qi + Vi
Qi + Vi
)(
Qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
pj − c
)
+ δ
(
q˜j + Vj + Tj
Qj + Vj + Tj
)(
Qi
Qi + Vi
pi − c
)
≥ 0 if Rνi > Rνj (2.13)
Otherwise, Rνi ≥ c for all i such that Ti + Vi > 0
Conversely, for any {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2}such that the above conditions are satisfied, there
exists a combined equilibrium with the same {Vi, Qi, Ti}i∈{1,2}.
When the expected revenue at each location the same, individual rationality will
be satisfied whenever the expected revenue is greater than or equal to the cost. When
the expected revenue is different, the discounted expected revenue must exceed the
cost. This means that the expected revenue could be below the cost in the low-
revenue location, provided there is sufficiently high revenue in the high-revenue loca-
tion. The individual rationality condition are easier to interpret when δ approaches
1. The limiting nonnegative discounted profit condition is
∑
i∈{1,2}
pi Qi ≥
∑
i∈{1,2}
c (Qi + Ti + vi)
The total revenue that drivers receive must exceed the total cost they incur. All of
the drivers choose strategies with the same expected payoff; therefore, in the limit
their expected discounted profit will be the same regardless of the individual driver’s
current location. Since the limiting profit is the same, the individual driver’s profit
will be positive if the total revenue exceeds the total cost.
Using the price-vacancy representation of the equilibrium, the regulator’s maxi-
mization problem is to maximize
WTSML =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi + Ti)
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− φi (Qi + Vi + Ti) + (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi + Ti))
)
(2.14)
subject to the constraints implied by Proposition 2. Given a preferred set of prices
and vacancy rates, the regulator will need to assign
NML =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(Vi +Qi + Ti)
medallions. The medallions cover the taxis that are occupied, vacant, or transitioning
in each location.
2.6 Comparing Exclusive Cruising and Combined Regulation
We compare exclusive cruising regulation and combined regulation in two ways. We
start by looking at how the environment affects which type of regulation is preferred.
We then look at the exclusive cruising equilibrium characteristics and see if they can
provide information about which regulation is preferred. To aid us in comparing
the different types of regulation, we develop a result that allows us to determine
whether exclusive cruising regulation is preferred to combined regulation when there
are no trips between locations. When exclusive cruising is preferred, we can find
environments with the same aggregate demand in both locations and where there is
a positive number of trips between locations such that exclusive cruising regulation
is preferred to combined regulation. Since the equilibria are simpler to find when
there are no trips between locations, this makes it easier to show that certain factors
cause exclusive cruising regulation to be preferred to combined regulation.
When the number of trips between locations is zero, the exclusive cruising prob-
lem can be solved by maximizing the weighted total surplus at each of the locations
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independently. For each location the planner chooses a price and vacancy level to
maximize
WTSLECi =
∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, Vi) dQ− c ni − φi ni + (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c ni)
subject to Rνi ≥ c when Qi > 0. Let RLECi be the revenue levels at location i that
occur under prices and vacancy rates which maximize the surplus at location i.
Under metropolitan level regulation, when the number of trips between locations
is zero, in equilibrium either the expected revenue in the two locations is equal or
the quantity is only positive for one location. If the expected revenue in the two
locations was not equal, then drivers at the low-value location would either want to
search while relocating to the high-value location or they would want to transition to
the high-value location without searching. Drivers at the high-value location would
search while remaining in the high-value location. Since occupied taxis remain in
their location, the resulting net flow of taxis to the high-value location would violate
stationarity. Under combined regulation, the planner maximizes
WTSLEC1 +WTS
LEC
2
subject to Rν1 = R
ν
2 ≥ c when Qi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2} and Rνi ≥ c when Qi > 0 for
some i ∈ {1, 2}.
When the demand function has no trips between locations, any combined regula-
tion equilibrium can also be achieved as an exclusive cruising equilibrium. Combined
regulation places an additional constraint on the profit levels. WhenRLEC1 andR
LEC
2
are disjoint, the regulator will not be able to obtain the same weighted total surplus
under combined regulation as they do under exclusive cruising regulation. When the
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weighted total surplus in each of the two locations is positive and the expected max-
imizing revenue sets are disjoint, exclusive cruising will be preferred to combined
regulation. The following Lemma give conditions to extend the result to certain
environments with a positive number of trips between locations.
Lemma 1 Let {(qi, 0, ei, ωi, c)}i∈{1,2} where {P (Qi, vi) : Qi > 0} and {Qi(c, vi)} are
bounded for i ∈ {1, 2}. If
1. maxWTSLECi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
2. RLEC1,0 ∩RLEC2,0 = ∅
3. For both i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists an Ri ∈ RLECi,0 such that δRi > c.
Then there exist α∗1 and α
∗
2 such that for α1 < α
∗
1 and α2 < α
∗
2, exclusive cruising
regulation is strictly preferred to combined regulation when {(q′i, q˜′i, ei, ωi, c)}i∈{1,2}
with q′i = (1− αi) qi and q˜′i = αi qi, .
The third condition is necessary to extend the result that exclusive cruising reg-
ulation is preferred to combined regulation when there are a small number of trips
between locations. When there are a positive number of trips between locations, the
drivers will make a trip to the other location with positive probability. When drivers
end up in the other location their stream of revenue is delayed by a single period,
therefore, they have to receive a sufficiently high revenue in subsequent periods to be
willing to provide service. When this condition is satisfied, we can use a continuity
argument to show that the exclusive cruising is still preferred when the number of
trips between locations is sufficiently close to zero.
The lemma provides method for finding situations where exclusive cruising regu-
lation is preferred to combined regulation. In order to show that a factor can lead to
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exclusive cruising regulation being preferred, it is sufficient to look at what happens
when there are no trips between locations.
2.6.1 Environment Characteristics
We compare the efficiency of each form of regulation looking at the environment.
We look at how the location specific demand, externality, and preference to revenue
affect which form of regulation is preferred. We start by looking at factors that
cause exclusive cruising regulation to be preferred. Differences in the characteristics
of the locations can lead to exclusive cruising regulation being preferred to combined
regulation. This can be due to differences in the externality, weighting on driver
profit, or the demand.
Proposition 4 There exist environments {(qi(), q˜i(), φi, ωi, c, δ)}i∈{1,2} with q˜i() > 0
whenever qi( ) > 0 such that exclusive cruising regulation is preferred to combined
regulation when the only factor that differs between the locations is:
1. The externality at the locations
2. The regulators weighting on driver profit
3. The demand function
For each factor, we find an environment where there are zero trips demanded to
the other location, the only factor that differs is the factor of interest, and the profit
levels differ at the optimal price and vacancy levels. Lemma 1 shows that exclusive
cruising regulation will be preferred for an environment where the number of trips
between location is positive for both locations. For each of these factors, differences
in the factor will cause the preferred profit levels to differ. Provided the expected
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revenue exceeds the marginal cost, we can choose a discount factor such that the
third condition of the lemma is satisfied.
When there are no trips between locations, a higher externality will tend to in-
crease the desired regulated price and decrease the desired vacancy rate. When the
externality is sufficiently high, the profit levels at the exclusive cruising surplus max-
imizing outcome will be positive. We choose different levels of externality such that
at the surplus maximizing values, the profit levels will differ. A high preference for
driver profit has a similar effect. For a sufficiently high preference towards revenue,
the driver profit at the surplus maximizing outcome is strictly increasing in the pref-
erence towards revenue. We can find an example where the profit levels differ by
choosing different preferences towards revenue that are sufficiently high to generate
positive profit at the surplus maximizing outcome.
When the demands differ, the desired price and vacancy rates will differ. This
can cause the expected revenue at the surplus maximizing outcome to differ. For
the profit to differ, there needs to be some factor causing the expected revenue at
the weighted total surplus maximizing levels to be greater than zero. There needs
to be either a sufficiently high externality or a sufficiently high preference to revenue
to ensure that the surplus maximizing profit is positive; therefore, in addition to
differences in demand, we need a positive externality or positive preference towards
driver profit for exclusive cruising to be preferred.
While the result informs us of the potential factors leading to exclusive cruising
regulation being preferred to combined regulation, it looks at the limiting behavior
when there are a small number of trips between locations. It does not give us a good
indication of the tradeoffs when there are a larger number of trips between locations.
We determine what happens more generally as the number of trips between loca-
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tions increases. We look specifically at the case where the locations have symmetric
demand. We also restrict the combined regulation equilibrium prices to be the same
in both locations.
The environment is given by {((1−α)Qi(), αQi(), φi, ωi, c, δ)}i∈{1,2} where Q1() =
Q2( ) and α is a parameter that affects the number of trips between locations. We
allow locations to differ in their externality and the preference to revenue. We as-
sume that the demand functions are sufficiently well behaved that we can apply
the envelope theorem to the exclusive cruising and metropolitan level optimization
problems.
Under exclusive cruising, the loss in weighted total surplus from increasing the
number of trips between locations is:
∂WTSLEC
∂α
= −
(
c Q∗1 + c Q
∗
2 +
φ1
ω1
Q∗2 +
φ2
ω2
Q∗1
)
The drivers incur losses due to the increased return trips that they are required to
make. Their is also an increase due to the external cost of taxis making more trips
to the other location. This additional external cost is incurred by the other location.
Eventually, as the proportion of trips between locations increases, it may be impos-
sible to maintain positive profit. When this occurs, there would be a discontinuous
drop in the joint weighted total surplus.
Since both locations have to have the same price, they will also have the same
vacancy rate and the same number of trips between locations. The same policies can
be maintained regardless of the proportion of the trips to going to the other location.
The regulator’s choice of vacancy rates and the corresponding total surplus will be
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the same regardless of the proportion of trips going to the other location; therefore,
∂WTSML
∂α
= 0
Under combined regulation with a more general pricing structure, an increase in
the number of trips between locations could increase surplus, decrease it, or leave
it unchanged. When the number of trips between locations is small, the surplus
maximizing outcome occurs when both locations have the same profit level. Since
the number of trips between locations is small, these are the only flow rates that can
be sustained while providing a decent level of service to both locations. Over that
range, the joint weighted total surplus will remain the same. As the proportion of
trips between locations grows large, the increasing number of trips between locations
could make it so that an equilibrium with different profit levels at each location has
higher surplus. The increase in the number of trips between locations could also
make the original policy infeasible, decreasing total surplus.
We now look at situations that ensure that combined regulation will be preferred
to exclusive cruising regulation. The next result shows that when locations are the
same, combined regulation is preferred to exclusive cruising regulation. This shows
that there needs to be some difference between the two locations, to make it so that
exclusive cruising regulation is preferred to combined regulation. So long as the
expected revenue is decreasing in the vacancy rate and the taxi profit is positive at
the optimal values, this result will also hold when the difference between location
specific characteristics is sufficiently small.
Proposition 5 Combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regula-
tions when each location has the same demand, preference towards revenue, and ex-
ternal cost of driving. If, under exclusive cruising regulation, q˜LECi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
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the preference will be strict.
When the externality, preference towards revenue, and demand are the same, the
locations can be made better off by choosing the same prices and vacancy levels as
under exclusive cruising regulation. Since the price, vacancy rates, and demand are
the same, the number of occupied trips to the other location will also be the same.
When drivers choose to search while remaining in the same location, there will be no
movement of vacant or transitioning taxis. The outcome will be individually rational,
since taxis receive the same expected payoff but no longer have to transition back to
their original location.
This eliminates the transitioning trips without affecting service levels. Because of
the elimination of duplicate transitioning, the joint weighted total surplus increases.
The consumer surplus is the same because the price and vacancy levels remain the
same. Driver profit has increased, because taxis no longer transition, and the total
externality has decreased. Since the exclusive cruising equilibrium was maximized
considering the return trips, by further optimizing an even higher joint weighted
total surplus can be reached.
When there is no externality and no additional preference towards revenue, and
when the demand from location i to each location is proportional to the total demand,
combined regulation will also be preferred to exclusive cruising regulation.
Proposition 6 Combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regula-
tions when the external cost of driving is zero, there is no preference towards driver
revenue, and demand for trips to the other location satisfies
q˜i(pi, Vi) = αi Qi(pi, Vi)
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for some αi ∈ [0, 1]. If, under exclusive cruising regulation, q˜LECi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
the preference will be strict.
We start by looking at the solution to the “no return” exclusive cruising problem;
the problem where the price and vacancy rates are chosen as though all the trips
remain in the same location. Since there is no externality or preference towards
revenue, at the no return optimal values the expected revenue will equal the expected
cost. If the flow equation is satisfied for the “no return” optimal price and vacancy
rates, then the outcome will be implementable under combined regulation. In each
of the locations the expected revenue will equal the expected cost; therefore, taxis
at each of the locations prefer to search for passengers, but are indifferent in how
they direct their search. By choosing the appropriate search behavior, the outcome
is stationary with zero transitioning. Since the expected revenue at each location
equals the cost the outcome will be individually rational.
Weighted surplus will be higher than under exclusive cruising because the “no
return” problem has the same demand but no return trips. Any solution to the
original exclusive cruising problem will be feasible under the “no return” problem.
Due to the required return trip under the original exclusive cruising problem, the
weighted surplus will be lower under the original exclusive cruising problem. As a
result, combined regulation will have a higher weighted surplus.
If the flow equation is not satisfied, we need to adjust the prices and vacancy
levels to ensure that the flow equation is satisfied. We start by increasing the price
and decreasing the vacancy level, in the locations with the large number of trips.
We do this continuously up to the exclusive cruising price and vacancy levels. Either
there will be some intermediate price and vacancy levels which are equilibria, or
we will have to increase the vacancy rate in the other location. When choosing an
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intermediate price and vacancy rate, surplus in both locations is higher than under
exclusive cruising. If we increase the vacancy in the location with the lower number
of trips, only the surplus generated from that location will be higher.
2.6.2 Exclusive Cruising Equilibrium Characteristics
We look at conditions on the exclusive cruising equilibrium outcomes to determine
what can be inferred about the preferred type of regulation. In particular, we are
curious what can be said about which type of regulation is preferred for a given set of
prices, vacancy levels, quantities of trips to the same location, and quantities of trips
to the other location. We cannot give any conditions that guarantee that exclusive
cruising regulation will be preferred to combined regulation; however, we can find
conditions that guarantee that combined regulation is preferred to exclusive cruising
regulation. The next result shows that is not possible to just look at whether the
prices and vacancy levels are the same.
Proposition 7 There exist exclusive cruising equilibria where both locations have
the same price level and vacancy rates (pLEC1 = p
LEC
2 and V
LEC
1 = V
LEC
2 ), such that
exclusive cruising regulation is strictly preferred to combined regulation.
When the exclusive cruising prices and vacancy levels are the same, the quantities
demanded may still differ. These prices and vacancy levels may not be sustainable as
a combined regulation equilibrium. Different demand functions may give rise to the
same optimal price and vacancy rates. When they do, the profit levels will generally
be different. We can choose environments such that all the trips are to the same
location. When the optimal price and vacancy rates are the same but the expected
revenue at these price and vacancy rates is different, exclusive cruising regulation
75
will be preferred.10
When looking at the prices and vacancy rates, we did not look specifically at
whether they were implementable as a combined regulation equilibrium. By looking
at the exclusive cruising prices, vacancy levels, and resulting quantity demanded,
we have enough information to determine whether these prices and vacancy levels
are feasible as a combined regulation equilibrium. If the prices and vacancy levels
form a combined regulation equilibrium, then the corresponding combined regulation
equilibrium will be preferred. We can use Proposition 2 to find conditions that
guarantee that we can form a combined regulation equilibrium with the same price
and vacancy levels.
Proposition 8 When
QLEC1
QLEC1 + V
LEC
1
p1 =
QLEC2
QLEC2 + V
LEC
2
p2 (2.15)
and
Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i (2.16)
combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regulation.
There exist demand functions such that (2.15) and (2.16) are satisfied but q˜LEC1 6=
q˜LEC2 and U
LEC
1,1 6= ULEC2,2 .
The first condition ensures that the profit under combined regulation equilibrium
is the same. The second condition ensures that the flow condition will be satisfied.
Since, when the expected revenue is the same, taxis will choose to search for pas-
sengers in both locations. This will eliminate any transitioning that occurred under
10Since the expect revenue is different, applying Lemma 1 shows that exclusive cruising is pre-
ferred to combined regulation.
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the exclusive cruising equilibrium while maintaining the same prices, vacancy levels,
and quantities; therefore, the joint weighted total surplus will increase. Even though
the profit levels are the same under a combined regulation equilibrium, they need
not be the same under the original exclusive cruising equilibrium. The presence of
return trips may make it so that the profit levels differ under the exclusive cruising
equilibrium.
These results show that you cannot naively look at the outcomes and conclude
that similarities in the exclusive cruising outcome will lead to combined regulation
being preferred. Even if the prices and vacancy levels are the same in both locations,
we cannot guarantee that combined regulation is preferred. Alternatively, even when
the locations look different, we may still be able to look at the exclusive cruising
equilibrium outcome and conclude that combined regulation is preferred. To be able
to conclude that moving to a combined regulatory structure would be preferred we
need to look at the exclusive cruising optimal prices, vacancies, and quantities.
2.7 Conclusion
We developed a model to describe the strategic incentives that taxicabs face under
two different types of regulation; exclusive cruising regulation and combined regu-
lation. We are able to characterize equilibria in terms of responses to prices and
vacancy levels. We show that, despite the duplicate costs of exclusive cruising reg-
ulations, they can enhance efficiency. Differences in local needs may lead cities in
metropolitan areas to prefer this type of regulation. We characterized the charac-
teristics that can lead to exclusive cruising regulation being preferred. We find that
externalities, preferences toward revenue, and differences in demand can each cause
exclusive cruising regulation to be preferred to combined regulation. When these
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factors are not present, combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising
regulation.
We then looked at characteristics of exclusive cruising equilibria outcomes, fo-
cusing on observable market characteristics. We find it is necessary to be careful
when making conclusions about the inefficiency of exclusive cruising regulations.
Even when the exclusive cruising surplus maximizing price and vacancy level are the
same, exclusive cruising regulation could still be preferred to combined regulation.
Despite this result, we are able to develop a condition that uses the exclusive cruising
surplus maximizing prices, vacancy rates, and quantities to give a set of conditions
that ensures that combined regulation is preferred to exclusive cruising regulation.
The model leaves room for extensions. We can use it to look at cities such as New
York, where yellow taxis are able to pick up passengers in the entire city but taxis
affiliated with the outer boroughs are only able to pick up passengers in the outer
boroughs. The model can also be extended to consider a dispatch environment. In a
dispatch environment firms have a strategic choice of where to offer service. Finally,
both exclusive cruising regulation and combined regulation can be inefficient, the
question arises whether more sophisticated mechanisms that improve the efficiency
of the cruising regulation can be found. This topic is addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Designing a Market for Tradable Taxicab Cruising Rights
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3.1 Introduction
The taxi industry is characterized by entry regulations, price restrictions, and exclu-
sive cruising when there are multiple regulatory locations in close proximity. Exclu-
sive cruising regulation occurs in areas with multiple regulatory locations that each
has the requirement that only taxis affiliated with the location are able to provide
service. These regulations prevent taxis from simultaneously being affiliated with
multiple regulatory locations. Taxis that drive passengers from their affiliated loca-
tion to an unaffiliated location have to return to an affiliated location in order to
be able to pick up passengers. When empty return trips from different regulatory
locations overlap, the duplicate return trips result in inefficiency.
Exclusive cruising often occurs in metropolitan areas where there are multiple
regulators in close proximity, such as the Boston metropolitan area. The Boston
metropolitan area has a number of municipalities that border each other. Local
regulations in these municipalities prevent taxis that are affiliated with other munic-
ipalities from picking up passengers in the municipality. Despite theses regulations,
taxi drivers frequently drive passengers from one municipality to another, and are
required to return empty to their affiliated municipality in order to be able to pick
up passengers.
Exclusive cruising regulation also occurs when a single regulator divides a city
up into multiple affiliations and restricts where taxis of a given affiliation are able to
pick up passengers. The regulators of Los Angeles and New York City have chosen
to implement exclusive cruising regulation within their cities. In Los Angeles, the
city is subdivided into five zones. Taxi companies are licensed to provide service
in specific zones. Cruising taxis are prevented from picking up passengers in other
zones. In 2013, New York City introduced Boro Taxis, a special class of taxis that
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are only able to operate in the lower demand areas of the city. The Boro Taxis were
introduced because most of the taxi service was provided in Manhattan, leaving too
little vacancy in the other boroughs. The Yellow taxis continue to be able to provide
service to the entire city.
In other cities, such as Chicago and Houston, registered taxis can pick up pas-
sengers throughout the city. These combined regulations have their own sources of
inefficiency. Since affiliated taxis can move freely between locations, drivers will di-
rect their search in a manner that grants them the highest expected revenue. The
location that has the highest expected revenue may not be the most socially desirable
location for taxis to be searching for passengers, potentially causing too many taxis
to be in one location and two few taxis to be in another. Drivers directing their
search towards the high-value location leads to inefficiency by limiting the ability of
the regulator to choose price and vacancy levels that are ideal for all of the locations.
These differing sources of inefficiency may cause either type of regulation to be
preferred. As established in the previous chapter, there is a trade-off between in-
efficiency caused by duplicate return trips under exclusive cruising regulation, and
the inefficiency caused by losing the flexibility to choose price and vacancy levels
that meet the needs of the localities under combined regulation. Exclusive cruising
regulation will tend to be preferred when there are few trips between locations and
the localities are different, while combined regulation will tend to be preferred when
there are a large number of trips between locations and the locations are similar.
Looking at the source of inefficiency under exclusive cruising regulation suggests
a way to deal with the problem. Under exclusive cruising regulation, returning taxis
from different affiliations drive by passengers on their return trip and are unable to
pick these passengers up. One may envision a regulatory structure that allows these
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drivers to temporarily exchange the right to pick up passengers in each other’s affili-
ated locations. If two taxicabs are located in the others affiliated location, then their
drivers can temporarily exchange for the right to pick up passengers affiliated with
the other location. Allowing taxis to exchange the right to pick up passengers has
the potential to eliminate some of the costs of duplication while still giving regulators
the flexibility to choose policies that meet the particularities of their localities.
In this chapter, we study the consequences of a proposed exchange market that
allows the regulator to choose prices and the total number of taxis affiliated with
each location. Taxis would be able to pick up passengers in their affiliated location
but have to exchange for the right to pick up passengers in unaffiliated locations.
When drivers that are affiliated with different locations are in each other’s affiliated
location, the drivers would be able to trade for the right to be able to temporarily
pick up passengers in each other’s affiliated location. This exchange gives drivers the
opportunity to search for passengers in the other location instead of being forced to
return to their original location.
To analyze the regulatory exchange market, we use a dynamic network flow model.
Taxi drivers search for passengers strategically, maximizing their expected profit.
When occupied, taxis drive passengers to their desired location. Given the restric-
tions placed on the drivers by the regulatory structure, taxis that remain vacant
are able to direct their search. Under exclusive cruising regulation, the regulatory
structure requires that drivers return to their original location before picking up
another passenger. The return trip is a source of inefficiency. Under combined reg-
ulation, drivers prefer the high-valued location and direct their search accordingly.
This frequently prevents the regulator from implementing the efficient outcome.
The regulatory exchange market gives the regulator the ability to choose service
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levels for the individual location but eliminates the duplicate return trips that are
prevalent under exclusive cruising regulation. The regulatory exchange market can
achieve the first-best, provided that the“no-subsidy” condition is satisfied at the first-
best. The no-subsidy condition is satisfied if the expected revenue at each location
exceeds the cost of operating a taxi. When this condition is satisfied, profit from
one of the locations is not necessary to subsidize losses at the other location, and
the first-best can be achieved using a regulatory exchange market. The first-best can
be achieved by using prices such that in equilibrium drivers are indifferent between
searching for passengers in each of the locations.
When the no-subsidy condition is not satisfied, the regulatory exchange market
may not be able to achieve the first-best. Even when it does not achieve the first-
best, it is still worth comparing it to the two most common types of regulation;
exclusive cruising regulations and combined regulations. We find that, regardless
of whether the first-best satisfies the no-subsidy condition, the regulatory exchange
market is preferred to both exclusive cruising regulation and combined regulation.
The regulatory exchange market can be used to eliminate the duplicate costs under
exclusive cruising regulation, and can be used to give the regulator more flexibility
in choosing price and vacancy levels than under combined regulation.
We model the regulatory exchange market by assuming that there is a market
maker that chooses a regulatory exchange price. By participating in the exchange,
drivers temporarily gain the right to pick up passengers in an unaffiliated location but
temporarily lose the right to pick up passengers in their affiliated location. Depending
on whether the exchange price is positive or negative, drivers either make a payment
or receive a payment. Under the regulatory exchange market, the market maker
chooses regulatory exchange prices such that the regulatory exchange prices represent
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a payment from drivers affiliated with one location to drivers affiliated with another
location for the right to pick up passengers in each others’ affiliated locations.
We choose to use a market because the regulatory exchange market would likely
perform well under conditions that are more general than the model that we study;
for instance, when demand varies over time, using a market to exchange regulatory
locations ensures that minimum service levels are met. Under a regulatory exchange
market, regulators have less ability to manipulate the regulatory exchange price than
they would if the exchange prices were independently set by the regulator. Under
the regulatory exchange market, the drivers’ net revenue will typically only depend
on the price and vacancy rates in their affiliated location, limiting the ability for
local regulators to strategically manipulate the exchange prices.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we extend the network model
of the previous chapter to incorporate exclusive cruising regulation, combined regu-
lation, and the regulatory exchange market into a single framework. In Section 3.3,
we present the main results; we characterize the first-best from a joint regulator’s
perspective and look at the efficiency properties of the three types of equilibria, fo-
cusing our attention on the Regulatory Exchange Market Equilibrium. Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Model
We extend the model from the previous chapter, incorporating the regulatory ex-
change. As in the previous chapter, there are two locations, each with a set of
affiliated taxicabs. Taxis can pick up passengers in their affiliated location; however,
to be able to pick up passengers at the other location, taxis must acquire the right
to pick up passengers by participating in the regulatory exchange. When participat-
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ing in the regulatory exchange, drivers either incur a cost or receive a payment, are
temporarily able to pick up passengers in the unaffiliated location, and temporarily
forgo the right to pick up passengers in their affiliated location. By choosing an
appropriate price, the regulatory exchange framework allows us to look at exclusive
cruising, combined regulation, and the regulatory exchange market.
Taxis move between locations according to the flow behavior in Section 2.4.1.
The demand structure is the same as in Section 2.4.2. In addition, we assume that
for any (pi, Vi) and (p
′
i, V
′
i ) such that
Qi(pi, Vi) = Qi(p
′
i, V
′
i )
we have
qi(pi, Vi) = q(p
′
i, V
′
i ) q˜i(pi, Vi) = q˜i(p
′
i, V
′
i )
This assumption simplifies the proof of many of the results. In particular, it leads
to a simpler representation of the first-best, thereby allowing us to state a simpler
definition of the no-subsidy condition.1
3.2.1 Driver Strategies
Drivers can pick up passengers freely in their affiliated location; however, to be able
to pick up passengers in the other location, taxis must exchange for the right to pick
up passengers. Upon participating in the regulatory exchange, drivers may either
1This simplifying assumption is weaker than the assumption that the demand for trips is pro-
portional to the aggregate quantity demanded. For instance, for low quantities, the proportion of
trips between locations could be low and could increase as the total number of trips increases. The
assumption requires the proportion of trips between locations must be the same only when the
number of trips between locations is the same. The proportion can differ when the total number of
trips differs.
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incur a cost or receive a payment. Over time, taxis move between location according
to their search behavior and whether they acquire passengers.
At the beginning of each period, taxis in their affiliated location choose between
one of three actions; searching for passengers and remaining in the same location if
unoccupied, ν, searching for passengers and moving to the other location if unoccu-
pied, ν˜, and transitioning to the other location without searching for passengers, T .
Drivers at location i that are affiliated with regulator i have a choice set
Si,i = {ν, ν˜, T}
Taxis that are not in their affiliated location have to choose whether to partici-
pate in the regulatory exchange. If they participate in the regulatory exchange, they
have a choice between searching for passengers while remaining in the same location
if unoccupied, νm, searching for a passenger while moving to the other location if
unoccupied, ν˜m, and transitioning to the other location without searching for a pas-
senger, Tm. Otherwise, if they choose not to participate in the regulatory exchange,
they have to return to their affiliated location without searching for passengers, T .
We allow the driver to choose a strategy Tm because it may be difficult for the regula-
tor to determine whether a taxi is actively searching for a passenger. Drivers could,
in principle, participate in the regulatory exchange market but drive by potential
passengers. Drivers at location i affiliated with location j have a choice set
Si,j = {T, νm, ν˜m, Tm}
As in the previous chapter, we assume that drivers can choose strategies based on
their location, and the number of taxis at each location that are affiliated with each
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regulator. We assume that all taxis with the same affiliation choose the same mixed
strategy. Using these strategies, we can determine the number of taxis choosing a
particular strategy and the number of taxis with each affiliation choosing a particular
strategy. Define nsi as the total number of drivers in location i choosing strategy s
or sm, with n
s
i,a having affiliation a. Then
nsi,a =
∑
s∈{Si,a∩{s,sm}}
ni,a σ
a(s;n1,n2, i)
and
nsi =
∑
a∈{1,2}
nsi,a
Using the procedure in section 2.4.3 we can determine the evolution of the vacancy
rates, the quantities, and the transitioning behavior of the taxis
(vi,a, v˜i,a, qi,a, q˜i,a, Ti,a)i∈{1,2},a∈{1,2} (3.1)
3.2.2 Driver Payoff
Drivers choose strategies to maximize their expected discounted profit, discounting
future periods at a rate δ. In each period, drivers in the unaffiliated location that
participate in the regulatory exchange receive a payment or incur a cost. Taxis that
become occupied receive a location specific price from their passengers. All drivers
incur a cost, c, of operating their taxis. Drivers have the choice of whether to provide
service; therefore, to be willing to provide service taxis need a non-negative expected
discounted profit at every point in time.
At the start of each period, taxis in location i with affiliation j have to decide
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whether to participate in the regulatory exchange. Taxis that participate in the
regulatory exchange make a payment τi to the market maker. By participating in the
regulatory exchange, drivers temporarily acquire the right to search for passengers in
the unaffiliated location and forgo the opportunity to search up passengers in their
affiliated location.2 The value of τi can either be positive or negative. When the
value of τi is negative, drivers in in location i receive a payment for temporarily
switching which location they can pick up passengers in. The number of taxis in
location i that participate in the regulatory exchange market is nmi .
The expected revenue that drivers receive from passengers does not depend on
whether they participate in the regulatory exchange; therefore, the single period
expected revenue is defined the same as in the previous chapter. The single period
profit is determined by the expected revenue that the driver receives, the cost of
providing service, and, when the driver participates in the regulatory exchange, the
regulatory exchange price. The driver’s single-period expected profit is given by
pisii,i =

Rsii − c if si ∈ {ν, ν˜}
−c if si = T
, pisii,j =

Rsii − c− τi if si ∈ {νm, ν˜m, Tm}
−c if si = T
Since market participation does not affect the transition probabilities, the tran-
sition probabilities will be the same as in the previous chapter. Given a particular
set of strategies chosen by the other drivers σ′ and a current state (n1,n2, i), we can
2We focus on the case where the exchange price is a price to search passengers rather than a price
for picking up passengers. When the price is a price to pick up passengers, the efficient outcome is
not typically obtainable. We discuss this further in Section 3.3.3, when we discuss the properties
of the regulatory exchange market.
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determine the Bellman equation for a taxi at location i facing prices pi and τi:
Ui,a(σ
′;n1,n2) = max
s∈Si,a
pisi,a + δ ∑
k∈{1,2}
ρsik Uk,a(σ
′;n′1,n
′
2)
 (3.2)
The drivers’ maximizing strategy set is the set of the strategy that maximizes equa-
tion (3.2).
3.2.3 Equilibrium
The stationary Markov equilibrium is defined similarly to the previous chapter. In
addition the total number of taxis of each affiliation and the location specific prices,
the regulator also chooses a regulatory exchange price for each location.
Definition Stationary Markov Equilibrium: Let N1 and N2 be the number of taxis
affiliated with each location, let p1 and p2 be the prices at the locations, and let τ1
and τ2 be the regulatory exchange prices. A stationary Markov equilibrium is a set
of mixed strategies such that
1. Ni = n1,i + n2,i for i ∈ {1, 2}
2. The set of strategies played with positive probability satisfies
arg maxsi∈Si,a
pisii,a + δ ∑
k∈{1,2}
ρsiik Uk,a(σ−;n
′
1,n
′
2)

3. For all i ∈ {1, 2} and a ∈ {1, 2} where ni,a > 0
Ui,a ≥ 0
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4. For all a ∈ {1, 2}
T1,a + q˜1,a + ν˜1,a = T2,a + q˜2,a + ν˜2,a (3.3)
We can model exclusive cruising regulation, combined regulation, and the regu-
latory exchange market as special cases of the stationary Markov Equilibrium. An
Equilibrium Under Exclusive Cruising Regulation is a stationary Markov equilibrium
in a setting with τi =∞ for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Since there is an infinite exchange price,
taxis will never want to pick up passengers in the unaffiliated locations. An Equi-
librium Under Combined Regulation is a stationary Markov equilibrium in a setting
with N2 = 0 and τ2 = 0. Taxis are affiliated with location 1 and can freely pick up
passengers in both locations.
A Regulatory Exchange Market is a stationary Markov equilibrium in a setting
with τ1 = −τ2 and nm1 = nm2 . The market forms a bilateral exchange with price
τi and quantity n
m
i . When τi is positive drivers with affiliation j make a payment
τi to the drivers affiliated with location i. The drivers from both locations acquire
the right to search for passengers in their unaffiliated location and lose the right to
search for passengers in their affiliated location.
A regulatory exchange market is different from equilibrium under exclusive cruis-
ing regulation and combined regulation. Under exclusive cruising regulation, the fee
for the regulatory exchange is positive in both location; therefore, the regulatory
exchange prices are not payments from drivers affiliated with one location to drivers
affiliated with the other location. Under combined regulation, taxis are affiliated
with location 1; therefore, when service is provided to both locations, there will be
a positive number of taxis affiliated with location 1 participating in the regulatory
exchange, and none from location 2.
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3.2.4 Regulator’s Objective
To model the regulator’s preferences, we assume that there is a single regulator
that seeks to maximize the joint weighted surplus of the two locations. We use the
joint regulator to represent a single regulator in a large city, such as New York or
Los Angeles, that is divided up into multiple affiliations. We can also use the joint
regulator to represent multiple regulatory jurisdictions in close proximity, such as in
the greater Boston metropolitan area, by assuming that transfers between regulators
are feasible and that information is symmetric. The joint regulator takes into account
the consumer surplus, the driver profit, and the location-specific external cost of taxi
traffic. We allow the joint regulator to place a higher weighting on driver profit than
it does on other components of the surplus.
The number of vacant taxis affects the benefits passengers receive and the costs
drivers incur. The consumer surplus from trips originating at location i is given by
CSi =
∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− pi Qi
The consumer surplus depends on both the price and the vacancy rate. Increasing
the vacancy rate causes passengers’ willingness to pay to increase, thereby increasing
consumer surplus. The producer surplus generated from drivers at location i is given
by
PSi = pi Qi − c ni
Taxis receive revenue from becoming occupied and driving passengers to their desired
locations. They incur costs whenever they drive passengers to their desired locations,
remain vacant after searching for passengers, or transition to the other location.
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The traffic externality is a location dependent constant external cost per unit of
time spent driving. Each location has a constant marginal external cost φi of driving.
The external cost is the same whether the taxi remains vacant, becomes occupied,
or transitions to the other location without searching for passengers; therefore, we
represent the total the total external cost as3
Φi(Vi, Qi, Ti) = φi (Vi +Qi + Tj) = φi ni
By representing the externality in this way, we assume that the unit cost of the
externality is independent of the number of taxis on the road, thereby ignoring the
externality that taxis place on other taxis.
The regulator may place a greater weight on drivers profit than she does on other
components of the surplus; the consumer surplus and the externality. To model the
regulator’s preference over driver profit, we assume that the regulator places a weight
of ω on driver profit. We assume that ω ≥ 1. When ω = 1, the regulator maximizes
total surplus. When ω > 1, the regulator places a greater weight on driver profit
then she does on consumer surplus and the external cost components of total surplus.
Given the location specific externalities and preferences towards driver profit, the
3By representing the externality in this fashion, we assume that location i incurs the entire
external cost of trips originating from location i and traveling to the other location. Since we are
looking at stationary values, this representation is equivalent to one where we assume that half of
the externality is incurred in each location.
92
weighted surplus is:4
WTS =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(CSi + ωPSi − Φi)
=
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c ni − φi ni + (ω − 1)(pi Qi − ni ci)
)
(3.5)
Given this setup, we can characterize an environment by the demand functions,
the externalities, the shared preference towards driver profit, the shared marginal
cost, and the shared discount rate.
{(qi( ), q˜i( ), φi, ω, c, δ)}i∈{1,2}
For a given environment, the regulator chooses prices, medallion levels, and a regu-
latory exchange price in order to maximize weighted surplus.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 First-best
We characterize the first-best stationary outcome from the regulator’s perspective.
Under the first-best, the regulator assigns search behavior to the taxicabs without
regard to their incentives and does not have to ensure that drivers make non-negative
expected discounted profit. In this sense, the first-best ignores both the incentive
4We can allow the preference over driver profit to differ by location. When there are multiple
regulators, we can assume that the transferable component of the surplus is the driver revenue and
represent the joint weighted surplus by
WTS =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(
PSi +
1
ωi
CSi − 1
ωi
Φi
)
(3.4)
This is done in the previous chapter. Assuming this general structure does not compromise any of
the major results.
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compatibility and the individual rationality constraints. Since the regulator is not
bound by incentive compatibility and individual rationality, under the first-best we
can disregard the affiliations of the drivers.
The regulator chooses price levels and the total number of taxicabs at the two
locations, and assigns behaviors to the taxicabs. Without loss of generality, we
can say that the regulator assigns probabilities that taxis at location i are assigned
actions v, v˜, and T . We assume that the regulator assigns all taxis at location i
the same probability of choosing a given action. We denote the probability of a taxi
at location i being assigned an action s by σi(s). The choice of prices, number of
taxis in each location, and taxi actions determines the number of taxis that search
for passengers, remain vacant, become occupied, and transition. It also determines
the number of occupied and vacant taxis from each location that end the period in
the other location.5
A stationary outcome under the planner’s problem is a choice of ni and σi(s)
such that the flow of taxis between location is equal. The regulator’s problem is to
choose prices, the number of taxicabs at each location, and taxi actions in order to
maximize the weighted surplus:
max
{pi,ni,σi}i∈{1,2}
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c ni − φi ni + (ω − 1)(pi Qi − ni ci)
)
5The total number of taxis at location i that search for passengers is determined by the number
of taxis at location i and the probability of being assigned either ν or ν˜. The number of searching
taxicabs at location i and the price, pi, determine the number of taxis in location i that become
occupied and the number that remain vacant. The taxis that become occupied drive to their
passengers desired location. Of the Qi occupied taxis, qi remain in the same location and q˜i
relocate. Of the vacant taxis, vi stay in the same location and v˜i relocate based on the proportion
of taxis that are assigned each search direction.
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subject to the stationary flow condition:
v˜1 + q˜1 + T1 = v˜2 + q˜2 + T2
Throughout the chapter, we assume that the first-best has Qi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
This means that demand is sufficiently high in both locations such that it is worth
providing service to both locations under the first-best.
The choice variables for the planner are the number of taxis assigned to each
location, the prices, and the assigned taxi actions; however, since Douglas (1972),
the taxicab literature has looked at equilibria in terms of prices and aggregate vacancy
levels. This makes the problem more intuitive to evaluate. The vacancy level is a
more direct measure of the quality of service to the passengers. We show that we
can represent the first-best as an optimization problem in terms of price and vacancy
rates, subject to an inequality that ensures the flow condition is satisfied. The proof
of this and subsequent results are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 9 The first best has no transitioning; therefore, the planner’s problem
can be stated as a solution to the surplus maximizing problem with respect to price
and aggregate vacancy levels:
max
{pi,Vi}i∈{1,2}
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c ni − φi ni + (ω − 1)(pi Qi − ni ci)
)
subject to
Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i i ∈ {1, 2} (3.6)
Since vacancy provides value to passengers, there will be zero transitioning under
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the first-best. Whenever there is transitioning, the regulator can increase weighted
surplus by reassigning transitioning drivers to be searching drivers. Since the vacancy
rate increases, consumers’ willingness to pay increases. The regulator increases the
price so that the same quantity will be demanded, and chooses search behavior such
that the same number of taxis relocate. This increases the passengers’ value while
leaving the quantity and number of drivers at each location the same. Since the
quantity is the same, the drivers’ cost and the external cost remain the same. This
causes the unweighted surplus to increase. Since the price increases, driver profit
also increases and, as a result, the weighted surplus increases.
A set of price and vacancy rates can achieve a stationary distribution when there
is sufficient vacancy to cover the net flow of occupied taxis between locations. If
there is a positive net flow of occupied taxis from location j to location i, then there
needs to be sufficient vacancy in location i such that taxis at location i that are
assigned to search while relocating can counteract the flow of occupied taxis. When
equation (3.6) is satisfied, there are enough vacant taxis at location i to satisfy the
flow equation. Alternatively, any stationary outcome will satisfy equation (3.6) since
the vacancy rate must exceed the number of vacant taxis that are relocating.
Since the weighted surplus depends on the price, the vacancy level, and the
corresponding quantities, any set of actions that induce the same price and vacancy
levels induces the same weighed surplus. This allows us to look at the first-best
problem in terms of the price and the vacancy rates, and use equation (3.6) to
determine whether the prices and vacancy levels satisfy the stationary flow equality.
This allows us to represent the first-best as the solution to the weighted surplus
maximization problem with respect to price and vacancy.
Characterizing the problem in terms of prices and vacancy levels is a more intu-
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itive way to represent the first-best optimization problem because the interpretation
of the first order conditions are more intuitive then the first order conditions cor-
responding to the price, total number of taxis, and assignment of search behavior.
When the flow inequality does not bind, the first order conditions with respect to
the quantity and vacancy rate at location i are:
pi = c+
φi
ω
−
(
ω − 1
ω
)
∂pi
∂Qi
Qi
∫ Qi
0
∂pi
∂Vi
dQ = ωc+ φi
The optimal price depends on the cost, the per-unit external cost of driving, the
preference towards driver profit, and the demand curve. By producing an additional
unit of taxi service, drivers receive a payment pi. The drivers incur a cost c of for
the additional occupied trip. There is an externality from the additional trip that
is place on non-market participants. By producing an additional unit of taxi service
the price falls; therefore, drivers incur an inframarginal loss and passengers receive
an inframarginal benefit. Since the weight on driver profit is higher than the weight
on consumer surplus, the regulator puts more weight on the inframarginal loss than
on the inframarginal benefit.
Increasing the vacancy rate increases the benefit passengers receive. The drivers
incur the cost of operating the taxi, and is an external cost incurred by non-market
participants. The vacancy rate is chosen such that the weighted benefit of increasing
the vacancy is equal to the weighted cost of increasing the vacancy. The total increase
in the willingness to pay from an additional unit of vacancy will be equal to the
marginal cost weighted by the preference to driver profit plus the marginal external
cost. When the flow inequality for location j binds, increasing Vi or decreasing pi
increases the number of trips to location j. This requires that either pj decreases or
that Vj increases; therefore, the we have to ensure that the price and vacancy rates
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in both location are simultaneously chosen in an optimal fashion.
We define a condition, the no-subsidy condition, which is a sufficient condition for
the first-best to be obtainable using a regulatory exchange market and a necessary
condition for implementing the first-best under exclusive cruising regulation. When,
for a given set of price and vacancy levels, Rνi < c for at least one of the two locations,
the efficient outcome cannot be realized without a subsidy. The subsidy could either
occur indirectly, as a result of profit from the other location being used to subsidize
losses, or directly, through a subsidy from the regulator. Alternatively, when Rνi ≥ c
for i ∈ {1, 2}, neither type of subsidy is necessary to satisfy the individual rationality
constraint. We define the no-subsidy condition:
Definition No-Subsidy Condition
An allocation satisfies the no-subsidy condition so long as the expected revenue at
each location is sufficient to cover the expected cost:
Rνi ≥ c i ∈ {1, 2}
Since any stationary first-best outcome that satisfies the no-subsidy condition
can be implemented using a regulatory exchange market, one would hope that the
efficient outcome always satisfies the no-subsidy condition. Unfortunately, as the
following result shows, this is not the case; when there is no externality imposed by
taxi traffic and the regulator does not place any additional weighting on driver profit
the efficient outcome will not satisfy the no-subsidy condition.
Proposition 10 For a given environment where φi = 0 and ωi = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2},
the first best will not satisfy the no-subsidy condition.
When there is no externality or preference towards driver profit, in absence of the
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flow constraint, the ideal price will be equal to the operating cost. In any outcome
where the flow inequality binds in location i, optimality requires that the price in
location j is generally less than or equal to the cost of service. If the price in location
i were above the cost, lowering the price would increase the surplus and will still
maintain the flow inequality. As a result when there is no preference towards driver
profit, the first-best price is pi ≤ c for at least one of the two locations. Due to
vacancy, the expected revenue will be below the price and the no-subsidy condition
will not be satisfied.
A positive externality or a positive preference towards revenue are needed to
ensure that the no-subsidy condition is satisfied at the first-best. Both a positive
externality and a positive preference towards revenue cause the regulator to prefer a
higher price. If the externality or preference towards revenue are sufficiently large,
than the expected revenue at the first-best can be above the marginal cost.
3.3.2 Exclusive Cruising and Combined Regulation
We examine the properties of exclusive cruising and combined regulation. We char-
acterize situations where we can achieve the first-best under each type of regulation.
In certain situations, exclusive cruising regulation will achieve the first-best but com-
bined regulation will not. In other situations, the reverse will occur; combined reg-
ulation will achieve the first-best but exclusive cruising will not. This shows that
there are instances where each type of regulation is preferred to the other. In this
section, we assume that the no-subsidy condition is satisfied at the first-best. In
both of the following results, if the no-subsidy condition is violated at the first-best,
then the first-best will not be achievable.
Under exclusive cruising, the source of inefficiency is trips from one location to the
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other. Anytime there are trips from one location to the other, the exclusive cruising
outcome will be inefficient. Alternatively, when taxis do not drive passengers to the
other location, exclusive cruising will be efficient. We state these results formally:
Proposition 11
1. If, for some i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) > 0 whenever Qi(pi, Vi) > 0, then the first best
is not achievable under exclusive cruising regulation.
2. If, for i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) = 0 for all pi and Vi, then the first best is achievable
under exclusive cruising regulation.
When there is a positive demand for trips to the other location, the exclusive
cruising regulation outcome will not achieve the first-best. To achieve the same price
and vacancy rates as under the first-best, taxis would have to transition back to
their desired location. Since the first-best has zero transitioning, it is impossible to
achieve the first-best under exclusive cruising. Alternatively, when the demand at
each location has no trips to the other, the first-best is achievable. The regulator
chooses the number of medallions equal to the number of search taxis under the first.
Passenger will not demand trips to the other location and vacant taxis will not find
it worthwhile to go to the other location. The no-subsidy condition ensures that
taxis generates enough revenue to cover their operating costs.
Under combined regulation, drivers search for passengers strategically. There are
two types of equilibria, equilibria where the expected revenue in each location is
equal and equilibria where the expected revenue in the two locations differs. When
the expected revenue is the same, drivers will be indifferent between searching for
passengers while remaining in the same location and searching for passengers while
relocating. In equilibria where profit levels differ, drivers in the low-value location
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either search for passengers while relocating or they transition without searching for
passengers. We can use these features of the combined equilibria to give a partial
characterization of the efficiency of combined regulation.
Proposition 12
1. If the two locations have the same demand and the same external cost, combined
regulation achieves the first best.
2. If, for i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) = 0 for all pi and Vi then combined regulation may
not achieve the first best.
When locations are symmetric, the first-best price and vacancy rates will be the
same in both locations.6 We assign taxis to search for passengers while remaining in
the same location. The outcome will be an equilibrium with the desired price and
vacancy rates. Since the price and vacancy rates are the same in both locations, so
is the expected revenue; therefore, the search behavior will be incentive compatible.
The number of occupied trips between locations will also be the same. Since vacant
taxis remain in the same location, the flow of taxis will remain the same; therefore,
the outcome is an equilibrium.
Alternatively, when there is no demand for trips between locations, the only
equilibria will have equal expected revenue. If the expected revenue levels were to
differ, taxis in the high-value location would prefer to search while remaining in the
same location and taxis in the low-value location would either prefer to search while
relocating or to transition without searching. There would be a flow of taxis from
the low-value location to the high-value location; therefore, in equilibrium, the profit
levels must be the same. When, for a given environment, the profit levels at the
6When there are multiple first-best price and vacancy rates, any price and vacancy rate that is
part of an optimal can be chosen for both locations.
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first-best are the same for some allocation, we can slightly perturb the environment
so that the first-best has different profit levels.
Collectively, Propositions (11) and (12) imply that there are instances where each
type of regulation is strictly preferred to the other. In certain instances combined
regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regulation, and in other insistences
exclusive cruising regulation will be preferred to combined regulation. Neither type
of equilibrium will always achieve the first-best, even when we restrict our attention
to instances where the no-subsidy condition is satisfied at the first-best.
3.3.3 Regulatory Exchange Market
We look at outcomes that can be implemented using a regulatory exchange market.
We characterize the types of equilibria that exist under the regulatory exchange
market. We then show that so long as the first-best satisfies the no-subsidy condition,
it can be achieved using the regulatory exchange market. Finally, we show that even
when the first-best does not satisfy the no-subsidy condition, the regulatory exchange
market will be preferred to exclusive cruising regulation and combined regulation.
Under the regulatory exchange market, equilibria fall into two cases; the case
where taxis are indifferent between moving between locations and the case where
taxis prefer one of the two locations. Taxis will be indifferent between searching in
each of the locations when τi satisfies
τi = R
ν
i −Rνj (3.7)
When this condition is satisfied, the single period expected profit from a driver
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affiliated with location a searching for passengers will be
piνi,a = R
ν
a(pa, Va)− c
Drivers of a given affiliation will receive the same single-period expected profit
from searching for passengers regardless of location. When the single-period profit
is the same in each of the locations, drivers would prefer to search for passengers
rather than transition to the other location; however, they are indifferent between
searching for passengers while remaining in the same location and searching for
passengers while relocating. Since the expected single period profit for a taxi with
affiliation a is the same regardless of the location, the outcome will be individually
rational provided piνi,a is non-negative. This means that the outcome will be individual
rational if and only if the no-subsidy condition is satisfied for a particular price and
vacancy level.
There are also equilibria where the single-period expected profit levels differ based
on location. When τi > R
ν
i −Rνj , drivers find location j more appealing than location
i, regardless of affiliation. Drivers at location i will either search while relocating or
they will transition. When τi is close to R
ν
i − Rνj taxis at location i will prefer to
search for passengers rather than transitioning. As the value of τi increases taxis will
find it worthwhile to transition. There exist regulatory exchange markets where the
no-subsidy condition is violated and where taxis transition. Due to the regulatory
exchange price, drivers affiliated with location i could make sufficient profit in loca-
tion j to cover their cost in location i. This allows us to find regulatory exchange
markets where the no-subsidy condition is violated, but the outcome achieves the
first-best.
The next result show that the regulatory exchange market achieves the first best
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when the no-subsidy condition is satisfied.
Proposition 13 If the first-best outcome satisfies the no-subsidy condition, then it
can be realized using the regulatory exchange market.
When the no-subsidy condition is satisfied at the first-best, the joint regulator
can choose the τi from equation (3.7). Drivers receive the same single-period profit
regardless of their location; therefore, they will be indifferent between which direction
the direct their search. As a result, the strategies that induce the first-best will be
incentive compatible. The no-subsidy condition ensures that the discounted expected
profit is non-negative; therefore, the outcome will satisfy the individual rationality
constraint. By assigning the appropriate number of taxis to each of the locations,
the outcome is a Regulatory Exchange Market Equilibrium.
The structure of the regulatory exchange market is important. The regulatory
exchange price is a payment to search for passengers. Alternatively, the regulatory
exchange price could be a payment drivers make when they pick up passengers. This
alternative structure of the regulatory exchange market will typically not achieve the
first best. For the outcome to be incentive compatible, the expected payment that
a taxi affiliated with location i makes is τi = R
ν
i − Rνj . Letting τ¯i be the payment
that the driver makes for picking up a passenger, the efficient alternative regulatory
exchange prices are
τ¯i =
τi
Qi
Qi+Vi
Since the probability of finding a passenger tends to differ by location, the efficient
outcome will tend not to be implementable under a regulatory exchange market
where the price is a payment for picking up passengers.
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When the no-subsidy condition is not satisfied, the regulatory exchange market
may not achieve the first-best; however, we can still compare it to exclusive cruising
and combined regulation. The regulatory exchange market will always be preferred
to exclusive cruising regulation and combined regulation. It will be preferred to
exclusive cruising regulation because we can choose a regulatory exchange market
equilibrium such that the same quantities are chosen but some of the duplicate trips
are eliminated. It will be preferred to combined regulation because any combined
equilibrium can be mimicked as a regulatory exchange market with a regulatory
exchange price of zero.
Proposition 14 The regulatory exchange market is preferred to exclusive cruising
regulation. This preference will be strict provided for some i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) > 0
whenever Q(pi, Vi) > 0.
The regulatory exchange market is preferred to exclusive cruising regulation, since
we can implement the same price and vacancy levels with the lowest level transition-
ing necessary for a stationary flow of taxis. Taxis that search for passengers and
remain in the same location under exclusive cruising can choose to search for passen-
gers and relocate under the regulatory exchange market, thereby eliminating some
of the transitioning. When there are trips to the other location, this decreases the
total level of transitioning. Since the price and vacancy are the same, the passengers
wellbeing is unaffected. The decrease in transitioning causes the drivers cost and
the externality to decline. The regulatory exchange price is used to ensure that this
outcome can be maintained as a part of an equilibrium.
When the flow inequality is satisfied at the exclusive cruising equilibrium price
and vacancy levels, the same price and vacancy rates are achievable without any
transitioning. The regulatory exchange price is set equal to τi = R
ν
i − Rνj . Under
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these prices, drivers are indifferent between searching while remaining in the same
location and searching while relocating; therefore, drivers can search for passengers in
a manner that maintains a stationary flow of taxis. The outcome will be individually
rational, since taxis affiliated with each of the two locations have the same single-
period expected profit in their affiliated location under exclusive cruising regulation
and no longer have to transition back to their affiliated location in order to pick up
passengers.
When the flow inequality is not satisfied, it is necessary for taxis to transition
from one location to the other. Under the regulatory exchange market, drivers will
only transition at one of the two locations. The regulatory exchange fee should be
chosen such that some taxis will want to transition. By choosing the appropriate
fee, some taxis will be indifferent between searching for passengers while relocating
and transitioning. The vacancy rates are stationary for the appropriate choice of
medallion levels. The drivers affiliated with both locations will have at least as high
profit as under exclusive cruising regulation because they have the option of choosing
the same strategies as under exclusive cruising regulation.
The regulatory exchange market will be preferred to combined regulation. We can
mimic any combined equilibrium using a regulatory exchange market with a regula-
tory exchange price of zero. The combined equilibrium will be incentive compatible
and individually rational; however, since all taxis are affiliated with location 1, the
outcome will not be a regulatory exchange market equilibrium. We can maintain
the same total number of taxis in each location while reallocating some of the taxis
to affiliation 2. This means that the price and vacancy rates from any combined
equilibrium can be achieved under a regulatory exchange market.
Proposition 15 Every combined equilibrium is payoff equivalent to a regulatory ex-
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change market equilibrium. As a result, the regulatory exchange market is weakly
preferred to combined regulation.
The regulatory exchange market gives the regulator more flexibility than under
combined regulation. The regulatory exchange price allows the regulator to maintain
price and vacancy rates that cannot be maintained under combined regulation due to
incentive compatibility issues. When the flow inequality does not bind, the regulator
is able to implement any outcome that satisfies the no-subsidy condition using the
regulatory exchange market. Under combined regulation the regulator is limited to
outcomes that satisfy the no-subsidy condition and have equal profit levels. The
regulator also has more flexibility to choose prices and vacancy levels when the flow
inequality binds.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we used a dynamic network model of the taxicab industry to model
taxi regulation. We develop a framework where taxis have affiliated locations, but
are able to pick up passengers in unaffiliated locations using a regulatory exchange
mechanism. Using the regulatory exchange mechanism framework, we are able to
look at the two most prevalent types of regulation, exclusive cruising regulation and
combined regulation. We are also able to use the regulatory exchange mechanism
to model a regulatory exchange market; a market that allows taxis to temporarily
exchange the right to pick up passengers in each other’s affiliated location.
We characterized the first-best and showed that sometimes the efficient outcome
requires that the losses from driving in one location be subsidized, either by using
profit that the driver receives from another location or through a subsidy from the
regulator. We show that the two most prevalent types of regulation are inefficient,
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even when the no-subsidy condition is satisfied. Alternatively, the regulatory ex-
change market achieves the first-best provided that, at the first-best, the no-subsidy
condition is satisfied. Further, the regulator exchange market is preferred to exclusive
cruising regulation and combined regulation, regardless of whether the no-subsidy
condition is satisfied.
By implementing a regulatory market framework, efficiency would be improved.
Many of the necessary ingredients are already being used in the taxi industry. GPS
tracking is currently quite common; therefore, the regulator would only have to find
a mechanism to communicate price and facilitate the payments between drivers.
Enforcement issues should not be problematic because the mechanism relies mostly
on taxis making the appropriate decision of how to search for passengers rather than
where to direct their search. Unless there is a significant discrepancy in the number of
trips between locations, taxis will find it beneficial to participate in the mechanism.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
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Proposition 1 (Stationary Markov Equilibrium - Exclusive Cruising Regulation)
An exclusive cruising equilibrium can be characterized by {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2} such that
for i ∈ {1, 2},
1. Demand: The quantities demanded satisfy qi = qi(pi, Vi) and q˜i = q˜i(pi, Vi).
2. Flow Behavior: The number of transitioning taxis is Ti = q˜j.
3. Individual Rationality: The discounted expected profit must be non-negative
δpi Qi ≥ c (Qi + δq˜i + Vi) if q˜i > 0
pi Qi ≥ c (Qi + Vi) if q˜i = 0
Conversely, for any pair {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2} such that the above conditions are satisfied,
there exists a unique exclusive cruising equilibrium {(pi, NLECi )}i∈{1,2} with the same
values of {(Vi, Qi, Ti)}i∈{1,2}.
Proof Let a given outcome be an exclusive cruising equilibrium. The equilibrium
consists of nki taxis affiliated with regulator k at location i, with taxis affiliated with
regulator i choose strategies sii = ν and s
i
j = T for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since there are nii
searching taxis cabs at location i, in equilibrium Qi and Vi are uniquely determine
by the solution to
Qi + Vi = n
i
i
With the vacancy rate determined, the values of qi(pi, Vi) and q˜i(pi, Vi) are also
determined.
Using the stationary distribution equation
ν˜1,a + q˜1,a + Ti,a = ν˜2,a + q˜2,a + T2,a
for a ∈ {1, 2}. Since sii = ν and sji = T , this reduces to T kj = q˜ki or Tj = q˜i.
The third condition comes from individual rationality. We calculate the contin-
uation value of the profit for each location:
U ii =
Qi(n
V
i )
Qi(nVi ) + Vi(n
V
i )
pi − c+ δ
(
1− q˜i
Qi(nVi ) + Vi(n
V
i )
)
Ui
+ δ
q˜i
Qi(nVi ) + Vi(n
V
i )
Uj
U ij = −c+ δUi
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Solving the system gives
U ii =
1
1− δ
(
Qi
Qi + Vi + δq˜i
pi − c
)
U ij =
1
1− δ
(
δ Qi
Qi + Vi + δq˜i
pi − c
)
The values of U ii and U
i
j are nonnegative if and only if
Qi pi ≥ (Qi + Vi + δq˜i) c (A.1)
and
δ Qi pi ≥ (Qi + Vi + δq˜i) c (A.2)
respectively.
When q˜i = 0 taxis affiliated with location i are in location i with probability 1;
therefore, individual rationality is satisfied if and only if Equation A.1 holds. When
q˜i > 0, taxis from location i are in both locations with positive probability; therefore,
both Equations A.1 and A.2 must hold. Since Equation A.2 is the more restrictive,
individual rationality is satisfied if and only if Equation A.2 is satisfied.
Conversely, assume that the conditions of the proposition hold. The equilibrium
consists of strategies sii = v and sj = T , with stationary quantities n
i
i = Qi + Vi
and nij = q˜i. Since the number of searching taxicabs is the same, at a price pi, the
quantity and vacancy rates (Q′i and V
′
i ) satisfy
Q′i = Qi, V
′
i = Vi
The number of transitioning taxicabs, T ′ji = q˜
′
i, is the same; therefore, the variables
induced by the equilibrium, {Qi,a, Vi,a, Ti,a} for i ∈ {1, 2}and a ∈ A, will be the same.
The strategies will be individually rationality since
U ii ≥ 0 iff Qi pi ≥ (Qi + Vi + δq˜i) c
and
U ij ≥ 0 iff δQi pi ≥ (Qi + Vi + δq˜i) c
Proposition 2 (Search Behavior) For each combined equilibrium with price and va-
cancy levels {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2}. The following conditions hold:
1. If Rν1 = R
ν
2 then Ti = 0 and Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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2. If Rνi > R
ν
j for some i, j ∈ {1, 2} where j 6= i, define
R∗j =
δ ρν˜jj
1 + δ(1− ρvii)
Rνi
Then Ti = 0 and
Vj = q˜i − q˜j Tj = 0 if Rνj = R∗j
Vj + Tj = q˜i − q˜j if Rνj = R∗j
Tj = q˜i − q˜j Vj = 0 if Rνj = R∗j
Alternatively, for a given set of prices and vacancy rates {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2}, when con-
ditions (1) or (2) are satisfied there is some sets of strategies that induces these price
and vacancy levels such that the stationary flow conditions are satisfied and players
are choosing best responses. Any such strategies induces the same {(Qi, Vi, Ti)}i∈{1,2}.
Proof We break the proof up into the cases. We first show that if the expected
revenue is equal the equilibrium will satisfy the conditions in part (1) and any char-
acteristics that satisfy the conditions in part (1) will be an equilibrium. Second, we
do the same for the conditions in part (2).
(1⇒) If Rν1 = Rν2 , then when choosing si ∈ {ν, ν˜} for i ∈ {1, 2}, the flow value
Rν1 − c, is achieved with certainty in both states. Choosing σ(T ;n1, n2, i) > 0 for
at least one i ∈ {1, 2} lowers the payoff in state i with probability σ(T ;n1, n2, i)
and does not ever generate a higher payoff; therefore, Ti = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since the flow equations satisfy
v˜i + q˜i = v˜j + q˜j
the inequality
Vi ≥ vi ≥ v˜i − v˜j = q˜j − q˜i
is satisfied.
(1⇐) Alternatively, assume {(pi, Vi)}i ∈ {1, 2} such that Rν1 = Rν2 satisfy Vi ≥ q˜j− q˜i
and Ti = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then ni = Qi + Vi for i ∈ {1, 2}. Further, any equilibrium
has σi(T ) = 0 and any strategies that have σi(T ) = 0 are incentive compatible.
Without loss of generality, assume q˜j ≥ q˜i. For the outcome to be stationary,
vi = q˜j − q˜i + vj
where vi ≤ Vi and vj ≤ Vj. We know that we can find such strategies because
vi = q˜j − q˜i vj = 0
satisfies the conditions (1) in the proposition.
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Any values that satisfy both the flow condition and incentive compatibility can
be achieved with the strategies
σi(ν˜) =
v˜i
Vi
σj(ν˜) =
v˜j
Vj
σi(ν) = 1− σi(ν˜) σj(ν) = 1− σj(ν˜)
with n1 = Q1 + V1 and n2 = Q2 + V2. With these strategies, the stationary flow
equation is satisfied and {(Qi, Vi, Ti)}.
(2 ⇒) We start by showing that Ti = 0 and Vj + Tj = q˜i − q˜j . The difference in
the payoffs is
Ui(s−, ni, nj)− Uj(s−, ni, nj)
≥ Rνi −Rsjj + δ
∑
k∈{1,2}
ρvik Uk(s−;n
′
1, n
′
2)− δ
∑
k∈{1,2}
ρ
sj
ik Uk(s−;n
′
1, n
′
2)
= Rνi −Rsjj + δ
(
ρvii − ρsjji
)
(Ui(s−;n′1, n
′
2)− Uj(s−;n′1, n′2))
so
(Ui(s−, ni, nj)− Uj(s−, ni, nj)) (1− δ
(
ρvii − ρsjji
)
) ≥ Rνi −Rsjj
so Ui > Uj. Since Ui > Uj, and the outcome is a combined equilibrium si = v, and
σj(ν) = 0. Since si = v, T1 = 0. Since σj(ν) = 0, vj = 0 and v˜j = Vj. Therefore, we
can rewrite the flow equation as
Vj + Tj = q˜j − q˜i
For given transition probabilities, since the value of choosing si = v, sj = T is
constant in Rνj and the value of choosing si = v, sj = ν˜ is increasing in R
T
j , for a
given Rνi there exists a cutoff R
∗
j such that
Rνj > R
∗
j BRj = {ν˜}
Rνj = R
∗
j BRj = {ν˜, T}
Rνj < R
∗
j BRj = {T}
At the critical value, the payoff from choosing ν˜ and T are the same so using the
Uj representation for sj = ν˜ gives.
Ui − Uj = Rνi − c+ δ (ρvii Ui + (1− ρvii) Uj)
− (R∗j − c+ δ (ρν˜ji Ui + (1− ρν˜ji) Uj))
= Rνi −R∗j + δ
(
ρvii − ρν˜ji
)
(Ui − Uj)
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Rearranging the previous equation gives
Rνi −R∗j = (Ui − Uj)(1− δ(ρvii − ρν˜ji)) (A.3)
Since at the critical value R∗j the payoffs from choosing ν˜ and T at location j are
the same, we set the Uj from choosing sj = ν˜ equal to Uj from choosing sj = T :
(R∗j − c) + δ (ρν˜jj Uj + (1− ρν˜jj)Ui) = −c+ δ Ui
Rearranging in terms of Ui − Uj
Ui − Uj =
R∗j
δ ρν˜jj
(A.4)
We substitute A.4 into A.3:
Rνi −R∗j =
1− δ(ρvii − ρν˜ji)
δ ρν˜jj
Rνj
and solve for R∗j
R∗j =
δ ρν˜jj
1 + δ(1− ρvii)
Rνi
(2 ⇐) Let Rνi > Rνj for {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2}. Then ni = Vi + Qi and nj = Vj + Qj + Tj.
The best responses are BRi = ν and
BRj = {ν˜} if Rνj > R∗j
BRj = {ν˜, T} if Rνj = R∗j
BRj = {T} if Rνj < R∗j
Therefore; the unique set of strategies that induces {(Qi, Vi, Ti)}i∈{1,2} such that
drivers are choosing best responses is
σi(v) = 1 σi(ν˜) = 0 σi(T ) = 0
σj(v) = 0 σj(ν˜) =
Vi +Qi
Vi +Qi + Ti
σj(T ) =
Ti
Vi +Qi + Ti
Proposition 3 (Metro-Level Equilibrium) A combined equilibrium can be charac-
terized by {(pi, Vi)}i∈{1,2} and {(qi, q˜i, Ti)}i∈{1,2} such that
1. Demand: The quantities demanded satisfy qi = qi(pi, Vi) and q˜i = q˜i(pi, Vi).
2. Flow Behavior: Either condition (1) or (2) in Proposition 2 is satisfied.
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3. Individual Rationality: The discounted expected profit must be non-negative:
If Ti + Vi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}:
Rνi ≥ c if Rν1 = Rν2 (A.5)(
1− δ qi + Vi
Qi + Vi
)(
Qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
pj − c
)
+ δ
(
q˜j + Vj + Tj
Qj + Vj + Tj
)(
Qi
Qi + Vi
pi − c
)
≥ 0 if Rνi > Rνj (A.6)
Otherwise,
Rνi ≥ c for all i such that Ti + Vi > 0 (A.7)
Conversely, for any {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2}such that the above conditions are satisfied, there
exists a combined equilibrium with the same {Vi, Qi, Ti}i∈{1,2}.
Proof We first show that equilibrium implies the results, and then we show the
results imply the equilibrium.
(⇒) Let a given outcome be a metro level equilibrium with ni taxis at each location
with mixed strategies σ. We show that the three conditions are satisfied.
(1) For a given combined equilibrium, there are associated vacancy rates Vi and
qi(pi, Vi) via the procedure in the proof of Proposition 1.
(2) We showed that condition 2 is satisfied in Proposition 2.
(3) We require that Ui ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. When Rν1 = Rν2 , Ui = Uj so we require
Ui > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. When U1 = U2
Ui =
Ri − c
1− δ
Therefore, Ui > 0 if and only if R
ν
i ≥ c for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Alternatively, when Rνi > R
ν
j , the Uj < Ui; therefore, Uj ≥ 0 occurs if and only
if Ui, Uj ≥ 0.
Since, any choice is chosen with positive probability has the same expected payoff,
we can represent the payoff as the probability of being in a choosing a particular
strategy multiplied by the payoff associated with the strategy. Upon simplifying,
this becomes
Uj = Rj
Qj + Vj
Qj + Vj + Tj
− c+ δ qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
Uj + δ(1− qj
Qi + Vi + Ti
)Ui
with
Ui = Ri − c+ δ
(
1− q˜i
Qi + Vi
)
Ui + δ
q˜i
Qi + Vi
Uj
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We can write this as a system of equations of the form
a1 Ui + a2 Uj = pii, b1 Ui + b2 Uj = pij
where
a1 = 1− δ(1− q˜i
Qi + Vi
) a2 = −δ q˜i
Qi + Vi
b1 = −δ(1− qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
) b2 = 1− δ qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
pii =
Qi
Qi + Vi
pi − c pij = Qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
pj − c
Solving the system gives
Uj =
ai pij − b1 pii
a1 b2 + b1 a2
so Uj ≥ 0 if and only if ai pij − b1 pii ≥ 0, or(
1− δ qi + Vi
Qi + Vi
)(
Qj
Qj + Vj + Tj
pj − c
)
+ δ
(
q˜j + Vj + Tj
Qj + Vj + Tj
)(
Qi
Qi + Vi
pi − c
)
≥ 0
If Tk + Vk = 0 for some k ∈ {1, 2}, then the individual rationality condition will
be trivially satisfied for all locations where Ti + Vi = 0; therefore, the individual
rationality requires
Rνi ≥ c for all i such that Ti + Vi > 0
(⇐) Assume that {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2}satisfy the three equations. By choosing the strategies
from the proof of Proposition 2 we know that the drivers are playing best responses
and that the flow equation is satisfied. Further, since the statements in part (3) of
the proof are if and only if, we know that incentive compatibility is satisfied.
Lemma 1 Let {(qi, 0, ei, ωi, c)}i∈{1,2} where {P (Qi, vi) : Qi > 0} and {Qi(c, vi)} are
bounded for i ∈ {1, 2}. If
1. maxWTSLECi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
2. RLEC1,0 ∩RLEC2,0 = ∅
3. For both i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists an Ri ∈ RLECi,0 such that δRi > c.
Then there exist α∗1 and α
∗
2 such that for α1 < α
∗
1 and α2 < α
∗
2, exclusive cruising
regulation is strictly preferred to combined regulation when {(q′i, q˜′i, ei, ωi, c)}i∈{1,2}
with q′i = (1− αi) qi and q˜′i = αi qi, .
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Proof The proof proceeds as follows. We show that for type of regulation and
each α1, α2 there is a solution to the maximization problem. We then show that
when α1 = α2 = 0 conditions (1) and (2) imply that exclusive cruising regulation
is preferred to combined regulation. Finally, we show that the joint weighted total
surplus under exclusive cruising regulation is bounded below by a continuous function
and joint weighted total surplus under combined regulation is bounded above by a
continuous function at (α1, α2) = (0, 0). The conclusion follows.
Maxima Exist: LEC: Assume α1 and α2 are fixed. Then the price is bounded by:
pmaxi = sup{pi : Qi(pi, Vi) > 0}
and the maximum quantity for which revenue could exceed cost is
Qmaxi = max{Qi(c, Vi)}
Therefore, the maximum vacancy rate is the maximum of the set of vacancy levels
that provide a non-negative profit and the levels of vacancy that is obtainable when
Rνi < R
ν
j :
V maxi = max
({Vi : Pi Qmaxi ≥ (Qmaxi + Vi) c)} ∪ {Qmaxj })
We can restrict the space of possible price and vacancy levels under exclusive
cruising equilibrium to
SLECB = {(p1, V1, p2, V2) : pi ∈ [c, Pmaxi ], Vi ∈ [0, V maxi ]}
SLECB is compact set in R4.
Under exclusive cruising, we require the zero profit condition. The set of price
and vacancy levels that satisfy the constraints is
SLECC = {(p1, V1, p2, V2) ∈ SLECB : δQi pi ≥ c(Qi + Vi + δ αiQi}
The set SLECC is compact and (0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ SLECC ; therefore, since WTSLEC is con-
tinuous in its arguments, the exclusive cruising optimization problem
max
s∈SLECC
WTSLEC
has a solution.
Maxima Exist: ML Under combined regulation, we look at the set
SMLB = {(p1, V1, T1, p2, V2, T2) : pi ∈ [c, Pmaxi ], Vi ∈ [0, V maxi ], Ti ∈ [0, Qmaxj ]}
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Defining : SMLIR and S
ML
IC as the set of points that in S
ML
B that are individually
rational and incentive comparable respectively. We show that each of the set is
closed.
(IR) We want to show that the set of points satisfying A.5, A, or A.7 is closed.
We look at limit points and discontinuities in each of the equations and show that
they will fall into one of the three cases.
Assume (pn1 , V
n
1 , T
n
1 , p
n
2 , V
n
2 , T
n
2 ) are inA.5, A, or A.7, and that the sequence con-
verges to (p1, V1, T1, p2, V2, T2). We show that the sequence is in A.5, A, or A.7.
We look limit points in Equation A.5. The only discontinuities that are relevant
are when Qi = 0; however, if Qi = 0, then we are in case A.7. Likewise for any
sequence of point satisfying Equation A.7, points where Qi = 0 satisfy the Equation
A.7 trivially.
So we need to show the points that satisfy are also closed. First assume Qi = 0,
then Qj = 0, Ti = 0, Tj = 0 so the limiting point is in A.7.
Second, Assume Qi 6= 0 and Vj +Tj = 0, then since Rνi > Rνj , for ?? to hold, Rni > c
for all n, so Rni ≥ c; therefore, we are in case A.7.
Finally, assume Rνi = R
ν
j , then Ri ≥ c, therefore Rj ≥ c. Hence either Equation A.5
or Equation A.7 is satisfied. Therefore, by the process of eliminate the set is closed.
(IC) We break the incentive compatibility constraint and flow conditions up into
three subsets based on how the profit levels compare (Rν1 = R
ν
2 , and R
ν
i > R
ν
j
i ∈ {1, 2}). The subsets where Rνi > Rνj are also broken up into three subsets.
We sub sequentially show any limit point in each subset must be in the incentive
compatible set.
When Rν1 = R
ν
2 , the set of price and vacancy levels that satisfy the flow constraint
is
SMLIC,R1=R2 = {(p1, V1, T1, p2, V2, T2) ∈ SMLB : Rν1 = Rν2 , Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i, } (A.8)
When Rνi > R
ν
j the set of equations that has to be satisfied as
SMLIC,Ri>Rj = Z
Ri>Rj
1
⋃
Z
Ri>Rj
2
⋃
Z
Ri>Rj
3
where
Z
Ri>Rj
1 = {(pi, Vi, Ti, pj, Vj, Tj) ∈ SML : Ti = 0, Vj = 0, Tj = q˜i − q˜j, Rνj < R∗j}
(A.9)
Z
Ri>Rj
2 = {(pi, Vi, Ti, pj, Vj, Tj) ∈ SML : Ti = 0, Vj + Tj = q˜i − q˜j, Rνj = R∗j} (A.10)
Z
Ri>Rj
3 = {(pi, Vi, Ti, pj, Vj, Tj) ∈ SML : Ti = 0, Tj = 0, Vj = q˜i − q˜j, Rνj > R∗j ≤ Rνi }
(A.11)
To show that SMLIC is closed, it is sufficient to show that every limit point of any
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individual subset is in one of the subsets
SMLIC,R1=R2 : The only limit points are when Qi → 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}. If Qi → 0
for i ∈ {1, 2}, we are done; otherwise, assume Qi > 0 and Qnj → 0. Then Rν,nj → 0,
and T nj → 0 so we are in case A.9.
Z
Ri>Rj
1 : If Q
n
i → 0, then V nj → 0, so we are in case A.8. If Qni 6→ 0, and Qnj → 0,
Rvj = 0. Since
{(pi, Vi, Ti, pj, Vj, Tj) ∈ SML : Ti = 0, Vj = 0, Tj = q˜i − q˜j, Rνj = R∗j} ⊆ ZRi>Rj2
all the limit points are in one of the subsets.
Z
Ri>Rj
2 : The same argument applies for Q
n
i → 0 and Qnj → 0, as under ZRi>Rj1 .
Those are the only limit points of interest.
Z
Ri>Rj
3 : The same argument applies for Q
n
i → 0 and Qnj → 0, as under ZRi>Rj1 .
Since
{(pi, Vi, Ti, pj, Vj, Tj) ∈ SML : Ti = 0, Vj = 0, Tj = q˜i − q˜j, Rνj = R∗j} ⊆ ZRi>Rj2
and
{(pi, Vi, Ti, pj, Vj, Tj) ∈ SML : Ti = 0, Vj = 0, Tj = q˜i − q˜j, Rνj = Rnui } ⊆ SMLIC,R1=R2
all the limit points are in one of the subsets. Therefore the set SMLIC is closed.
The set
SMLC = S
ML
B
⋃
SMLIR
⋃
SMLIC
is compact and (0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ SMLC ; therefore, since WTSML is continuous in its argu-
ments, the exclusive cruising optimization problem
max
s∈SMLC
WTSML
has a solution.
(LEC > ML) When α1 = α2 = 0, the exclusive cruising joint weighted total
surplus maximum maximizes the sum of the total surplus of the two locations in a
separable fashion:
maxWTSLEC =
∑
i∈{1,2}
max
(pi,Vi,p2,V2)∈SLECC
WTSi
ωi
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where
WTSi =
∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi)− φi (Qi + Vi)
+ (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi))
and
SLECC = {(p1, V1, p2, V2) ∈ SLECC : Qi pi ≥ c(Qi + Vi)}
Since the solution is separable, by assumption (1)
maxWTSLEC =
∑ maxWTSLECi
ωi
Assumption (1) implies the vacancy rate are positive in both locations. By assump-
tion (2), for any set of price and vacancy levels the maximizes exclusive cruising
surplus, the profit levels are not equal.
The combined regulation problem is given by the maximization of
WTSML =
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi)
− φi (Vi +Qi) + (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi))
)
subject to the constraints Proposition 2. However, by Proposition 2, if pii > pi2,
R∗j = 0, so Tj = Vj = 0; therefore, the constraints are the set of points such that
Qi pi ≥ c(Qi + Vi), which also satisfy pi1 = pi2, V1 = 0, or V2 = 0. This constraint
set is contained in SLECC . Since the function that is being maximized is the same
as the metro level case and since ΠLEC1,0 6= ΠLEC2,0 , the points that maximize the joint
normalized weighted total surplus are not metropolitan-level equilibria. Therefore,
maxWTSLEC0,0 > maxWTS
ML
0,0
(LEC bounded below by a continuous function) Let {(pLEC1 , V LEC2 )}i∈{1,2} be
a set of price and vacancy levels that maximizes joint total surplus when α1 = α2 = 0.
When αi > 0 , the zero profit condition for location i can be restated as
δ Ri ≥ cQi(1 + δαi) + Vi
Qi + Vi
(A.12)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since, by assumption (3), δ Ri > c there exists αLEC1 > 0 such that
A.12 is satisfied for αi < α
LEC
i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Keeping the same price and vacancy level, means Qi is constant and q˜i = αi Qi
is varying continuously in αi; hence, the joint weighted total surplus bounded below
by the continuous function
WTSLB =
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(∫ QLECi
0
pLECi
(
Q, V LECi
)
dQ− c (QLECi + V LECi + Ti)
− φi
(
V LECi +Q
LEC
i + αj Q
LEC
j
)
+ (ωi − 1)
(
QLECi p
LEC
i − c
(
(1 + αi)Q
LEC
i + V
LEC
i
)))
for αi < α
LEC
i , where V
LEC
i , Q
LEC
i , p
LEC
i and are the optimal values when α1 =
α2 = 0.
(ML bounded above by a continuous function) We apply a variant of Berges
Maximum theorem. The objective function for metro level joint weighted total sur-
plus is continuous in its argument, so if we can show that the constraint is upper
hemicontinuous, it is sufficient to guarantee that the metro level joint total surplus
is bounded above by a continuous function.
Let αn1 , α
n
2 → (0, 0), and let
βn = (pn1 , V
n
1 , T
n
1 , p
n
2 , V
n
2 , T
n
2 )
be a sequence of points that satisfies the metropolitan level constraint. We show
that, if βn → β where
β = (p1, V1, T1, p2, V2, T2)
then it also satisfies the metropolitan level constraints. We divide the proof up into
subsequences that satisfy one case of proposition 2. Since any convergent sequence
converges in at least one subsequence it is sufficient to show that any sequence the
lies entirely in each of the cases converges.
We divide situation up into three cases; Rν1 = R
ν
2 , R
ν
1 6= Rν2 but Ti + Vi > 0 for
i ∈ {1, 2}, and Ti + Vi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}. We need to show that individual
rationality and incentive compatibility continue to hold. When the number of trips
between locations is zero these conditions amount to Rν1 = R
ν
2 or Vi = 0 for some
i ∈ {1, 2}and that Ri ≥ c for all i such that Vi > 0.
Assume, Rn1 = R
n
2 for all β
n, we want to show β. If Vi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, then
R1 = R2, otherwise Vi = 0 for some i. If Vi > 0 by continuity Ri ≥ inf Rni > c.
Assume Rni > R
n
j for all β
n. Then since Qni → Qi, V nj < αi Qi → 0, therefore
Vj = 0. Since the IR constraint is satisfied, R
n
i > c; therefore the outcome satisfies
the metropolitan level constraint.
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Assume Ti +Vi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}. If Vi = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the outcome
satisfies the metropolitan level constraints trivially. Otherwise let i be the location
with Vi > 0, then Ri ≥ inf Rni > c.
Hence, the assumptions of the theorem are satisfied and the metropolitan level
surplus is bounded above by a continuous function.
Comparing bounds As a result there will be a neighborhood of (α1, α2) = (0, 0)
such that the bound on the exclusive cruising regulation will be above the bound on
the metro level regulation. In this neighborhood, exclusive cruising regulation will
be preferred. Therefore, for some positive values of α1 and α2 in a neighborhood of
(0, 0), local exclusive cursing regulations will be preferred.
Proposition 4 There exist environments {(qi(), q˜i(), φi, ωi, c, δ)}i∈{1,2} with q˜i() > 0
whenever qi( ) > 0 such that exclusive cruising regulation is preferred to combined
regulation when the only factor that differs between the locations is:
1. The externality at the locations
2. The regulators weighting on driver profit
3. The demand function
Proof We show that for each of the cases, we can find outcomes that lead to local
the exclusive cruising equilibrium being preferred when the number of trips between
location is zero and use the lemma to extend the results to demand functions with
positive trips between locations.
We use simulations to show the existence of demand functions such that the profit
is not equal at the exclusive cruising surplus maximizing price and vacancy levels.
When this occurs exclusive cruising regulation is preferred to metropolitan-level rev-
enue. We do this using a series of examples. Case 1 shows an example where the
externalities differ, Case 2 shows an example where the preferences towards revenue
differs. Case 3a shows an example where each location has the same positive exter-
nality, has different demand functions, and different profit levels. Case 3b shows an
example where each location has the same preference towards revenue, has different
demand functions, and different profit levels. The examples are shown in the table
below. The examples use a cost c = 1, and in each case, a discount rate can be
chosen such that δ Rνi > c.
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Case 1/2: Differing Externality/Preference to Profit
Case 1 Case 2
Location 1 Location 2 Location 1 Location 2
p1 = 12− p2 = 12− p1 = 2.5− p2 = 2.5−
q1 − 18
V1
q2 − 18
V2
0.001q1 − 30
v1
0.001q2 − 30
v2
ei 2 3 0 0
ωi 1 1 1.4 1.6
Rνi 1.5 1.6 1.11 1.16
Case 3: Different Demands
Case 3a Case 3b
Location 1 Location 2 Location 1 Location 2
p1 = 2.5− p2 = 3− p1 = 2.5− p2 = 3−
0.001q1 − 30
v1
0.001q2 − 30
v2
0.001q1 − 30
v1
0.001q2 − 30
v2
ei 0.5 0.5 0 0
ωi 1 1 1.6 1.6
Ri 1.29 1.33 1.16 1.31
By applying Lemma 1, the results follow.
Proposition 5 Combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regula-
tions when each location has the same demand, preference towards revenue, and ex-
ternal cost of driving. If, under exclusive cruising regulation, q˜LECi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
the preference will be strict.
Proof Without loss of generality, we can choose weighted surplus maximizing price
and vacancy levels that are the same (p1 = p2 and V1 = V2). The surplus under
exclusive cruising regulation is
WTSLEC =
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi + q˜i)− φi (Qi + Vi + q˜j)
+ (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi + q˜i))
)
By choosing the same price and vacancy levels under combined regulation, the
quantities demanded are the same; therefore, the surplus is
WTSML =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi + Ti)
− φi
(
qi +
1
2
q˜i +
1
2
q˜j + Vi +
1
2
Ti
)
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+ (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi + Ti))
)
=
∑
i∈{1,2}
1
ωi
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi)− φi (Qi + Vi)
+ (ωi − 1) (Qi pi − c (Qi + Vi))
)
Taking the difference gives
WTSML −WTSLEC = 2 q˜LECi (c +
φi
ωi
)
Therefore, metro-level regulation is preferred and strictly preferred when there a
positive number of trips between locations.
Proposition 6 Combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regula-
tions when the external cost of driving is zero, there is no preference towards driver
revenue, and demand for trips to the other location satisfies
q˜i(pi, Vi) = αi Qi(pi, Vi)
for some αi ∈ [0, 1]. If, under exclusive cruising regulation, q˜LECi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
the preference will be strict.
Proof We look at the ”no return” problem with the same aggregate demand, where
all the taxis travel to the same location, and are subject to exclusive cruising regu-
lation. The regulator’s maximization problem for the no return problem is:
WTSNR = max
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c (Qi + Vi)
)
(A.13)
s.t. pi Qi ≥ c (Qi + Vi) i ∈ {1, 2}
The first order conditions on the unconstrained problem are
pi = c i ∈ {1, 2}
therefore, the zero profit constraint binds and Rν1 = R
ν
2 = c. So let (p
NR
i , V
NR
i ) be
the price and vacancy levels that optimize profit when there are no return trips.
If
V NRi ≥ q˜j(pNRj , V NRj )− q˜i(pNRi , V NRi )
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then the flow condition is satisfied. Since Rν1 = R
ν
2 = c the outcome satisfies Propo-
sitions 2 and 3; therefore, the outcome is a combined equilibrium. Since the payoff
under the combined equilibrium is equivalent to the solution to Equation (A.13), the
exclusive cruising problem without the return trips, the joint weighted total surplus
will be higher than under the exclusive cruising outcome. The joint weighted to-
tal surplus will be strictly higher when the trips between locations at the optimal
exclusive cruising regulation is positive.
Alternatively, if this equation is not satisfied, then for some j ∈ {1, 2}
V NRj < q˜i(p
NR
i , V
NR
i )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj )
We look at pi = p
LEC
i , Vi = V
LEC
i , pj = p
NR
j , and Vj = V
NR
j . One of the following
conditions must hold:
V NRj ≤ q˜i(pLECi , V LECi )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj ) (A.14)
V NRj > q˜i(p
LEC
i , V
LEC
i )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj ) (A.15)
If Equation A.14 is satisfied, we can choose pi = p
LEC
i and Vi = V
LEC
i , and
choose pj = p
NR
j , the vacancy level solve the implicit function such that V
X
j =
q˜i − q˜j(pNRj , Vj). A solution to the problem exists since
V NRj ≤ q˜i(pLECi , V LECi )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj )
and
V diffj ≥ q˜i(pLECi , V LECi )− q˜j(pNRj , V diffj )
when V diffj = q˜i(p
LEC
i , V
LEC
i ) − q˜j(pNRj , V NRj ). The solution is unique since q˜j is
increasing in the vacancy rate. Therefore, the set of prices and vacancy levels
(pLECi , V
LEC
i ), (p
LEC
j , V
X
j )
satisfies the flow equation. We show that (si, sj) = (ν, ν˜) is a best response. Here
Riν ≥ c ≥ ν˜, so if the payoff from choosing (si, sj) = (ν, ν˜) exceeds (si, sj) = (ν, T ),
then it is a best response.
Since
∂
∂Qj
WTSLEC = Pj − (1 + αj) c
And since the individual rationality condition for location j is
δpiQi ≥ c ((1 + δαi)Qi + Vi)
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therefore, the constraint binds and Ui.j = 0 and Ui.i > 0. Therefore, since Vi = V
LEC
i
and pi = p
LEC
i :
Ui > 0 Uj ≥ 0
Then
U ν˜,νj = R
ν
i − c+ δ
(
(1− ρν˜jj)Ui + ρν˜jj Uj
)
= (1− ρν˜jj)(−c+ Ui) + ρjj(pj − c+ δUj)
≥ (1− ρν˜jj)ULECj,i + ρjj(pj − c+ δUj)
= ρjj(pj − c+ δUj > 0
since pj > c; therefore, the strategies are best responses.
Define ∆WTSNR = WTSNR −WTSLEC . The difference in total surplus is
∆WTS =
(
TLECj − Vj + V LECj + TLECJ
)
c+
∫ Qj
QLECj
pj(Q, V
NR
j )− c d Q+ ∆WTSNR
Since TLECj > Vj and ∆WTS
NR > 0 this is positive.
If Equation A.15 is satisfied, then take Vi = V
LEC
i , Vj = V
NR
j , and pj = p
NR
j . We
choose pi ∈ [c, pLECi ] such that
1. Rν˜i = c and V
NR
j ≥ q˜i(pi, V LECi )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj , or
2. Rν˜i > c and V
NR
j = q˜i(pi, V
LEC
i )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj
We know such a value exists by continuity sinceRνi (p
LEC
i , V
LEC
i ) > c,R
ν
i (c, V
LEC
i ) < c
, and
V NRj > q˜i(p
LEC
i , V
LEC
i )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj )
If Rνi (pi, Vi) = C and V
NR
j ≥ q˜i(pi, V LECi ) − q˜j(pNRj , V NRj , then Rν1 = Rν2 and
the outcome is incentive compatible, by condition (1) of the Proposition 2. Since
Rνi = C for i ∈ {1, 2}, the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied, and the outcome
is a combined equilibrium.
If Rνi (pi, Vi) > c and V
NR
j = q˜i(pi, V
LEC
i )− q˜j(pNRj , V NRj ), then the flow condition
is satisfied. We show that drivers are playing best responses. Since Rνi (pi, Vi) > c
and Rνj (pi, Vi) = c, Ui, Uj > 0; therefore,
U ν˜,νj = R
ν
i − c+ δ
(
(1− ρν˜jj)Ui + ρν˜jj Uj
)
= (1− ρν˜jj)(−c+ Ui) + ρjj(pj − c+ δUj)
≥ (1− ρν˜jj)ULECj,i + ρjj(pj − c+ δUj)
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= ρjj(pj − c+ δUj > 0
Therefore, since U ν˜,Tj < 0, the drivers are choosing best responses with (sj, si = ν˜, ν).
The difference in total surplus is
∆WTS =
(
TLECj + T
LEC
J
)
c+ ∆WTSNR +
∫ Qi
QLECi
pi(Q, V
LEC
i )
Again this is positive.
Proposition 7 There exist exclusive cruising equilibria where both locations have
the same price level and vacancy rates (pLEC1 = p
LEC
2 and V
LEC
1 = V
LEC
2 ), such that
exclusive cruising regulation is strictly preferred to combined regulation.
Proof The proof is constructive let Qi(pi, Vi) be a demand function such that
qi(pi, Vi) = Qi(pi, Vi) with optimal price and quantity p
∗
i and V
∗
i , and average profit
pi∗i > 0. We will assume that the location has an externality ei and place no addi-
tional preference on revenue. Since the proof of Proposition 4, provides environments
where these conditions are met, we know such environments exist. Let the inverse
demand function be given by pi(qi, Vi) and define
pj(qj, Vj) = α (pi(α qi, Vi)− p∗i ) + p∗i
Then, provided the profit is positive at pj = p
∗
i and Vj = V
∗
i , the externality
is the same and there is no preference placed on revenue, the first order conditions
imply that regulator j prefers the same equilibrium price and vacancy level. The
equilibrium quantity is 1
α
q. Taking α ∈ (0, 1) ensures that Qi is higher and that
profit is positive. The vacancy levels are equal and the prices are equal, but the
quantity is not; therefore, the profit per taxi differs between locations. By the
construction of Proposition 4, this means that there exists a demand function with
a positive number of trips between location such that exclusive cruising regulation
is always preferred to combined regulation.
Proposition 8 When
QLEC1
QLEC1 + V
LEC
1
p1 =
QLEC2
QLEC2 + V
LEC
2
p2 (A.16)
and
Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i (A.17)
combined regulation will be preferred to exclusive cruising regulation.
There exist demand functions such that (A.16) and (A.17) are satisfied but q˜LEC1 6=
q˜LEC2 and U
LEC
1,1 6= ULEC2,2 .
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Proof Choosing the metropolitan-level price and vacancy levels (pLEC1 , V
LEC
1 ) and
(pLEC2 , V
LEC
2 ), implies that the conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied and the
outcome is a metro level equilibrium.
As we showed in the proof of Proposition 6, by keeping the same price and vacancy
levels, and eliminating return trips, the joint weighted total surplus increases.
We can construct an example where nether the number of trips between locations
nor the profit is the same:
Demand c φ α = q˜
Q
p Q q˜ V
Location 1 pi = 5−Qi + 32 − 32 V1 1 1 0 2 3 0 1
Location 2 pi = 5−Qi + 94 − 94 V2 1 13 13 2 3 1 1
By choosing demand of the form
pi = 5−Qi + ai − ai
V1
Qi = 3 and Vi = 1 is a solution to each of the first order conditions.
The first order conditions are
pi = (c+ φi) + αi · φj
and ∫ Qi
0
∂pi(Q, Vi)dQ
∂Vi
=
aiQi
V 2i
= c+ φi
Since the optimal price, vacancy level, and aggregate quantity are the same, and
the flow condition is satisfied, the conditions of the proposition are satisfied. The
equilibrium profit under exclusive cruising differs because the number of return trips
differ. The expected profit is
Ui =
1
1− δ
Qi pi − (Qi + Vi + δq˜i) c
Qi + Vi + δq˜i
This means that the profit is also different.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
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Proposition 9 The first best has no transitioning; therefore, the planner’s problem
can be stated as a solution to the surplus maximizing problem with respect to price
and aggregate vacancy levels:
max
{pi,Vi}i∈{1,2}
∑
i∈{1,2}
(∫ Qi
0
pi (Q, vi) dQ− c ni − φi ni + (ω − 1)(pi Qi − ni ci)
)
subject to Vi ≥ q˜j − q˜i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof We first show Ti = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Let {ppi , npi , σpi }i∈{1,2} be a feasi-
ble solution to the planner’s problem with stationary values {qpi , q˜pi , vpi , v˜pi , T pi }i∈{1,2}
such that Ti > 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}. We show that we can find {p′i, n′i, σ′}i∈{1,2} with
{q′i, q˜′i, v′i, v˜′i, T ′i}i∈{1,2} that has greater weighted total surplus than under {ppi , npi , σpi }i∈{1,2} .
Choosing v˜′i = v˜
p
i + T
p
i , V
′
i = v
p
i + v˜
′
i, T
′
i = 0, and p
′
i = pi(Q
p
i , V
′
i ), and let the
rest of the variables keep their original values. This is done by choosing σ′i(ν˜) =
v′i
Vi
,
σ′i(ν˜) =
v˜′i
Vi
and σ′j = σ
p
j .
Them Q′i = Q
p
i , so
q˜′i + v˜
′
i + T
′
i = q˜
p
i + v˜
p
i + T
p
i
= q˜pj + v˜
p
j + T
p
j = q˜
′
j + v˜
′
j + T
′
j
Since Q′i = Q
p
i and pi(Qi, V
′
i ) > pi(Qi, Vi); therefore,
WTS ′ −WTS =
∑
i∈{1,2}
∫ Qpi
0
pi(Q, V
′
i ) dQ−
∫ Qpi
0
pi(Q, V
p
i ) dQ ≥ 0
Since the WTS increases, the surplus maximizing outcome has Ti = 0 for all i ∈
{1, 2}.
We show that the constraints are equivalent. Assume that an optimal set of
{pi, ni, σi}i∈{1,2} satisfies
v˜i + q˜i + Ti = v˜j + q˜j + Tj
Then, since Ti = 0, v˜i + q˜i = v˜j + q˜j,
Vi ≥ v˜i = v˜j + q˜j − q˜i ≥ q˜j − q˜i
Alternatively, let {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2} be a set of equations that satisfy the inequality in
the proposition (with Ti = 0). Without loss of generality we can assume
q˜i + Vi ≤ q˜j + Vj
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The planner chooses nk = Vk +Qk for k ∈ {1, 2} and
σi(T ) = 0 σi(v) = 0 σi(v˜) = 1
σj(T ) = 0 σj(v) = 1− q˜i + Vi − q˜j
Vj
σj(v˜) =
q˜i + Vi − q˜j
Vj
For these strategies,
Ti = 0 vi = 0 v˜i = Vi
Tj = 0 vj = q˜j + Vj − q˜i − Vi v˜j = q˜i + Vi − q˜j
Therefore, v˜j + q˜j = q˜i + v˜i.
Any other strategies that gives the same {pi, Vi, Qi}i∈{1,2} will have the same
total surplus. As a result, any payoff that can be obtained in the price-vacancy
representation can also be obtained in the strategy framework.
Proposition 10 For a given environment where φi = 0 and ωi = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2},
the first best will not satisfy the no-subsidy condition.
Proof Assume that {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2} satisfies the no-subsidy condition. We show that
the price and vacancy rates do not maximize weighted total surplus. By assumption,
Qi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Assume, without loss of generality, that q˜i ≤ q˜j. Then pi > c
and q˜i(pi, Vi)− q˜j < Vj;. Taking p′j = pj, V ′i = Vi, V ′j = Vj. Since
∂
∂Qi
WTS = pi − c
By continuity we can choose p′i < pi such that p
′
i > c and q˜i(p
′
i, Vi)−q˜j < Vj. Then the
weighted total surplus increases and the flow inequality constraint is still satisfied.
This means that any choice of {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2} that satisfies the no-subsidy condition is
not first best; therefore, the first best does not satisfy the no-subsidy condition.
Proposition 11
1. If, for some i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) > 0 whenever Qi(pi, Vi) > 0, then the first best
is not achievable under exclusive cruising regulation.
2. If, for i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) = 0 for all pi and Vi, then the first best is achievable
under exclusive cruising regulation.
Proof (1) Assume q˜i(pi, Vi) > 0 for all pi, Vi such that Qi(pi, Vi) > 0. Any strategies
that give (pfbi , V
fb
i ), have q˜i > 0; therefore, q˜i,i = q˜i and Tj,i = q˜i,i > 0. Since under
the first best, Tj = 0, the first best is not achievable.
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(2) Assume for i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) = 0 for all pi, Vi. Then choosing pi = pfbi
and Ni = Q
fb
i +V
fb
i for i ∈ {1, 2} induces an equilibrium that achieves the first best.
The equilibrium has ni,i = Ni and ni,j = 0.
Let si,a be a strategy that taxis at location i with affiliation a play in the steady
state equilibrium. By Lemma 4, on page 145, si,i = ν, si,j = T is incentive com-
patible. The number of searching taxis at location i is Qfbi + V
fb
i ; therefore, since
pi = p
fb
i , Qi = Q
fb
i and Vi = V
fb
i . Since si,i = ν and ni,j = 0, Ti = T
fb
i .
By Lemma 4, the discounted payoff is
Ui,i =
Rνi − c
1− δ ≥ 0
the individual rationality condition is satisfied.
Since q˜i = 0, q˜i,i = 0. Since si,i = ν, v˜i,i = 0 and Ti,i = 0. Since nj,i = 0, q˜j,i = 0,
v˜j,i = 0 and Tj,i = 0. Therefore,
q˜i,i + v˜i,i + Ti,i = 0 = q˜j,i + v˜j,i + Tj,i
Proposition 12
1. If the two locations have the same demand and the same external cost, combined
regulation achieves the first best.
2. If, for i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) = 0 for all pi and Vi then combined regulation may
not achieve the first best.
Proof (1) Let (pfbi , Q
fb
i , V
fb
i , T
fb
i ) be the first best price, quantity, vacancy rates,
and transitioning levels.
Choose pi = p
fb
1 for i ∈ {1, 2}, τ2 = 0, and N1 = 2Q1 + 2V1. Then the first best
outcome with ni = Q1 + V1 is an equilibrium with ni,1 = Q1 + V1 and si,1 = ν for
i ∈ {1, 2}.
IC: Since piνi,1 = R
ν
1 − c and piν˜i,1 = Rν1 − c, and piTk,1 = −c, the payoff from choosing
si,1 = ν is equal to the payoff from choosing si,1 = ν˜ and exceeds the payoff from
choosing T in each location; therefore, the strategies are incentive compatible.
IR: Since piν1,1 = pi
ν
2,1, the expected payoff is
Ui,1 =
pii,1
1− δ =
pifbi,1
1− δ ≥ 0
Flow equation: Since q˜1,1 = q˜2,1,v˜i,1 = 0, and Ti,1 = 0:
q˜1,1 + v˜1,1 + T1,1 = q˜2,1 + v˜2,1 + T2,1
(2)
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Since the exclusive cruising outcomes in Proposition 4 are achievable, the propo-
sition gives four examples where combined regulation does not achieve the first best.
Proposition 13 If the first-best outcome satisfies the no-subsidy condition, then it
can be realized using the regulatory exchange market.
Proof Since the first-best outcome has Ti = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, Vi ≥ q˜j−q˜i for i ∈ {1, 2};
therefore, since no-subsidy condition is satisfied, we apply the result from Lemma 2
on page 134. The outcome is an equilibrium with Ni = Qi + Vi, τi = R
ν
i − Rνj , and
pi = p
fb
i .
Proposition 14 The regulatory exchange market is preferred to exclusive cruising
regulation. This preference will be strict provided for some i ∈ {1, 2}, q˜i(pi, Vi) > 0
whenever Q(pi, Vi) > 0.
Proof Let {pECi , V ECi }i∈{1,2} be exclusive cruising equilibrium surplus maximizing.
By Lemma 4, the equilibrium strategies are si,i = ν and si,j = ν˜. We look at two
cases:
1: V ECi ≥ q˜ECj − q˜ECi for all i ∈ {1, 2}
2: V ECi < q˜
EC
j − q˜ECi for some i ∈ {1, 2}
In both cases we find an allocation that has the same price and vacancy rate, but
a lower level of transitioning when one location has q˜ECi > 0.
Case 1: We use Lemma 2. We show that the two conditions of the Lemma are
satisfied. By assumption, V ECi ≥ q˜ECj − q˜ECi for all i ∈ {1, 2}, so we need to show
that the no-subsidy condition is satisfied.
Since UECi,i > 0
Rνi
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) −
c
1− δ > 0
therefore, since
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) ≥ 1− δ
Rνi ≥ c for i ∈ {1, 2}, so the no-subsidy condition is satisfied. By Lemma 2, pi = pECi ,
Ni = Q
EC
i + V
EC
i , τi = R
ν
i − Rνj form a regulatory exchange market with pi = pECi ,
QREMi = Q
EC
i , V
REM
i = V
EC
i , and T
REM
i = 0.
The difference in surplus is
WTSREM −WTSEC =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(ωc q˜i + φj q˜i)
which is positive whenever q˜i > 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Case 2 Let V ECi < q˜
EC
j − q˜ECi . We use Lemma 3 to show that there exists a
regulatory exchange market with pk = p
EC
k , Vk = V
EC
k , and Qk = Q
EC
k for all
k ∈ {1, 2}, and Ti = q˜ECj − q˜ECi − V ECi and Tj = 0.
We need to show the two revenue inequalities in Lemma 3 hold. Since Uj,i ≥ 0,
δ Rνi
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) −
c
1− δ > 0
therefore, using the argument from case 1, Rνi ≥ c.
Since Ui,j ≥ 0
δ Rνj
1− δ ρjj − δ2(1− ρjj) −
c
1− δ > 0
we have
Rνj >
1− δ ρjj − δ2(1− ρjj)
δ(1− δ) c
By applying the lemma, we have the specified regulatory exchange market.
The transition rate in location i falls from Ti = q˜
EC
j to T
′
i = q˜
EC
j − q˜ECi −V ECi and
the transition rate it location j goes from Tj = q˜
EC
i to 0. The difference in surplus is
WTSREM −WTSEC = ωc(2q˜ECi + V ECi ) + φi (q˜ECi + V ECi ) + φj q˜ECi > 0
Proposition 15 Every combined equilibrium is payoff equivalent to a regulatory ex-
change market equilibrium. As a result, the regulatory exchange market is weakly
preferred to combined regulation.
Proof Let a combined equilibrium have {pCi , V Ci , QCi , TCi }i∈{1,2} with strategies σi,1(si).
Assume, WLOG, that taxis that transition at location 2 participate in the regulatory
exchange market (σC2,1(T ) = 0 and σ
C
2,1(T
m) ≥ 0).
Let
ni,a =
nCi n
C
a
nC1 + n
C
2
Then choose τi = 0, pi = p
C
i , and Ni = ni for i ∈ {1, 2}. The outcome is an
equilibrium with ∑
i∈{1,2}
ni,a = n
C
a
∑
a∈{1,2}
ni,a = n
C
i
and strategies
σ1,1(si) = σ
C
1,1(si) σ2,1(s
m
i ) = σ
C
2,1(s
m
i )
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σ1,2(s
m
i ) = σ
C
1,1(si) σ2,2(si) = σ
C
2,1(s
m
i )
The number of searching taxicabs is
nνtoti = ni,i(σi,i(ν) + σi,i(ν˜)) + ni,j(σi,j(ν
m) + σi,j(ν˜
m))
= (ni,i + ni,j)(σi,i(ν) + σi,i(ν˜)) = n
C
i (σi,i(ν) + σi,i(ν˜)) = n
νtot,C
i
therefore, the Qi = Q
C
i and Vi = V
C
i .
Since taxis choose the same strategies regardless of location, the number of taxis
involved each task will be proportion to the number of taxis of each affiliation at
each location; therefore,
q˜i,a =
nCa
nC1 + n
C
2
q˜Ci v˜i,a =
nCa
nC1 + n
C
2
v˜Ci Ti,a =
nCa
nC1 + n
C
2
TCi
This implies
q˜1,a + v˜1,a + T1,a =
na
n1 + n2
(q˜C1,1 + v˜
C
1,1 + T
C
1,1)
=
na
n1 + n2
(q˜C2,1 + v˜
C
2,1 + T
C
2,1) = q˜2,a + v˜2,a + T2,a
Since the pice and vacancy rate are the same
piνi,i = pi
νm
i,j = R
ν
i − c piν˜i,i = piν˜
m
i,j = R
ν˜
i − c piTi,i = piT
m
i,j = −c
therefore, the bellman equation is the same as under combined regulation. Individual
rationality and incentive compatibility are satisfied since they are satisfied under
combined regulation.
Lemma 2 Assume, for a given {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2} that
1. Vi ≥ q˜j(pj, Vj)− q˜i(pi, Vi) for i ∈ {1, 2}
2. The no-subsidy condition is satisfied at {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2}
Then there exists a regulatory exchange market with Ni = Qi + Vi and τi = R
ν
i −Rνj
such that the prices and vacancy rates are (pi, Vi)i∈{1,2}, Ti = 0, and piν1,a = pi
ν
2,a for
all a ∈ {1, 2}.
Conversely, any regulatory exchange market such such that piν1,a = pi
ν
2,a satisfies
Vi ≥ q˜j(pj, Vj)− q˜i(pi, Vi) and Ti = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof Choose
ni,a =
ni na
ni + na
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Then Ni = ni = Qi + Vi. After relabeling as necessary, assume that q˜2 > q˜1. Assign
mixed strategies
σ1,1(ν˜) = σ1,2(ν˜
m) =
v˜1
V1
, σ1,1(ν) = σ1,2(ν
m) = 1− σ1,1(ν˜), σ2,1(ν˜m) = σ2,2(ν˜) = 1
These strategies induce the desired vacancy rates at the price pi, with q˜1+v˜1 = q˜2+v˜2.
We set τi = R
ν
i −Rνj . The single-period profit is:
piνi,i = pi
ν˜
i,i = R
ν
i − c piν
m
i,j = pi
ν˜m
i,j = R
ν
j − τi − c = Rνi − c
piTi,i = −c piT
m
i,j = −τi − c piTi,j = −c
IC: Since the maximal single period payoffs are the same, any set of strategies that
achieves the maximal payoff is incentive compatible; therefore, the chosen strategies
are incentive compatible.
IR: Since the single-period payoff is pii,a = R
ν
i − c in both locations, the expected
discounted profit is
Ui,i = Uj,i =
Rνi − c
1− δ
Since the no subsidy condition is satisfiedRνi−c > 0, and the allocation is individually
rational.
SS: Since Ti,a = 0, the outcome is stationary since
q˜1,a + v˜1,a = q˜1
n1,a
n1
+ v˜1
n1,a
n1
= (q˜1 + v˜1)
n1,a
n1
= (q˜2 + v˜2)
n2,a
n2
= q˜2
n2,a
n2
+ v˜2
n2,a
n2
= q˜2,a + v˜2,a
REM: The exchange fees represent a transfer, since
τ1 = R
ν
1 −Rν2 = −(Rν2 −Rν1) = −τ2
and the regulatory exchange market clears all taxis participate in the market and
n1,2 =
n1 n2
n1 + n2
=
n2 n1
n2 + n1
= n2,1
Assume the single period profit levels are equal, if Ti 6= 0 then σi,k(T ) > 0 and
ni,a > 0 for some a ∈ {1, 2}. When this occurs, taxis affiliated with location a receive
piTi,a = −c with positive probability; therefore they are not maximizing.
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When Ti,a = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}, a ∈ {1, 2}, the stationary flow equation can be
written as q˜i,a + v˜i,a = q˜j,a + v˜j,a. Summing across a gives q˜i + v˜i = q˜j + v˜j. Then
Vi ≥ v˜i = q˜j + v˜j − q˜i ≥ q˜j − q˜i.
Lemma 3 Assume that for a given {pi, Vi}i∈{1,2} that Vi < q˜j(pj, Vj)− q˜i(pi, Vi) for
some i ∈ {1, 2}. Then if
Rνi ≥ c Rνj ≥
1− δ ρνjj − δ2(1− ρνjj)
δ (1− δ) c
then there exists a regulatory exchange market with the same price and vacancy rates
such that
qk = qk(pk, Vk) q˜k = q˜k(pi, Vi)
Ti = q˜j(pj, Vj)− q˜i(pi, Vi)− Vi Tj = 0
for k ∈ {1, 2}. Under this regulatory exchange market piνi,a < piνj,a for a ∈ {1, 2}.
Conversely, any regulatory exchange market with τi > R
ν
i−Rνj , satisfies piνi,a < piνj,a
for all i ∈ {1, 2}. For such equilibrium Vi ≤ q˜j(pj, Vj)− q˜i(pi, Vi) and
qk = qk(pk, Vk) q˜k = q˜k(pi, Vi)
Ti = q˜j(pj, Vj)− q˜i(pi, Vi)− Vi Tj = 0
for k ∈ {1, 2}
Proof By Lemma 2, when τi = R
ν
i − Rνj , Ti = 0; therefore, τi 6= Rνi − Rνj . Take
a general τi > R
ν
i − Rνj . We look at the payoff for each action, considering the
optimal market participation decision when taxis transition. The expected single-
period profit in each location by being affiliated with regulator i and j are
piνi,i = pi
ν˜
i,i = R
ν
i − c piνj,i = piν˜j,i = Rνj + τi − c > Rνi − c
piνi,j = pi
ν˜
i,j = R
ν
i − τi − c < Rνj − c piνj,j = piν˜j,j = Rνj − c
piTi,i = −c piTj,i = max{−c, τi − c}
piTi,j = max{−c,−τi − c} piTj,j = −c
For each affiliation, the single-period profit of searching in location j exceeds i.
We show that the ν /∈ SBRi,k and ν = SBRj,k . Let k, l ∈ {1, 2} such that k 6= l. Let
U sk,sli,a be the payoff from choosing a strategies sk and sl. The continuation value of
choosing strategies sk, sl are
U sk,slk,a = pi
sk
k,a + δ (ρ
sk
kkU
sk,sl
k,a + ρ
sk
klU
sl,sk
l,a )
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Setting ρskkk = 1− ρskkl and simplifying the previous equation gives
(1− δ)U sk,slk,a = piskk,a − δ ρskkl (U sk,slk,a − U sl,skl,a ) (B.1)
Finding (1− δ)(U sk,slk,a − U sl,skl,a ) and rearranging gives
U sk,slk,a − U sl,skl,a =
piskk,a − pisll,a
1− δ + δρskkl + δρsllk
Therefore,
(1− δ)U sk,slk,a = piskk,a − δ ρskkl
piskk,a − pisll,a
1− δ + δρskkl + δρsllk
=
(1− δ + δρsllk) piskk,a + δ ρskkl pisll,a
1− δ + δρskkl + δρsllk
Since
∂Ui,a
∂ρ
sj
ji
< 0
∂Ui,a
∂R
sj
i,a
> 0
ρνji < ρ
ν˜
ji < ρ
T
ji and pi
ν
j,a = pi
ν˜
j,a > pi
T
j,a, the value for Uj,a is maximized when sj = ν.
Then sbrj,i = ν
m and sbrj,j = ν.
Given sj = ν, the maximizing si has pi
sj
j,a > pi
ν
i,a, because (1 − δ) Ui,j is a convex
combination of the pik,a. Since
∂
∂ρsiij
U
si,sj
i,a > 0
and since ρνkl < ρ
ν˜
kl and pi
ν
k,a = pi
ν˜
k,a, the strategy si = ν˜ provides a higher payoff than
si = ν; therefore, ν /∈ SBRi,k .
This result taxis can transition from at most one location. For Vi < q˜i − q˜j for
some i ∈ {1, 2}, the only possible regulatory exchange market has Ti = q˜j − q˜i − Vi
and Tj = 0. For incentive compatibility, we require τi > R
ν
i −Rνj .
We show that there exists a critical value τ cr,ai such that:
τi < τ
cr,a
i ⇒ SBRi,a ∈ {ν˜}
τi = τ
cr,a
i ⇒ SBRi,a = {ν˜, T}
τi > τ
cr,a
i ⇒ SBRi,a ∈ {T}
For each affiliation, we find out what happens as we change τi. The pi
s
k,l are
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continuous in τi with
∂
∂τi
(1− δ)(Uν,Tj,j − Uν,ν˜j,j ) =

δ ρνji
1−δ+δρνji+δρν˜ij
− −δ ρνji
1+δρνji
if τi < 0
δ ρνji
1−δ+δρνji+δρν˜ij
if τi ≥ 0
> 0
and
∂
∂τi
(1− δ)(Uν,Tj,i − Uν,ν˜j,i ) =

(1−ρν˜ij)δ ρνji
(1−δ+δρνji+δρν˜ij)(1+δρνji)
if τi > 0
− 1−δ+δρν˜ij
1−δ+δρνji+δρν˜ij
if τi ≤ 0
When τi = R
ν
i − Rνj , Uν,ν˜j,a > U ν,Tj,a . For low values of τi, (1 − δ)(U ν,Tj,i − Uν,ν˜j,i )
is decreasing in τi over some range and increasing at a constant rate thereafter;
therefore, there exists a unique τ cr,ai for each a ∈ {1, 2}, such that Uν,ν˜j,a = Uν,Tj,a .
We now show that a regulatory exchange market exists in each of six cases. Based
the desired {Qi, Vi, Ti}i∈{1,2}, we find the the outcome will fit into one of two cases,
based on the critical values, and one of three sub-cases based on whether taxis from
both locations transition, and whether the regulatory exchange price is positive. The
cases are:
Case τ cr Ti,a > 0 τ
cr,j
i ≷ 0? Price sBRi,i sBRi,j sBRj,i sBRj,j
1.1 τ cr,ii ≤ τ cr,ji a ∈ {i} τ cr,ji ≷ 0 τ cr,ii {T, ν˜} {ν˜m} {νm} {ν}
1.2 τ cr,ii ≤ τ cr,ji a ∈ {i, j} τ cr,ji > 0 τ cr,ji {T} {T, ν˜m} {νm} {ν}
1.3 τ cr,ii ≤ τ cr,ji a ∈ {i, j} τ cr,ji < 0 τ cr,ji {T} {Tm, ν˜m} {νm} {ν}
2.1 τ cr,ii > τ
cr,j
i a ∈ {j} τ cr,jj > 0 τ cr,ji {ν˜} {T, ν˜m} {νm} {ν}
2.2 τ cr,ii > τ
cr,j
i a ∈ {j} τ cr,jj < 0 τ cr,ji {ν˜} {Tm, ν˜m} {νm} {ν}
2.3 τ cr,ii > τ
cr,j
i a ∈ {i, j} τ cr,jj < 0 τ cr,ii {ν˜, T} {Tm} {νm} {ν}
Incentive Compatibility:
We have shown that sj,i = ν
m and sj,j = ν. The best responses given in the above
table are true based on the definition of τ cr,ii and τ
cr,j
i
Case 1:
Assume τ cr,ii ≤ τ cr,ji . Then if
Qi + Vi ≥ Ti
ρνji
(B.2)
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holds we are in Case 1.1. If the equation does not hold, if τ cr,ji > 0 we are in Case
1.2 and if τ cr,ji ≤ 0 we are in Case 1.3.
Case 1.1 Choose τi = τ
cr,j
i . Divide the taxis up into two groups based on the
strategy of the location that chooses mixed strategies. We can form an ”equilibrium”
of taxis that fall into each of the groups. We will repetitively use the following
equations:
ρ
si,a
ij n
G¯
i,a = ρ
sj,a
j,i n
G¯
j,a (B.3)
and
nG¯i,j = n
G¯
j,i (B.4)
where G¯ is the a specific group.
The group T¯ has si,i = T , so n
T¯
i,i we find n
T¯
i,j using (B.3) with si,i = T and sj,i = ν.
Then we use (B.4) to find nT¯j,i. Finally, we use (B.3) with si,j = ν and sj,j = ν to
find nTj,j.
nT¯i,i = Ti n
T¯
j,i = n
T¯
j,i =
Ti
ρνji
nT¯j,j =
ρν˜ij
(ρνji)
2
Ti
Then
nT¯i = Ti
(
1 +
1
ρνji
)
nT¯j = Ti
(
1
ρνji
+
ρν˜ij
(ρνji)
2
)
The remaining taxis are part of a searching group.
nS¯i = Qi + Vi −
Ti
ρνji
The number of taxis in location j is in group S¯ is
nS¯j =
ρν˜ij
ρνji
nS¯i
=
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(
Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
)
When all taxis at both locations play the same strategies and participate in the
mechanism with certainty, for a given nG¯i and n
G¯
j a market equilibrium in the group
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has
nk,k =
(nG¯k )
2
nG¯i + n
G¯
j
nk,l =
nG¯k n
G¯
l
nG¯i + n
G¯
j
(B.5)
Therefore,
nS¯i,i =
ρνji
ρνji + ρ
ν˜
ij
(
Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
)
nS¯j,i =
ρν˜ij
ρνji + ρ
ν˜
ij
(
Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
)
nS¯j,i =
ρν˜ij
ρνji + ρ
ν˜
ij
(
Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
)
nS¯j,j =
(
ρν˜ij
)2
ρνji(ρ
ν
ji + ρ
ν˜
ij)
(
Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
)
Adding the taxis in each group gives:
ni,i =
ρνji (Qi + Vi)− Ti
ρνji + ρ
ν˜
ij
+ Ti nj,i =
ρν˜ij (Qi + Vi) + Ti
ρνji + ρ
ν˜
ij
nj,i =
ρν˜ij (Qi + Vi) + Ti
ρνji + ρ
ν˜
ij
nj,j =
(
ρν˜ij
)2
(Qi + Vi) + ρ
ν˜
ijTi
ρνji(ρ
ν
ji + ρ
ν˜
ij)
The equilibrium strategies are:
σi,i(T ) =
Ti
ni,i
σi,i(ν˜) = 1− σi,i(T ) σi,j(ν˜m) = 1
σj,i(ν
m) = 1 σj,j(ν) = 1
When (B.2) is satisfied, all of the equations have nonnegative values.
Case 1.2 Set τi = τ
cr,j
i . Only affiliated with j search for passengers at location i.
Taxis affiliated with j that transition do not take part in the regulatory exchange;
therefore, nmi,j = Qi +Vi. The regulatory exchange will balance when, nj,i = Qi +Vi.
The number of taxis with affiliation i will be stationary when ni,i = ρ
ν
ji(Qi+Vi). The
remaining taxis in each of the two locations are affiliated with location j; therefore,
ni,i = ρ
ν
ji(Qi + Vi) nj,i = Qi + Vi
ni,j = Ti + (Qi + Vi)(1− ρνji) nj,j = (Qj + Vj)− (Qi + Vi)
for a regulatory exchange equilibrium with affiliated strategies
σi,i(T ) = 1 σi,j(ν˜
m) =
Qi + Vi
ni,j
σi,j(T ) = 1− σi,j(ν˜m)
σj,i(ν
m) = 1 σj,j(ν) = 1
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When (B.2) does not hold, all of the equations have nonnegative values.
Case 1.3 Set τi = τ
cr,j
i . We start with the searching group. Taxis affiliated with j
search for passengers. Then nS¯i,j = Qi + Vi. From this we find n
S¯
j,i using (B.3) and
nS¯j,i using (B.4). From n
S¯
j,i we find n
S¯
i,i using (B.3):
nS¯i,i = ρ
ν
ji(Qi + Vi) n
S¯
i,j = n
S¯
j,i = Qi + Vi n
S¯
j,j =
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi)
The taxis in the transitioning group are given by
nT¯i = Ti − ρνji(Qi + Vi) nT¯j =
Ti
ρνji
− (Qi + Vi)
Then, choosing
nT¯i,i =
ρνji
ρνji + 1
nTi n
T¯
j,i =
1
ρνji + 1
nTi
nT¯i,j =
ρνji
ρνji + 1
nTj n
T¯
j,j =
1
ρνji + 1
nTj
When
ni,i =
ρνji
ρνji + 1
(Qi + Vi + Ti) ni,j = (Qi + Vi + Ti)
(
1
ρνji + 1
)
nj,i =
1
ρνji + 1
(Qi + Vi + Ti) nj,j =
(ρν˜ij(ρ
ν
ji + 1)− ρνji)(Qi + Vi) + Ti
ρνji(ρ
ν
ji + 1)
A market equilibrium is realized with affiliated strategies are
σi,i(T ) = 1 σi,j(ν˜
m) =
Qi + Vi
ni,j
σi,j(T
m) = 1− σi,j(ν˜m)
σi,j(ν
m) = 1 σj,j(ν) = 1
When (B.2) does not hold satisfied, all of the equations have nonnegative values.
Case 2:
Assume τ cr,ii ≤ τ cr,ji We are in case 2.1 when τi > 0. If τi < 0, we are in case 2.2
when
Qi + Vi >
ρνji
ρν˜ij
Ti (B.6)
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and case 2.3 otherwise.
Case 2.1 When τi > 0, set τi = τ
cr,j
i . Transitioning taxis affiliated with j do not
participate in the market. Therefore, the transitioning group just consists of taxis
from location j:
nT¯i,j = Ti n
T¯
j,j =
Ti
ρνji
nT¯i,i = n
T¯
j,i = 0
the remaining taxis are
nS¯i = Qi + Vi n
S¯
j = Qj + Vj −
Ti
ρνji
The remaining taxis form a market with
nS¯i,i =
(Qi + Vi)
2
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
nS¯j,i =
(Qi + Vi)
(
Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
)
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
nS¯i,j =
(Qi + Vi)
(
Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
)
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
nS¯j,j =
(
Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
)2
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
The outcome will be in a steady state with:
ni,i =
(Qi + Vi)
2
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
nj,i =
(Qi + Vi)
(
Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
)
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
ni,j =
(Qi + Vi)
(
Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
)
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
+ Ti nj,j =
(
Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
)2
Qi + Vi +Qj + Vj − Tiρνji
+
Ti
ρν˜ji
with strategies
σi,i(ν˜) = 1 σi,j(T ) =
Ti
ni,j
σi,j(ν˜
m) = 1− σj,i(Tm)
σj,i(ν) = 1 σj,j(ν) = 1
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Case 2.2 Set τi = τ
cr,j
i . The transitioning taxis are affiliated with location j;
therefore, nTi,j = Ti. The taxis in the transitioning group is
nT¯i,i =
ρνji
ρν˜ij
Ti n
T¯
j,i = n
T¯
i,j = Ti n
T¯
j,j =
Ti
ρνji
The number of searching taxis in each of the locations is:
nS¯i = Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
ρν˜ij
nS¯j =
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(
Qi + Vi − Ti
ρνji
ρν˜ij
)
The number of searching taxis at each location of each affiliation is given by
nS¯i,i =
Qi + Vi − Ti ρ
ν
ji
ρν˜ij
1 +
ρν˜ij
ρνji
nS¯i,j =
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(
Qi + Vi − Ti ρ
ν
ji
ρν˜ij
)
1 +
ρν˜ij
ρνji
nS¯j,i =
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(
Qi + Vi − Ti ρ
ν
ji
ρν˜ij
)
1 +
ρν˜ij
ρνji
nS¯i,j =
(
ρν˜ij
ρνji
)2 (
Qi + Vi − Ti ρ
ν
ji
ρν˜ij
)
1 +
ρν˜ij
ρνji
The number of searching taxis at each location of each affiliation is given by
ni,i =
ρνji (Qi + Vi + Ti)
ρν˜ij + ρ
ν
ji
ni,j =
ρν˜ij (Qi + Vi + Ti)
ρν˜ij + ρ
ν
ji
nj,i =
ρν˜ij (Qi + Vi + Ti)
ρν˜ij + ρ
ν
ji
nj,j =
(
ρν˜ij
)2
(Qi + Vi + Ti)
ρνji
(
ρν˜ij + ρ
ν
ji
) + 1− ρν˜ij
ρνji
Ti
The strategies that give this outcome are:
σi,j(T
m) =
Ti
ni,j
σi,j(ν˜
m) = 1− σi,j(Tm) σj,j(ν) = 1
σi,i(ν˜) = 1 σj,i(ν
m) = 1
When (B.6) holds, the equations are nonnegative.
Case 2.3 We divide the taxis into a searching group and a transitioning group.
The searching group consists of the searching taxis - affiliated with location i - and
the taxis affiliated with location j necessary to balance the market. The number of
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taxes in each location and of each affiliation in the searching group is:
nS¯i,i = Qi + Vi n
S¯
j,i = n
S¯
i,j =
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi) n
S¯
j,j =
ρν˜ij
(ρνji)
2
(Qi + Vi)
The number of taxis in the transitioning group in each of the locations is
nT¯i = Ti −
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi) n
T
j =
1
ρνji
(
Ti −
ρν˜ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi)
)
The number of taxis in the transitioning group in each of the locations and of each
affiliation is
nT¯i,i =
Ti − ρ
ν˜
ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi)
1 + 1
ρνji
nT¯i,j =
Ti − ρ
ν˜
ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi)
ρνji(1 +
1
ρνji
)
nT¯j,i =
Ti − ρ
ν˜
ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi)
ρνji(1 +
1
ρνji
)
nT¯j,j =
Ti − ρ
ν˜
ij
ρνji
(Qi + Vi)(
ρνji
)2
(1 + 1
ρνji
)
Then
ni,i =
Ti + (1 +
1−ρν˜ij
ρνji
) (Qi + Vi)
1 + 1
ρνji
ni,j =
Ti + ρ
ν˜
ij (Qi + Vi)
ρνji(1 +
1
ρνji
)
nj,i =
Ti + ρ
ν˜
ij (Qi + Vi)
ρνji(1 +
1
ρνji
)
nj,j =
Ti + ρ
ν˜
ij (Qi + Vi)(
ρνji
)2
(1 + 1
ρνji
)
is an equilibrium with strategies
σi,i(ν˜) =
Qi + Vi
ni,i
σi,i(T ) = 1− σi,i(ν) σj,i(νm) = 1
σi,j(T
m) = 1 σj,j(ν) = 1
When (B.6) does not hold the value of the equations are nonnegative.
IR: Since τi > R
ν
i −Rνi ,
piν˜i,i = R
ν
i − c ≥ 0
piνi,j = R
ν
i − c+ τi > Rνi − c ≥ 0
Therefore, since Uk,i is a linear combination of pii,i and pij,i, we have Uk,i > 0.
Taxis affiliated with j are indifferent between choosing si,j = T, sj,j = ν and
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si,j = ν˜, sj,j = ν. The payoff will be equivalent to the exclusive cruising payoff.
Using Lemma 4, discounted payoff is
Ui,j =
Rνj
1− δ ρjj − δ2(1− ρjj) −
c
1− δ
≥ UECj,j
UECj,j =
δ Rνj
1− δ ρjj − δ2(1− ρjj) −
c
1− δ ≥ 0
The last weak inequality holds since
Rνj ≥
1− δ ρνjj − δ2(1− ρνjj)
δ (1− δ) c⇒
δ Rνj
1− δ ρjj − δ2(1− ρjj) ≥
c
1− δ
Regulatory exchange market: The outcome is a regulatory exchange market by
construction.
Lemma 4 Under exclusive cruising, The payoff maximizing strategies are si,i = ν
and si,j = T . The discounted payoff is
Ui,i =
Rνi
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) −
c
1− δ Uj,i =
δ Rνi
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) −
c
1− δ
Proof We show si,i = ν and si,j = T . The payoff from si,i = T and si,j = T is
Ui,i = Ui,j =
−c
1− δ
The payoff from si,i = ν and si,j = T , and si,i = ν˜ and si,j = T is given by solving
UECi,i = R
ν
i − c+ δ
(
ρiiU
EC
i,i + (1− ρii)UECj,i
)
UECj,i = −c+ δUECi,i
where ρii is the transition probability implied by si,i. The payoffs are given by
Ui,i =
Rνi
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) −
c
1− δ Uj,i =
δ Rνi
1− δ ρii − δ2(1− ρii) −
c
1− δ
which is maximized when ρii is as large as possible, or when si,i = ν and si,j = T .
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